The Year 2000

PROCEEDINGS

of the

Association for the Scientific Study of Religion

March 4-5, 2000
Dallas, TX

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Editor's Note

This year marks a very special time both for me and the Association for the Scientific Study of Religion (ASSR). It has been both an honor and privilege to serve as the editor for *The Year 2000 Proceedings of the ASSR*. I believe that this year's edition of the *Proceedings* is one of the finest collections of papers ever submitted by our members.

With the arrival of this new millennium, the ASSR is more than just a growing organization. A renewed interest in what we do as a group is gaining both momentum and membership. The quality of these *Proceedings* attests to the fine work which has been accomplished by not only the individuals which have traditionally represented our core, but the efforts of many others who participate and promote our meetings through research, writing, attending our sessions, and sponsorship through both donations and the purchase of this collection. I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who helps to make the ASSR what is has been, what it is, and what it hopes to become.

I envision great things ahead for the organization and hope that all of you who are not already members will join our section. Joining the ASSR is free of charge and all we ask in return is your support and participation in our yearly sessions and helping to make them successful by writing and presenting papers, chairing sessions, and attending the presentations of others. Once again, I want to thank all of you for your support.

I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the officers of the ASSR for this last year. These are the people who, along with our presenters, truly made the Year 2000 meetings possible:

President: Richard Ambler, Southern Arkansas University
Vice-President: Jon K. Loessin, Wharton County Junior College
Secretary: Daphne Wiggins, Texas Christian University
Program Chair: Mark Hall, East Central (Oklahoma) University
Treasurer: Jean Humphries, Dallas Baptist Theological Seminary
Proceedings Editor: Jon K. Loessin, Wharton County Junior College

I hope all of you have a good year and I will be looking forward to your participation in the ASSR in 2001!

Sincerely,



Jon K. Loessin, Editor
Year 2000 Proceedings of the ASSR

A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN SPECIES

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Ever since Darwin's works on the origin of human species, there has been a continual debate as well as ideological clashes primarily between the natural sciences and religion in reference to the topic of human origins. Whereas Christian religious views have taken the position of creation (that God created man in his own image and made man's body from the dust of the earth), the general consensus of science or scientific arguments whether they are derived from biology, psychology, physical anthropology, ethology, etc is that humans evolved from some infrahuman species. This article attempts to focus on the topic of human origins from the unique framework of the sociological perspective and the results in implications which seriously question the validity of evolutionary explanations.

Sociology, defined as the scientific study of human society and social behavior, is indeed an extremely broad and encompassing scholarly discipline. In fact, a dilemma of the discipline is that the goal of achieving or even approximating a full understanding of society and social life seems rather remote. However, as a result of its breadth and scope, the discipline addresses issues or topics that other academic disciplines address and in some cases topics that that seem far removed from the social world. The world does not consist of a reality that everyone perceives or sees in the same way. Each scientific discipline as well as each theoretical frame of reference results in a distinct perspective to bare on a given subject and sees quite different things as a result. The purpose of this article is to present some basic insights of a dominant theoretical perspective in sociology in reference to the topic of socialization, incorporate some existing scientific evidence related to this paradigm, and how the implications of those insights relate to and provide a foundation to intellectually challenge the validity of the dominant academic account of human origins—evolution.

At birth, the human infant is a powerless, symbolless, mindless, self-less being who lacks knowledge of virtually everything and is totally dependent on others for survival for a prolonged span of time. Unlike other species whose behavior patterns tend to be genetically programmed, acceptable behavior among humans must be learned or socially derived. This process through which *Homo sapiens* become "social beings" capable of effectively participating in the social world of humans is referred to as socialization. Socialization can generally be defined as the process of social interaction through which people learn the patterns or ways of life of society (Henslin 1988, p. 441). A result of this social process for the individual is personality acquisition—the tendency of individuals to act, think, and feel in patterned ways (Macionis 1991).

How do human beings acquire mind, self, personality, and learn the ways of life in human society? The most prevalent theoretical explanation within the field of sociology to these

questions is provided by George Herbert Mead, a University of Chicago sociologist and founder of symbolic interaction theory.

Mead initially referred to this approach as "social behaviorism" to indicate behavior at the distinctively human level and to distinguish this perspective form John Watson's "radical behaviorism" in the field of psychology. Whereas psychological behaviorism tends to reduce human behavior to the same basic observable mechanisms of stimuli and conditioned responses characteristic of infrahumans, Mead argued that in addition to overt acts, the social context and covert activity are both necessary in the understanding of distinctively human behavior (Ritzer 1988, p. 292). What differentiates human beings from all other creatures on the face of the earth is the possession of mind and self—uniquely human attributes.

The basic foundation of symbolic interactionism can be found in Mead's book entitled Mind, Self and Society (1934). However, the logical order of Mead's thinking was not mind, self, society, but rather "society, mind and self." Although some interactionists might assert that order should be society, self, and mind (Meltzer 1978), it is nevertheless clear that from Mead's position, "society is prior to the mind and self." This insight is pointed out by many sociologists in attempting to cover Mead's position. For example, Cuzzort and King have pointed out that "Society, Mead argued, precedes the individual" (1988, p.126). Sociologists Turner and Beeghley stated that "Mead stressed that mind is not inborn, but must be learned by virtue of interaction with others in society. Without the prior existence of society, or organized or ongoing activity, mind could not emerge in an individual" (1981, p. 499). Sociologists Reiss and Lee point out that Mead's basic premise is that "the individual (*Homo sapien*) requires social interaction in order to become a fully developed (mind and self) human being" (1988, p. 50). In other words, the presence of a symbol-using creature is a "necessary condition" or a universal requirement for the genesis of mind and self to come into existence within an individual. The basic reason why a social context of a symbol-using creature is essential is because mind and self require the acquisition of symbols, which no human being possesses at birth.

According to Mead, humans are socialized into human society and the social world through role taking and role-playing. Whereas the latter refers to overt observable social behavior, the former refers to a covert socially based mental process through which an individual cognitively places himself/herself in the position of another. Through role taking, the child begins to realize that the "noises" others are making are not just noises, but symbols with attached agreed-upon meanings. Thus, it is through role taking with symbol-using humans that the child aquires language—a prerequisite for "mind."

The human being is not only lacking symbols at birth, but also a self. The genesis of the self is also the result of role taking with symbol-using humans. The "self" refers to a person's symbolic representation of himself/herself as an object in the world of experience. To Mead, having a self means that a human being can act socially toward himself/herself as an object in the world of experience just as one can act socially toward other human objects in his/her social world. Just as the individual can be proud of Jane, ashamed of Jill, love Amy, the individual can love himself, hate himself, or be proud of himself, etc. Initially, in order to view oneself as an object, one needs to place oneself mentally in the position of another which in turn provides the means of getting out of oneself and thus viewing oneself as an object. By role taking, the child begins to view himself as an object from the standpoint of those he/she is role taking with. By role taking with others, the child not only acquires symbols and the meaning these symbols have—beliefs, values, normative expectations, statuses, roles, material objects, etc.—but also sees himself as an object and internalizes the denotative and evaluative meanings others attach to

this object in the social world. The reflexive or social nature of the self can be indicated by the fact that the individual is symbolically two in one—that is both the subject and the object to himself simultaneously (Mead 1934, p.136 & 137). Mead, quite understandably, took the position that "there can be no self apart from society, no consciousness of self and no communication" (Coser 1977, p.334). The self "arises only in social experience" (Collins 1985, p.195).

Just as humans at birth are symbolless and selfless, they are also mindless, and the creation of the mind within the individual is also the result of role taking and social interaction with symbol using humans. Mind is distinct and separate from the concept of brain. Whereas the latter refers to the physiological material matter, the former refers to the ability to think through the medium of complex symbols or a human language. Just as self emerges out of social processes, mind is also a product of the social process of interaction. In essence, Mead viewed mind and self as twin emergents in the social process and mind as "constituting (in a very important sense) the self in action: (Meltzer 1978, p. 20). Just as the reflexive quality (being both subject and object) points to the social nature of the self, to engage in thinking or minded behavior also requires this social or dual nature. In order to think (talk to oneself) or engage in "minded behavior," one must be both the subject initiating the communication and the object receiving the communication. Thus, although a human being is physically one entity, to engage in minded behavior requires the ability to symbolically be two in one (subject and object). To Mead, the mind is not only socially in function, but social in origin—the result on importing within the individual the social process of interaction. As pointed out by Westby, to Mead "mind is the symbolic internalization of the social process (1991, p. 453 & Meltzer 1978).

As a result of taking a sociological perspective rather than an individualistic psychological orientation, Mead was able to contribute profound insights into an understanding of our humanity. Mead was critical of previous theories in that they presupposed the existence of mind and "failed to identify the processes through which mind and self appeared" (Mardindale 1981, p. 330). As Bernard N. Meltzer has stated, by "adopting a distinctly sociological perspective, he (Mead) helped direct attention to the fact that mind and self are not biologically given, but are social emergents" (1978, p. 26).

Peter Berger has appropriately contended that sociological consciousness incorporates within it a debunking motif, i.e. that the sociologist is "compelled by what he is doing to fly in the face of what those around him take for granted" (Berger 1963). As Richard Clayton has asserted, "sociologists on most campuses are more likely than their colleagues in others disciplines to be highly critical of the 'sacred cows' of society' (p. 9). Although it may be debatable the extend to which the scholarly view of humans as an evolved species constitutes a "sacred object" in higher education, it does seem to be, at a minimum, an explanation that is often "taken for granted" in the academic world. However, those academic disciplines which have arrived at and perpetuate such conclusions as biology, psychology (especially comparative), anthropology (especially physical), and ethnology tend to ignore, as a result of their perspectives, the social nature of humanity. In contrast, the orientation of sociology focuses attention on the social nature of human beings and as a result sheds light from a logical and empirical standpoint that is not only inconsistent with the logic of evolutionary thought on human origins but to a significant extent challenges the validity of explanations.

There seems to be two basic general orientations in evolutionary thought to account for the origin of human species. The most prevalent perspective, referred to as the modern synthetic theory of evolution by Dobzhansky asserts that these biological changes which eventually lead to

the rise of *Homo sapiens* occurred very gradually and have taken place over many centuries. This evolutionary model of human origins presumes that humans evolve either from apes or that both humans and apes emerged from common apelike ancestors. Evolutionists view an early precursor of modern man to be australopithecines which date back three million years. As a result of genetic mutations and natural selection, evolutionary processes gave birth to Homo Erectus, Neanderthal, and eventually the rise of *Homo sapiens* or modern man. The basis used for this sequential order primarily includes the dating of fossils, posture, dental patterns, and cranial capacity (Sanderson 1991).

A major transition that these evolutionary theorists must somehow account for is the origin of language among humans. Whereas infrahumans systems of communication are based on natural signs where the intended meaning is genetically fixed or rigidly predetermined, human communication is based on symbols in which meanings are arbitrarily determined by the user, require interpretation by the receiver, and must be learned. Taking an evolutionary framework to control their thought processes, Hacket and Ascher (Sanderson 1991) have speculated as to the possible gradual development of a genuine language that may have taken place over a million years or so. Although there is little consensus on how language first arose as well as when this initially occurred, evolutionary theory takes the position that as a result of genetic mutations, the biological precursors to modern mankind moved from a state in which the content of communication between species members was biologically programmed such that each species member was genetically endowed with the ability to communicate effectively to other members as a result of biological inheritance. This evolutionary process gradually moved to the state of modern man where virtually all content of communication is socially derived from interaction with others and requires interpretation as to the meaning of the content being communicated.

If this evolutionary perspective is an accurate depiction of reality as opposed to mere speculation, then one would logically expect to observe the existence of various biological species along the continuum as supportive evidence for their position. More specifically, we would expect to find, at least among our very closest biological relatives, a species in which a significant amount of basic communicative content is learned rather than unlearned or genetically bestowed and in the form of symbols requiring interpretation. Although this is indeed a very logical expectation from this version of evolutionary theory, this probable outcome is not verified in the current research with infrahuman species closest to humans. Observation of apes, supposedly our closest living relatives, reveals that the basic sounds of ape communication are unlearned. An observational research study that has conclusively proven this was conducted by Boutan who reared an ape for the first five years of its life in complete total isolation from other apes. Without the presence of other apes, he "uttered the same cries as those made by other apes" (Lindsmith, Strauss, & Denzin 1991, p. 37).

Because of the presumed ancestral closeness of monkeys and apes to our species, a number of psychologists have attempted to teach chimpanzees human language. Due to their physiological structure, they cannot learn to verbally communicate as humans do as a number of attempts by psychologists have clearly demonstrated (Lindsmith, Strauss, & Denzin 1999). Although most attempts at teaching these infrahumans sign language have failed, a few efforts by psychologists have been partially successful. For example, after years of training, developmental psychologist Penny Patterson taught a young gorilla to correctly use 500 words of sign language. Nevertheless, the most successful efforts sharply contrast with the symbolic abilities of humans. Psychologist H. S. Terrance, in an attempt to disprove the position of symbolic interactionists that language is a uniquely human capacity, concluded after four years

of teaching a chimp who learned 128 signs, that these animals are not learning human language, but instead behaviors that are associated with rewards (Vander Zander 1987, pp. 109-112)

Animals that have been trained to learn words are acquiring signs rather than symbols. Whereas the meaning of signs are constant and identified with its physical form and grasped through the senses, the meaning of symbols can be variable in nature, numerous in meaning, and irrelevant to physical characteristics. As Karp & Yoels have illustrated,

> "To Christians, a crucifix has meaning because it represents (or better, re-presents) a historical event, the crucifixion of Christ, which has been designated as a divine event. Whether a crucifix is made of gold, iron, or wood is irrelevant to Christians, who define it as a holy object and respond to it reverently. ...if strangers from another culture, never having heard of Christianity, were to happen upon a crucifix, there is no way that the physical characteristics of the object would indicate to them what it represents. They would have to learn through communication with others. The crucifix also evokes a different response (that is, has a different meaning) for members of groups with alternative religious views, such as Jews, Moslems, or atheists" (1986, p. 39).

Whereas signs are relatively limited to the "here and now," symbols can be used to represent events that occurred 1,000 years ago or expected to occur 1,000 years from now. As a result of this unique ability, only humans have a meaningful "history." As a result of human symbolic abilities, humans are not limited to the "here and now," but can imagine the distant past and plan and anticipate the distant future. With the ability to acquire, store, and communicate through the medium of symbols, only humans, for all practical purposes, posses a culture and all this entails—beliefs, values, religion, government, etc.

It should be noted that if we imagine some hypothetical event and assume for the moment that some psychologist were very successful and able to teach a chimp a real human language, the basic argument which is being stressed in this report would not be refuted. That is, the hypothetical chimp that has acquired symbols and possesses mind and self would nevertheless have been within the necessary social context for mind and self to come into existence—the presence of a symbol using being.

An alternative evolutionary theory, rather than taking a continuous gradual step-by-step approach, asserts that a sudden or abrupt biological modification occurred in otherwise biologically static organisms. Applying this approach, referred to as the "theory of punctuated equilibrium" by Eldredge and Gould (Sanderson 1991), to human origins would postulate that members of some non-symbol using species biologically produced at least one male and one female *Homo sapien*. This argument is logically consistent with the observable qualitative differences between humans and all other creatures. In fact, George H. Mead, being aware of the unique qualitative distinctiveness of humans borrowed this idea of emergent evolution" from biology. However, taking into account the social nature of mind and self, this explanation seems to be even more sociologically untenable—in fact, impossible. That is, these *Homo sapiens* would be clearly lacking the necessary social context (symbol-using beings) for mind and self to come into being.

Regardless of which evolutionary approach taken, one must assume at some point in this process that some species produced another in which the communication system must be learned, but sociological thought takes the position that without a symbol using being for this *Homo sapien* to role take with and from whom to pick up the meaning of symbols communicated, mind, and self will not manifest. If this condition is not universally required for the acquisition of mind and self, evolutionary theories might indeed be plausible explanations of human origins.

All verifiable contemporary evidence, however, supports the sociological position. That is, all cases in which humans were not exposed to social contact with symbol-users resulted in the absence of mind and the absence of self. For example, prior to learning symbols and their meanings, Helen Keller indicated in her own autobiography the personal non-existence of mind and self (Vander Zander 1987, pp.72 & 73). The classic example illustrating this point was Sociologist Kingsley Davis's (1940) case study of "extreme isolation." Two girls, Anna and Isabelle, were discovered around the age of six and neither knew any words or complex symbols but only emitted animal-like sounds. The situation for Isabelle is of particular significance in relation to the issue currently being addressed. She was isolated with a biological human being—her mother who was a "deaf mute." Being in the presence of this biological human being, but a non-symbol user, resulted in Isabelle acquiring no words during her first six years of life. Within eighteen months after her discovery by authorities, she acquired a vocabulary of 1500 words, entered school at the age of nine, and was "reported to have completed high school, to have married, and to have had her own normal family" (Vander Zander 1987, p. 114).

By taking into account the unique social nature of our humanity, sociological thought in addressing the issue of human origins provides insights that seriously challenge the probability of evolutionary arguments. In fact, the uniqueness of sociological thought is clearly demonstrated in the addressing of this topic. Whereas other academic disciplines point to infrahumans as the source of human origins, sociological insights would focus attention away from non-symbol using infrahumans toward a being or species possessing at a minimum the ability to think and socially interact through the medium of symbols. That is, since a social context of symbol-users is universally required for mind and self to emerge, the first humans to acquire mind and self had to be in the presence of beings who think through and communicate through complex symbols rather than non-symbol using infrahumans. Sociological thought on this topic ultimately leads to a being that possesses or has possessed an ability, quality, or power lacking in contemporary human experience—the ability to create mind and self on his or her own.

Now that the logic of this sociological position and evidence has been presented in addressing the topic of human origins, how does one account for archeological finds. As indicated earlier in this paper, there exists a number of archeological finds of species physiologically similar to modern man which resided on the earth many thousands or millions of years prior to the existence of our species. There is also indirect evidence (such as cave drawings) indicating these various species possessed the ability to learn, create, communicate, and think through the medium of symbols. If we completely ignore the social nature and social origins of mind and self, there seems to be an abundance of archeological evidence when fitted into a scheme seems to be strongly supportive of evolution.

It is quite possible, however, that at the time of their origins the members of these species came from or were in social contact with symbol-using beings. The existence of such archeological discoveries indicating symbol-using creatures on the earth is not being refuted. However, there are plausible explanations or interpretations to these facts other than those put forth by evolutionary theories. For example, any or all of these symbol-using species (including *Homo sapiens* for that matter) may have had their original existence from another planet and either intentionally decided to inhabit the earth or for reasons beyond their control were forced to make earth their home. Another alternative account of these finds lies in the traditional Judeo-Christian theory of creation. That is, biblical content from the King James Version implies the prior existence of creatures similar to *Homo sapiens* on the earth preceding the appearance of

modern man (Bible, Genesis 1:26-28). This version of the Bible was incidentally written well before the appearance of Charles Darwin.

There exists a contradiction between the sociological insights and evidence presented in this paper on the one hand and explanatory schemes from other academic disciplines in support of evolution on the other. An evaluation of truth-value of these contradictory positions must be based on the comparative validity of existing empirical evidence. It could be asserted that evidence supportive of the position taken in this paper is more valid simply because it is more contemporary and supported by direct empirical observations. In fact, if ethical considerations were to be totally ignored, numerous controlled experiments could be conducted in which human infants could be isolated from socialized humans and observations made to ascertain whether mind or self is manifested. Such finds would no doubt only confirm what all-existing evidence has already confirmed—the universally required presence of symbol users. In contrast, the evidence evolutionists incorporate to support their position are historical in source and speculative in nature. There is no doubt that genetic mutations occur and in some instances those biological modifications result in an adaptive process facilitating adjustment to the environment and enhancing the survival of such organisms and their biological descendants. At the same time, evidence in support of evolutionary theory of human origins that would be equivalent in empirical support to contemporary evidence that challenges it would be to directly observe a pregnant infra-human giving birth to a *Homo sapien.*

In conclusion, for decades innumerable scholars accepted the fallacious reductionist assumptions that mind is inborn and psychological in nature. The result of accepting this false assumption as truth was to retard or hinder the understanding of the social process through which mind comes into being. In a similar fashion, as long as scholars seeking the origins of human beings continue to neglect or ignore the sociological insights and truths referenced to in this paper (assuming they are correct now and have always been) addressing the social sources of our humanity, contemporary academicians may continue to be as successful in identifying the source of human origins as the alchemists were in their pursuit of discovering the proper combination of elements to obtain gold. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the insights relating to the genesis of mind and self provides additional solid empirical confirmation to the most basic assumption of the sociological perspective—that human beings are, by their very nature, SOCIAL BEINGS (Eitzen 1991).

In conclusion, the issue pertaining to the origin of human species will continue to be a subject of debate and speculation since science constitutes a tentative form of knowing rather than an absolute form of knowing and is therefore unable to prove anything in an absolute sense. The sociological frame of reference presented in this paper is obviously also unable to clearly identify the source of human origins. However, the position taken in this paper, unlike evolutionary thought, would not be incongruent with Biblical accounts of human origins. Put another way, the sociological position presented in this paper in relation to the Judeo-Christian position would probably be defined as very "GOD FRIENDLY."

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DE MAISTRE AND THE DIVINE

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"All civilization rests upon the executioner... He is the horror and bond of human association... Remove this incomprehensible agent from the world, and at that very moment, order gives way to chaos, thrones topple, and society disappears."[1]

---Joseph de Maistre

When scholars consider the social observations of Joseph de Maistre, the problem is often imagining their influence and impact on our world of today. Was Maistre relatively alone in his ivory tower of staunch theocratic dogma or were his words and ideas taken to heart by some that used them in an attempt to change the course of entire societies? This paper will examine the scope of Maistre's works and attempt to demonstrate that the unbending, reactionary perspectives to which he adhered exerted both a great theoretical and practical influence on the evolution of the American political system, the incubus of the nationalist (and even fascist) ideologies, and a historical basis for the development of modern Latin Catholicism.

Some scholars, like the eminent late British historian Isaiah Berlin, share the opinion that Maistre's influence on modern social thought was somewhat limited, having only a remote and perhaps propagandist influence on modern fringe movements. While Berlin acknowledged that many of Maistre's ideas obviously held some sway over the development of twentieth-century Western dictatorial governments, he states that, "his day is done, his world has no relevance to any contemporary or any future issue." Others disagree. De Maistre biographer Richard Lebrun (1988) along with the late Romanian-French philosopher-historian Émile Cioran both believe that his tenets will live to rise again periodically as traditionalist or nationalist movements evolve to combat a world in moral and ethical decay.

The social structure Maistre advocated seems derived from Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* coupled with the Christian tradition. It sounds strikingly similar to the famous sermon embarked upon by Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor in *The Brothers Karamazov* who recited the lines,

> No science will give them bread as long as they remain free, but in the end they will lay their freedom at our feet and say to us: 'Better that you enslave us, but feed us.' They will finally understand that freedom and earthly bread in plenty for everyone are inconceivable together... There are three powers, only three powers on earth, capable of conquering and

[1] This fragment is taken from the most celebrated passage from Maistre's *Soirées du St. Pètersbourg* (1821), usually considered one of his greatest works along with his 1819 masterpiece, *Du Pape* (Fleming, 1992: 10 and Berlin, 1990: 116-7).

> holding captive forever the conscience of these feeble rebels for their own happiness—these powers are miracle, mystery, and authority (Dostoevsky, 1990: 253, 255)

Maistre also seems to have had an influence on some of the ultra-nationalist and reactionary thinkers of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, namely Nietzsche, Pareto, Sorel, D. H. Lawrence, Charles Maurras[2], and several leaders of the European and Latin-American populist movements. There is no doubt however, that Maistre's influence touched the idea of how a society should ideally be structured in a divine, naturalistic manner. The examination of his ideas may help to better understand the foundations of modern political phenomena, from military coups and dictatorships, to religious fundamentalism, anarchism, the militia movement, and even the anti-abortion crusades.

Joseph-Marie, Comte de Maistre is classified today as a French anti-Enlightenment, Catholic reactionary when in fact, he was not a Frenchman at all. He had been born in Chambéry, Savoy in 1753, at a time when the province did not belong to France. His family (who was of French origin) had settled there more than a century before and had made their mark politically but were not among the nobility (Bertrin, 1910: 1). Concerning his birth, de Maistre wrote that, "Destiny had meant me to be born in France, but having lost her way in the Alps, dropped me in Chambéry." To Maistre, France was "the fairest kingdom after the Kingdom of Heaven" (Berlin, 1990: 103). One of ten children, Joseph had been educated by the Jesuits and they, along with his parents inspired him with an intense love of religion and a detestation of eighteenth-century philosophical rationalism. He spent his life discrediting the principles which led to the French Revolution and defending the positions of the counterrevolution.

Reciting anathemas such as, "Everything in the French Revolution is miraculously bad," (Cioran, 1992: 25) de Maistre condemned Protestants as being "the most dangerous enemy of the human race, destroyers whose aim was to sap the foundation upon which all societies rest." Men who lifted their hand against the universal Church, people like Voltaire and Rousseau, were no more than the secular disciples of the great subverters—Luther, Calvin, and their followers. He derided Protestantism as being nothing more than the revolt of individual reason against the sole basis of all authority. Catholics had never rebelled against sovereigns, according to de Maistre, and even in the case of the Spanish Inquisition, the revolt was against the usurpers of the faith, to preserve the minimum degree of stability and security without which no society can survive... (Berlin, 1990: 135-6). To de Maistre, *man* did not exist but *men* certainly had a divine purpose in being. He stated what he believed to be the obvious in his *Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg*:

> It is man who is charged with the slaughter of man... So it is accomplished... the great law of the violent destruction of living creatures. The whole earth, perpetually steeped in blood, is nothing but a vast altar upon which all that is living must be sacrificed without end, without measure, without pause, until the consummation of things, until evil is extinct, until the death of death. (Berlin, 1990: 111)

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[2] Charles Maurras (1868-1952), French politician and theorist, said to have had a great influence on the foundation of Fascist ideology as well as on Nationalist movements in Spain and Latin America. He is discussed more fully later in this paper.

And, sounding remarkably similar to Burke on the existence of the being called *man*, Maistre wrote:

> The Constitution of 1795, just like its predecessors, was made for *man*. But there is no such thing as *man* in the world. In the course of my life I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians... but as for *man*, I declare that I have never met him in my life; If he exists, he is unknown to me (Berlin, 1990: 100).

In fact, Henri de Saint-Simon adopted as the goal of the Saint-Simonian school of thought the reconciliation of Maistre's beliefs with those of Voltaire. This alone heralded Maistre's tremendous influence. Such an endeavor though, proved to be quite an undertaking. Voltaire stood for individual liberty, Maistre for authoritarianism; Voltaire for Enlightenment, Maistre for darkness; Voltaire hated the Roman Church, Maistre liked even its vices and regarded Voltaire as the Devil incarnate. Yet, there seems to be a frightening truth in this Saint-Simonian idea. For though their perspectives may be polar opposites in ideology, their relative ruthlessness and eloquence, steeped in historical analysis creates a shocking reality based on principle, one which certainly has crept into more modern political perspectives, a quality having been inherited by Marx, Lenin, Sorel, Pareto, Tolstoy, and even the authoritarians of the twentieth century (Berlin, 1990: 158-60).

There does seem to be a great association of these ideas with those of Auguste Comte, the professed "father of sociology," who was himself a staunch, royalist, traditionalist Catholic who had attended a polytechnic university and became expertly versed in the merits of science and technology. Comte, a disciple of the Saint-Simonian school (and for a time the close associate of Saint-Simon himself), had actually attempted to synthesize the ideas of de Maistre and Voltaire. On one hand, he was infatuated with the idea of French utopian socialism, on the other, establishing a authoritarian council to usher in a new scientific age where traditional religious values could be applied to the worship of society itself. He termed his new religion *positivism*, of which *sociology* was a part, and offered himself as the only man with the intelligence and ability to lead the world into this new epoch of history. (Collins, 1989: 20-9) While Comte's thoughts of grandeur and generally crazy propositions never had a great impact anywhere in Europe, there is some justification for their impact elsewhere. The nation of Brazil adopted many of the positivist ideas of Comte, even including on their flag the positivist motto, "Order and Progress"[3] (Sugrue, 1996).

While Spencer, Darwin and others believed that *man* had progressed from the simple to the complex, Maistre was convinced that the savages of his day were the result of the "fall of man." Echoing Montesquieu, Maistre writes:

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[3] It can be speculated that for this reason, Brazil has historically been among the most stable capitalist economies found in Latin America with a history based more on democracy rather than authoritarianism. As a nation, it is also today the economic giant of South America, perhaps having had an earlier exposure to Western democratic, capitalistic principles.

> The savage cuts down the tree to eat its fruit; he unharnesses the ox given him by missionaries and cooks its flesh with the wood of his cart. After three centuries all he wants of us is powder to kill others, fire water to kill himself. Thievish, cruel, dissolute, he nevertheless differs from us. We at least have to overcome our nature; the savage follows his; crime is his natural taste, he feels no remorse... parricide, eviscerating his mate, scalping, cannibalism, wild debauchery... What is the purpose of savages in creation? To be a caution to us. To show us how deep man can fall. The language of tribes is not the primitive strength and beauty of a beginning, only the confusion and ugliness of decay. It is the debris of ancient languages in ruins. (Berlin, 1990: 133)

He was not alone in his ideas. In the English-speaking world, supporters of this idea included Richard Whately, the Archbishop of Dublin, along with the Duke of Argyll.[4] Whately's contention was that "no community ever did or ever can emerge unassisted by external helps from a state of utter barbarism into anything that can be called civilization"; in short, all barbarous and savage races are but fallen descendants of races more fully civilized. The Duke of Argyll took Whately's argument one step further, declaring that men have been frequently found "among the woods and rocks" in a higher state of civilization than on the fertile plains, such examples being cited in Mexico, Peru, and even Scotland"[5] (White, 1997: 2). The implication was that weaker tribes, who were sinking in culture either escaped or were driven away by the stronger into more remote and unfavorable regions. This accounted for the great archaeological civilizations of the new world and demonstrated that men who cannot conform to expectations, tradition, or authority, or those who rebel against it see their culture destroyed. As their lifestyles changed, so too did their cultures collapse, down to even their languages becoming crude, childlike, and vulgar.

As Weber had concluded in *The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism* (1904)[6], the worldly asceticism and attentiveness to individualistic values among early Protestants that were intrinsic to Heavenly salvation were instrumental in launching the Industrial Revolution. He had not only become convinced that Industrialism had developed in Europe largely due to the influences of the Protestant Reformation, but among nations in which reformation had occurred were found the earliest vestiges of the industrial economy. The advance of science was naturally a part of industrialism and progress, and certainly was a integral element to Martin Luther's concept of the *calling*. As an unsympathetic opponent of the Enlightenment in general, Protestantism, the new era of industrial

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[4] John Douglas Sutherland Campbell, 9th Duke of Argyll (1845-1913), author of letters refuting scientific endeavor, especially the works and theories of Charles Darwin. Campbell had also served as Governor-General of Canada from 1878-1883).

[5] Referring to civilizations such as the Inca, Maya, and Anasazi who built great civilizations while other tribes maintained a nomadic, less civilized existence.

[6] Max Weber in his work *The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism* (1904), stated that, "Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. This reversal of what we should call the natural relationship, so irrational from a naive point of view, is evidently as definitely a leading principle of capitalism as it is foreign to all peoples not under a capitalist influence"

productivity, and the age of invention, de Maistre commented that, "All intellectuals are bad, but the most dangerous are the natural scientists." He had even told a Russian nobleman, during Maistre's service as Ambassador to St. Petersburg from the Kingdom of Sardinia, that "Frederick the Great was right when he said that scientists were a great danger to the state... Too much, even of literature, is dangerous, and the natural sciences are still more worthless..." (Berlin, 1990: 120-1). Maistre even, perhaps prophetically, proclaimed that "no religion can resist science, except one" (Bertrin, 1910: 2). One celebrated passage discussing his view of science begins:

> One of the inevitable drawbacks of science in every country, and every place, is to extinguish that love of action which is the true vocation of man; to fill him with sovereign pride, pervert him from himself and the ideas which are proper to him, to make him the enemy of all subordination, a rebel against every law and every institution, a born champion of every innovation... (Berlin, 1990: 120-1).

Generally, these sentiments reflect basic Catholic traditionalist thought as evidenced by Robert Merton's (1968) work, *Social Theory and Social Structure*. According to Merton, in reviewing studies comparing Protestants and Catholics, even as late as 1900, Protestants represented without exception a larger part of the student body in those schools which emphasize scientific and technical training, while Catholics concentrate their interests on classical and theological training (Merton, 1968: 645). Numerous studies have also found that unusually large proportions of outstanding scientists tend to be Protestants. In Alphonse Candolle's well-known study entitled, *Histoire des sciences et des savants*, in 1885, he found that within continental Europe there were more Protestant scientists than Catholics, even though Catholics outnumbered Protestants better than three to one (Merton, 1968: 648).

Another contemporary who shared de Maistre's basic views was the French nobleman, Louis de Bonald. Although Maistre greatly admired and corresponded with Bonald, the two never actually met (Berlin, 1990: 101). When Savoy was attacked and occupied by France during the revolutionary period, Maistre was forced to flee to Switzerland, Italy, and Sardinia, eventually accepting an appointment as the Sardinian Ambassador to St. Petersburg. Nonetheless, Bonald was an equally eloquent critic of both science and the industrial era. He longed for the "good old days" of the pre-bourgeoisie era. His admiration of the feudal order was consistent with his despising of the industrial age. Bonald, like de Maistre, concluded that industry was not an independent force that would guarantee peace and liberty. "Agricultural society was, in every respect, superior to industrial society." "The agricultural family can feed and nourish itself—it is not dependent on other men and other social events to assure its continued existence. The industrial family, on the other hand, produces children whom it cannot be sure of supporting, dependent as it is on the vicissitudes of the market..." The agricultural family respects the natural and divine order because the father is the authority, unlike the industrial system in which the father, mother, and children are isolated, and family unity is disturbed. Coupling harsh labor on children (which prevents their education and destroys their health) with discarding the weak and the old who cannot work, the industrial

revolution divides society into hostile classes and factions while agrarianism had unified it (Zeitlin, 1997: 58-9).

The age yet to come was not a reversion to agrarianism but the movement toward a new, exultation of the common man albeit in an industrializing world. It was here where Romanticism was born and where both Maistre and Bonald were required to co-exist.

Though there is little that de Maistre had in common with the undisciplined, emotional, and unstable spirit of Romanticism, there was a curious parallelism between his thought and that of the latter. Both saw the Reformation as the source for rationalism and free thought, both saw the Revolution as the dawning of a new era, both supported a renewed religious unity across Europe, both were inspired by the thought of an imminent spiritual revolution, and each were enemies of Enlightenment and admirers of Medieval Catholicism (Dawson, 1995: 6). Regarding America, yet another curious parallel was emerging-- the view of a society without respect for authority dividing and turning upon itself.

John Adams wrote in *A Defence of the Constitution* that "Democracy, simple democracy, never had a patron among men of letters." He added that, "The people are always expecting to be served gratis, and to be paid for the honor of serving them..." It was an age in early America where the aristocracy still governed, where the landowner was the politician, the taxpayer, and the voter. The constitutional system of government was in place but egalitarianism was certainly not the order of the day. When poets like Whitman and Emerson[7] began to sing the praises of democracy and rejection of the traditional order, a new movement expousing self-reliance, experience, and nature was born. Emerson was the most influential of these "men of letters" and appealed to a variety of egalitarian and innovating impulses common among many Americans. His ideas had much earlier been posited by Tocqueville: the passion for simplicity, the dislike of hierarchy, and the impatience with discipline and restriction. When Emerson made the bold move of reducing God to his concept of the Oversoul, when he appealed to individual judgement, preached growth, change, and becoming, and praised a freedom unfettered by compromise or parchment, he had become a prophet of the revolt against authority. His political theory became increasingly socialistic, as he was well aware of the Aristotelian principle that "men cannot exist without proper community." He rejected individualism for this reason and he shunned materialism and authority to usher in the new age from the "old tenures." Stating that all political systems must be founded upon "absolute right," Emerson designated the personality of the "violent hero" or the "wise man" as the sole authority to establish righteousness. He even appointed John Brown, the fierce abolitionist and butcher of innocent men at Harper's Ferry and in Kansas, the archetype of righteousness. Having been convicted and sentenced to hang, Brown began to compare himself to Jesus, and he was not alone in doing so. Emerson said that he was "the new Saint whose fate yet hangs in suspense but whose martyrdom if it shall be perfected, will make the gallows as glorious as the cross," and Henry David Thoreau commented that, "Some eighteen-hundred years ago Christ was crucified; This morning perchance, Captain Brown was hung... He is not Old Brown any longer; he is an angel of light" (Chowder, 2000: 1).

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[7] Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) was an American poet, essayist, and philsopher who is well-known as one of the founding fathers of Transcendentalism, a philosophy whose central tenet was the "mystical unity of nature," a principle derived largely from Plato, and Buddhist, Hindu, and Persian thinkers. Emerson is discussed more fully later in this paper.

Unfortunately, nowhere did the concept of sin find a place in Emerson's scheme, and such fatalistic indifference to moral considerations and the personal responsibilities in Emerson's thought were not only seen as politically irrational but a dangerous doctrine for a people (Kirk, 1986: 240-3).[8] By eliminating authority in his system, Emerson was driven to create an authority for his system, one based on principle, but never the divine. Exerting compliance through the force of the "violent hero" and "martyr" mimics not only the basis of de Maistre's Christianity but embodies the grandeur of Maistre's own "executioner," the force without which no society can survive.[9]

If Emerson had adopted the idea of the existence of sin, he well may have recognized, like Maistre, that man is corrupt, that his appetites need restraint, and that the forces of custom, authority, law, and government, as well as moral discipline, are required at all times to keep sin in check (Kirk, 1986: 244). As a social optimist ignoring the fact of sin, Emerson, like Rousseau, adhered to the supremacy of benevolent instincts. He long had been ready to discard the "old tenures" and introduce the powers of emotion (Kirk, 1986: 244). But as Max Scheler stated in his work *Ressentiment*, "when the visceral sensations are greatly stressed and intensified, their influence on the vital and communal instincts very often makes the affective impulses change their direction. The latter now turn against their own bearer. The result is "self-hatred," self-torment," and "revenge against oneself." In a word, nations can collapse under governance guided by emotion rather than authority. As one keen French observer of this very phenomenon stated, "a savage who cannot commit vendetta consumes himself, weakens, and finally dies" (Scheler, 1972: 72). If a people cannot achieve social unity and adherence to law and custom through core beliefs, values, and consistent normative structures, they may well turn upon each other and face their own internal destruction.

Of all of Emerson's critics, a Vermonter named Orestes Brownson answered the loudest. Brownson, a long-ignored American thinker with a restless mind, sampled nearly every dissent of these Transcendental times, and in the end, embraced orthodoxy with the fervor of a man who had found sanctuary (Kirk, 1986: 245). "We have heard enough of liberty and the rights of man" he wrote. "It is high time to hear something of the duties of men and the rights of authority." To Brownson, "Protestantism descends through three states: first, the subjugation of religion to the charge of civil government; second, the rejection of the authority of temporal government, and submission of religion to the control of the faithful; third, individualism, which 'leaves religion entirely to the control of the individual, who selects his own creed, or makes a creed to suit himself, devises his own worship and discipline, and submits to no restraints but such as are self-imposed.' In short, "under Protestantism, the sect governs religion, rather than submitting to governance; the congregations bully their ministers and insist upon palatable sermons, flattering to their vanity;" and which assert the universal and absolute supremacy of man. This tendency is fatal to democracy for it stimulates insubordination, disorder, disloyalty, and ultimately, rebellion (Kirk, 1986: 246-7). Constitutions cannot be made, said Brownson, agreeing with de Maistre, they are the product of slow growth, the measure of a nation's historical

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[8] Another helpful source for this notion is found under the subject heading "John Brown" in *Compton's Encyclopedia* (1968 ed.).

[9] In characterizing de Maistre, French scholar Émile Faguet states in his work, *Politiques et moralistes du dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris, 1899: 1) that he was, "...a fierce absolutist, a furious theocrat, an intransigent legitimist, apostle of a monstrous trinity composed of Pope, King, and Hangman... his Christianity is terror, passive obedience, and the religion of the state" (Berlin, 1992: 94).

experience, or mere paper. All of them are generated through Divine Providence, never the deliberate wisdom or will of men. In Europe, monarchy and aristocracy ought to be perpetuated because the entire tenor of their existence is bound within these institutions. In America, the commons alone migrated here, and must struggle to maintain the republic in its purity, strictly obeying its laws, and cleaving fast to its written Constitution (Kirk, 1986: 248). As Brownson wrote:

> Our great danger lies in the radical tendency which has become so wide, deep, and active in the American people. Ceasing to regard anything as sacred or venerable, spurning what is old, injuring what is fixed, setting adrift all religious, domestic, and social institutions, we borrow nothing from the past and ignore the data of experience. We even try and deny that language has exact meaning...We shall not escape from this deluge of change and perilous experiment until we recognize the principle of authority: God's authority. This cannot be apprehended without the Church. As Protestantism and its fumbling offshoots decay before our eyes, upon the mound of dissent must rise the fortress of orthodox belief, without which human sin and foible know no limits, without which, order and justice perish (Kirk, 1986: 249).

This is the great fallacy of revolutions to de Maistre. Though growth and change occur in society, nothing good or permanent has ever been accomplished overnight. All improvisation carries the seeds of its own decay. To change things abruptly and violently becomes the central crime of revolutions (Berlin, 1990: 132). De Maistre rabidly adhered to the idea that violence should never be used for change, only for preservation.

Following the French Revolution, there was actually a revival in religion, or at least a renewed respect for religion. Supporters of the Revolution stated that their intention was never to destroy the Church, but rather to make it a part of the machinery of the new bureaucratic state (Dawson, 1995: 1). This is evidenced by Rousseau's idea of a civil religion, where he could not even fathom a society existing without some form of religious faith (Sugrue, 1996). De Maistre gave no credence to civil religion, and none to Protestantism either, only embracing traditional Catholicism coupled with the governance of the *ancien regime*. He stated once that, "Louis XIV stamped on Protestantism, and he died in his bed, full of years, in a blaze of glory. Louis XVI caressed it, and died on the scaffold" (Berlin, 1990: 137). It goes without saying that because the Revolution in France happened at all, Maistre saw in it some divine purpose. "What we are witnessing," he wrote, "is a religious revolution; the rest, immense as it seems, is but an appendix" (Dawson, 1995: 5).

Though many revolutionaries had hoped to limit the religious function to that of educational institution whose business it was to make men useful and obedient citizens (reminiscent of Marx's decry that religion was the opiate of the people), Maistre saw this movement as a divine calling to rebuild the old order. The attempt to reform faith was in essence a threat against those who would rise up and reclaim the golden age of monarchy, heredity, and Church. He saw the power of a God who destroys to create and erases to write anew. De Maistre regarded the Revolution as the cleansing fire which would purify and regenerate France and restore the French monarchy which would emerge stronger than

ever before. With the fulfillment of these objectives, the divinely inspired wars of the Revolution would have accomplished its work (Dawson, 1995: 4-5).

No word was ever used more by de Maistre than the adjective "divine." Whether referring to constitutions, sovereigns, heredity, monarchy, the papacy, or even war, in short, to any authority consolidated by tradition, the divine was readily applied. The association of the Divine with every moment, event, terror, or custom was de Maistre's forte. Witness Maistre's opinion on human conflicts:

> If self-interest is what men pursue, why do they not form a league of peoples and attain to that universal peace which they profess that they so ardently yearn for? There is only one valid answer: men's desire to immolate themselves is as fundamental as their desire for self-preservation or happiness. War is the terrible and eternal law of the world. Indefensible on the rational plane, it is nevertheless mysteriously and irresistibly attractive. At the level of reasoned utilitarianism, war is indeed all it is thought to be, mad and destructive. If nevertheless it has governed human history, this only shows the inadequacy of rationalist explanations... Wars will not cease, however hateful, because wars are not a human invention: they are divinely instituted" (Berlin, 1990: 121-2).

Burke had recognized the beneficial influence of Catholicism as a preserving force. Tocqueville described its conservative tendencies in American life as well. Irving Babbitt (who was not a supporter of the Roman Catholic faith) wrote that it well might become the only effective instrument for preserving civilization. Maistre had adopted this premise all along.

With the fall of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, and the Jacobin leaders Robespierre, Marat, and Danton instituting the Reign of Terror, de Maistre's worst fears had been realized. The Jacobins began changing France institutionally, even down to the calendar. The year 1792, the first year of the French Republic, became year "one" and even the months were renamed. The brutal Robespierre though, refused to stop the bloodshed even after the enemies of the Revolution (among them the clergy) were suppressed. He was arrested and executed in 1794 and a more reasonable constitutional government was put into place and protected by a young artillery officer named Napoleon Bonaparte. Among the most interesting discussions of de Maistre is his ironic and paradoxical dilemma regarding Robispierre. Though he venomously opposed both the Jacobins and the French Revolution, the despotic, authoritarian control exercised by the French leader and his henchmen was still preferable and admirable in comparison to the man-made rules and human liberties afforded by constitutional democracy (Berlin, 1990: 171).

When Napoleon began his reign in France, Maistre's attitude toward him was curiously ambivalent. On one hand, Napoleon was brutally destructive of ancient values and the enemy of both Pope and Monarch. On the other hand, he maintained an astute grasp of the realities of power and held great contempt for democrats, liberals and intellectuals. De Maistre was powerfully attracted to the man who had restored France to glory, and Bonaparte himself was impressed by Maistre's writings, which he was said to find

politically sympathetic. Even though de Maistre longed to meet Napoleon, he never did, having to follow his orders against it in his role as Sardinian Ambassador to Russia.[10]

Maistre, like Hegel, and in the twentieth century, Oswald Spengler[11], were convinced that they were living in a age that was witnessing the decline and death of a long epoch of human civilization. When Masitre died in Turin, Italy in 1821, his works were not forgotten. In the twentieth century, de Maistre's influence can perhaps be found primarily among the theorists of Nationalism both in Europe and Latin America. Charles Maurras, often considered the precursor to the modern Fascists, attempted to collaborate with Hitler for perhaps the same reason Maistre strangely admired both Napoleon and Robespierre. On the scale of values:

> ...power comes almost highest, because power is the divine principle which governs the world, the source of all life and action, the paramount factor in the development of mankind; and whoever knows how to wield it, above all to make decisions, acquires the right to obedience, and is by that token instrument chosen by providence or history, at that particular moment, to work its mysterious purposes (Berlin, 1992: 170-1).

The Nationalistic movements in Latin America, particularly in Argentina in the twentieth century were intended to be a hybrid between Christian teachings, Greek philosophy, and Roman order. Unlike the Fascists in Italy and Germany, the Nationalists both in Spain, Portugal, and in Latin America remained closely connected to the church. Founded on the Aristotelian dictum of "man as a social animal," coupled with the "world of kings, estates, guilds, and "natural inequalities," the movements sought to defend the "national soul," undertake nationwide moral purification, and prevent the breakdown of the country's spiritual unity. The Nationalists upheld authoritarian rule while opposing liberalism, democracy, and capitalism and communism alike[12] (Rock, 1993: xvii-xx). The Latin American Nationalist movements are of great significance in their relationship to de Maistre and the entire embodiment of French counterrevolutionary thought as these movements lasted well into the latter part of the twentieth century and from time to time manifest themselves still today in less developed Latin nations. While many foreign influences aided these movements in Latin America (often emanating from priests in Rome who doubled as journalists and political activists for the church, and through publications from Spain which documented the historical grandeur of General Franco's *Falange*[13]),

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[10] The source relied on for facts concerning the French Revolution was *Compton's Encyclopedia* (1968 ed.) under the subject heading "French Revolution".

[11] Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) is well-known for his historical work entitled, *The Decline of the West* (2 vols, 1918, 1922) which chronicles the parallelisms in the history of Western civilization to other cultures past. Strangely, little mention is made of Catholicism in the work even though its central theme is the decline and collapse of Western civilization into a state similar to which de Maistre would have envisioned.

[12] It is interesting here to add that practically all of the leaders of twentieth-century Nationalist and Fascist movements in Western society [Franco, Hitler, Mussolini, Peron, Pinochet, and others] were either Catholics or had been strongly influenced by Catholic teachings in their upbringing.

[13] In Spain, the *Falangista* (or Spanish Phalanx), the fascist political party governing Spain after the civil war of 1936-39 which brought Generalissimo Francisco Franco to power. Franco made Roman Catholicism the state religion of Spain.

ideas from French sources were perhaps the most ideological and useful to the Latin-American Nationalists.

The writings of Charles Maurras, himself influenced by de Maistre, were labeled by one Argentine commentator as "romantic manifestations or anti-romanticism." His writings had become popular in Argentina as early as 1920 and upon his death in 1952, Maurras was lauded by Argentine Nationalist leader Julio Irazusta as "the greatest teacher of politics of his time." Maurras' key contribution according to many was to stress that the state should encourage "the multitude of small spontaneous associations and autonomous groups that existed before the state itself and would probably survive after its demise." Maurras was viewed as the Nationalists' Thomas Aquinas (Rock, 1993: 17).

Among other influences on Latin Nationalism with ties to de Maistre's original works included: Georges Sorel, who proposed using myth to create "an epic state of mind" among the general population; Vilfredo Pareto, who characterized society as divided into the "exceptionally gifted minority and the 'mediocre' majority"; and Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo[14], often referred to as the "lay saint of the *Falange*".

In the late nineteenth century, Menéndez Pelayo lead the crusade to restore Spain to its true Catholic "self" and its "providential mission." For Pelayo, it was only through religion that Spain had developed its culture, strength, and well-rooted institutions. For him, the Inquisition had produced, in only two short centuries, some of the purest literature and national solidarity ever seen in Europe. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment, which Pelayo called "the most perverse and ungodly age in history" literally destroyed Spain. The nation and its peoples lost their religion, their language, its science, its arts, "and everything that had made it wise, powerful, and feared in the world" (Rock, 1993: 11).

Menéndez Pelayo stirred the spirit of Spanish culture toward rebirth. For both Spain and Spanish America, a new "apostolic and warrior spirit" would emerge to reclaim the "historic essence of our society" (Rock, 1993: 12). "Saving civilization", in the words of Maurras, meant destroying "Rousseau's optimistic metaphysics," "Kantian idealism," and the "God of the inward conscience" expoused by both Protestants and Jews. It also meant rejecting capitalism and democracy, and especially one of democracy's reprehensible manifestations—feminism. Thought by the Nationalists as a phenomenon created by the United States, feminism had been encouraged to spread pacifism and thus to weaken resistance to American imperialism (Rock, 1993: 21). Even Bonald had recognized that one of the dangers of representative government lay in the opportunity it "offered for foreigners to intervene in [national] affairs" especially, as he couched it, "with their gold" (Rock, 1993: 9-10). Maurras concurred that often in democracies, "the rule of justice was replaced by the rule of gold," which had become the "judge of all thinking."[15] The "rule of gold" was "indifferent, the most absolute, the least responsible" of all possible forms of

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[14] Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo (1856-1912) was a Spanish poet, historian, and literary critic. Regarded as "the superior of all writers who have flourished since the Golden Age of Spain," he found his greatest delight in "devoting all his work to the glory of God and the exaltation of the name of Jesus" (Furlong, 1910: 1). His writings have been closely associated with the rise of Nationalism in both Spain and Latin America in the twentieth century.

[15] Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West* addresses this issue in Vol. 2, Ch. XIII & XIV. At one point sounding dramatically like the counterrevolutionaries mentioned herein, he states of modern money economies and ventures that, "...these machines become in their forms less and less human, more ascetic, mystic, esoteric... Man has felt the machine to be devilish, and rightly. It signifies in the eyes of the believer the deposition of God (Spengler, 1928: [II] 504).

government. Even the French sociologist Gustave Le Bon, who had become another strong influence on the Spanish and Argentine Nationalist movements, stressed that popular democracy was nothing more than mass irrationalism in action, a point strikingly similar to the French conservative writer Hipolite Taine who stated that:

> The life of a people, its institutions, its beliefs, and its arts [represent] the visible thread of its invisible soul. [Each people is] an organism created by the past... Infinitely more numerous than the living, the dead are infinitely more powerful than they (Rock, 1993: 17).

De Maistre, Bonald, Maurras, and their followers in Latin America had all hoped for what has been referred to as a "futurism of the past." As Maurras proclaimed, the "laws of gold" need to be supplanted by the "laws of blood" which would reunite and restore to society a Godly Golden Age (Rock, 1993: 18). It is perhaps no coincidence that the depiction of Jesus on the Cross adopted by most Latin Catholics is the image of a man suffering desperately, bleeding from his wounds, and in need of death. This is precisely the image of suffering Maistre applies to all of mankind. He viewed our society as:

> ...an inextricable network of weak, sinful, helpless human beings, torn by contradictory desires, driven hither and thither by forces too violent for their control, too destructive to be justified by any comfortable rationalist formula. All achievement was painful, and likely to fail, and could be accomplished, if at all, only under the guidance of a hierarchy of beings of great wisdom and strong will, who, being the repositories of the forces of history (which to him is almost God's word made flesh), laid down their lives in performing their task of organization, repression, and preservation of the divinely ordained order; by this act of sacrifice achieving communion with the divine order, whose law is a self immolation which defies explanation and brings with it no reward in this world (Berlin, 1990: 173-4).

There may never be an answer to the scholarly debate about how much influence de Maistre's philosophies have had through history or what ideological roles, if any, similar perspectives may today play in our modern, technological world. One thing seems clear, however. Counterrevolutionary ideas traceable back to de Miastre and others significantly impacted nationalist movements both in Europe and Latin America. Even today, these sentiments still arise from time to time in political dialogue. Witness Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez, the leader of the failed 1992 military coup in Venezuela, who in 1999 was elected the country's new president, quoted just last month[16] as saying, "We're in apocalyptic times, there's no middle ground. Either you are with God or you are with the devil, and we are with God."

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[16] This quote attributable to Chavez occurred in January, 2000 and is reported in the Feburary, 2000 issue of *Latin Trade* magazine.

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GIRARD AND BURKERT ON SACRIFICE AND RITUAL THEORY

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Introduction

Because of the technological cocoon that removes us from subsistent living, the idea of animal sacrifice as a part of religious ceremony may seem to present minds mysterious and far away. Yet the practice of sacrifice was ubiquitous and only gradually has it been removed as an institutional part of society.

Our modern astonishment, echoed in Burkert's and Girard's works, understandably makes modern analysis more difficult and seems to have influenced some premises concerning the social motivation behind the rite of sacrifice.[1]

In the following essay we will look at two works by Girard and Burkert and see where their analysis has led them in this field of inquiry and how that relates to the important concern of social formation. Finally we will provide a critical analysis and our own theoretical provision.

Walter Burkert's *Homo Necans*

For Burkert the central act of sacrifice is the axis on which rides all other forms of ritual and social organization. The one main act of killing, necessary for subsistence, which involves an inherent aggression, manifests itself in ritual behavior and social formation.

> Aggression and human violence have marked the progress of our civilization and appear, indeed, to have grown so during its course that they have become a central problem of the present. Analyses that attempt to locate the roots of the evil often set out with shortsighted assumptions, as though the failure of our upbringing or the faulty development of a particular national tradition or economic system were to blame. More can be said for the thesis that all orders and forms of authority in human society are founded on institutionalized violence.[2]

This is evident in the sacrificial ritual itself, which involves killing an animal. As Burkert mentions, these rites were pervasive throughout the ancient world among the

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[1] "How can the choice of such a victim be perceived as anything but random or arbitrary? How can such a grossly irrational phenomenon pass for rational and legitimate? The answer is within our reach, I believe, but we must be careful. For the truth of scapegoating, our subjective experience hardly exists." Rene Girard, "Generative Scapegoating" *Violent Origins: Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation,* edited by Robert G. Hamerton-Kelly, Stanford: Stanford University Press (1987) 78.

In referring to aggression and violence Burkert states, "Analysis that attempt to locate the roots of the evil often set out with shortsighted assumptions, as though the failure of our upbringing or the faulty development of a particular national tradition or economic system were to blame." Walter Burkert, *Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth,* Berkeley: Univesity of California Press, (1983) 1.

[2] Walter Bukert, 1.

Greeks, the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Babylonians, Persians, Etruscans and Romans and did not escape the religious revolution of Islam. The high point in the life of a Moslem is the pilgrimage to Mecca. The central point of the pilgrimage is the trip from Mecca to Mount Arafat where pilgrims pray from noon until sundown. This is followed by the Day of Sacrifice when the pilgrim himself sacrifices a sheep, goat or camel.[3]

Burkert takes us back to even more ancient times when primitive man's form of subsistence was primarily through the hunt. The conspicuous and patterned placement of animal bones among the Neanderthal and Siberian hunters recalls a similar distribution among the Mycenaeans in a goddess ceremony.

> Much earlier, in the household shrines of Catal Huyuk, there are genuine cow-horns set up in rows or inserted in plaster heads. Upper Palaeolithic deer hunters had attached a reindeer skull to a pole near a place where they used to throw young roes into the water, weighted down with stones—a "sacrifice of immersion." There is a life-size clay statue of a bear in the cave of Montespan, which had been covered with a genuine bearskin, including the skull. Similarly, hunters in the Sudan covered a clay figure with skins of slaughtered lions or leopards, just as farmers in southern Abyssinia did with the skin of a young sacrificed bull. Hermes the cattle-killer stretched out on a rock the skins of the cows he had slaughtered.[4]

All of this suggests a connection between the kill and ritual evolving into the rite of sacrifice. Interestingly, elements characteristic of the hunt and psychological reactions to the kill also manifest themselves in later sacrificial rites through reparation and restitution. For the primitive, anxiety developed over the kill itself because it was a ready reminder of one's own mortality. So apologies are often given to the animal and an assurance of restitution after death becomes an integral part of the rite of sacrifice.

> Hunting concentrated on the great mammals, which conspicuously resembled men in their body structure and movements, their eyes and their "faces," their breath and voices, in fleeing and in fear, in attacking and in rage. Most of all, this similarity with man was to be recognized in killing and slaughtering: the flesh was like flesh, bones like bones, phallus like phallus, and heart like heart, and , most important of all, the warm running blood was the same. One could, perhaps, most clearly grasp the animal's resemblance to man when it died. Thus the quarry turned into a sacrificial victim. Many observers have told of the almost brotherly bond that hunters felt for their game.[5]

But most importantly the sacrificial ritual served to bring about a social cohesion through a sense of community and as a release for collective aggression.

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[3] Walter Burkert, 9-11.
[4] Walter Burkert, 14-15.
[5] Walter Burkert, 20-21.

> The earliest male societies banded together for collective killing in the hunt. Through solidarity and cooperative organization, and by establishing an inviolable order, the sacrificial ritual gave society its form. As ethology has shown, a sense of community arises from collective aggression. A smile can, of course, establish contact, and a crying child touches our hearts, but in all human societies "seriousness" takes precedence over friendliness and compassion. A community bound by oaths is united in the "sacred shiver" of awe and enthusiasm—the relic of an aggressive reflex that made the hairs bristle—in a feeling of strength and readiness. This must then be released in an "act": the sacrificial ritual provides the occasion for killing and blood-shed.[6]

After Burkert constructs his theoretical basis for the origins and evolution of sacrifice he then traces elements in later ritual that are characteristic of the hunt. A successful hunt is accomplished through a violent and aggressive action, which is mirrored in behavioral patterns through intra-specific aggression and war. But only through ritual pattern and performance is latent violence and "collective" aggression released and social order maintained.

Elements of the hunt and the kill and the concomitant violence and aggressive behavior abound in all later ritual. This is where Burkert gives ample attention for the remainder of his thesis. In Greek funerary ritual the wailing, the tearing of clothes, the beating of breasts, strewing one's head with ash, dirt and clay, are all,

> an inevitable group reflex to offer to protect an endangered member against a hostile force by means of aggressive threats. When faced with the fact of death, this reflex aggression strikes out into a vacuum and hence returns in on itself. With no enemy near, the hand raised to strike comes down on one's own head.[7]

Furthermore the hunt and the kill and the resultant aggression and violence reveal a competitive spirit which if unchecked would lead to social dissolution, but through the ritual that diffuses the aggression, order is reestablished. And again dissolution and order are played out as characteristic elements of the ritual format. Thus the wolf motif which represents disorder through wildness and a tearing apart is an integral part of Greek Lykaia and Lykaion myth.[8] The format of order, dissolution and a reordering is especially typical of the Greek New Year's festivals.

> Here, the three parts of the sacrificial action--preparation, "act", restitution-- are expanded into three related festivals that can be characterized as (1) a symbolic sacrifice of a girl; (2) an "unspeakable sacrifice"; and (3) sacrifice of renewal. The rhythm of anticipatory renunciation, followed by the savage "act" and finally, pleasurable gratification, reflects the age-old situation of the hunter. In the city-

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[6] Walter Burkert, 34.
[7] Walter Burkert, 53.
[8] Walter Burkert, 84-93.

> culture, however, it is symbolically transformed into a New Year's festival following a period of dissolution, that is, a breakdown of the normal order. The same structure appears in Dionysiac orgies, almost as an atavistic regression. And, further on, we encounter the customs of fishermen who, although situated somewhere between hunting and city cultures, adapted themselves tot he same tradition. Through changing economic and social conditions, the fundamental structure of ritual remains.[9]

Thus for Burkert almost all aspects of ritual format and much of mythological structure can be traced back in some form or another to the hunt and the kill and to the subsistent situation of early man. Collective aggression is rarefied, order is maintained, social cohesion solidified, through the rite of sacrifice. The elements of death and the kill which represents disorder and the ordering element represented through the organization and cooperation necessary to pull off a successful kill are, as we have just seen, represented in later ritual format as well.

Rene Girard's Essay, "Generative Scapegoating"

While Burkert proposes evidence along ethological, ethnological, anthropological and archaeological lines, Girard, while holding some similar premises, builds his theory largely through psychological theorizing and literary critique. Girard differentiates his meaning of scapegoating from the anthropological category and the Biblical exoneration of sin.

> *The psychosocial meaning.* In popular novels, conversations, newspaper articles, and so on, the victim of victims of unjust violence or discrimination are called scapegoats, especially when they are blamed or punished not merely for the "sins" of others, as most dictionaries assert, but for tensions, conflicts, and difficulties of all kinds. In connection with "scapegoat" in this third sense the English language has forged such words as "to scapegoat" and "scapegoating." In the present essay, I will use these words only when these psychosocial connotations are implied.[10]

For Girard the basis of all sacrificial ritual is persecution. Just as mob violence or persecution is unleashed on minorities the same impulse is thrown onto the victim in the sacrificial ritual. But this violent impulse unleashed is of a delusional nature and is an unconscious and collective action. As Girard mentions whenever individuals are persecuting others or venting anger or discriminating, the action however unjustified is seen as justified.[11]

Girard goes on to show this delusional and unconscious element as manifesting itself in primitive myth and ritual. In the Yahuna Indian myth there was this little boy named Milomaki who sang so beautifully that people came from all over to hear him. But when those that heard him returned to their homes and ate fish they all died. Though Milomaki grew to manhood, because he was so dangerous the relatives of those that died killed him

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[9] Walter Burkert, 135.
[10] Rene Girard, 73-74.
[11] Rene Girard, 78-79.

by cremating him on a great pyre. Nevertheless the youth sang beautifully to the end even while the flames were licking his body and his soul was lifted to heaven. From the ashes where Milomaki's body was burned a great green blade sprouted which overnight grew into the first paxiuba palm in the world.[12]

In explaining the Milomaki myth, Girard attributes the action to a real event where disease may have broken out in the tropical climate where the myth originated and the people in a state of panic unleashed a collective and unconscious revenge onto an innocent victim.[13]

In the Greek myth about Oedipus we see a connection to the act of incest and an ensuing plague for which Oedipus is made to pay. As Girard mentions,

> The causal link between family crimes and "the plague" belongs to the logic of mobs on a rampage. Whenever any of these crimes is mentioned in the midst of mob. . . the collective rage gathers strength and tends to focus on the first available or most visible object. The violent impulse becomes so intense that it silences all other considerations, and the mad logic we see here takes over, the logos of human groups in a state of disarray. The innumerable crimes of sex and violence in the myths of the entire world suggest that the mob and its logic play a role in the genesis of mythology, and the myths themselves seem to confirm that suggestion when they show us, as they often do, the collective expulsion or death of those who supposedly committed these crimes.[14]

Girard further corroborates this thesis with examples from the Jews and foreigners being persecuted for the black death during the middle ages to elements in the Ojibway Indian myth where an anthropomorphic being emerges from the ocean to mingle with humans, but from his glance people die and he is thus made to return. As Girard explains, "This unintended murder plays the same role as the plague in the Oedipus myth or the fish poisoning in the Milomaki myth. This time, there is only one victim, but that makes no difference from the standpoint of the community. The threat is the same as in our two previous myths."[15]

So as we see from Girard, like Burkert, aggression and violence play an important role in the formation of ritual, myth and community. Both authors speak of a collective aggression, but for Burkert the genesis of this aggression comes from the violent and aggressive nature in the hunt itself which in turn lends characteristic elements to ritual and society.[16] For Girard it is the aggressive behavior alone that is generative in the form of persecutory scapegoating which is delusional and unconscious, but which as we have seen reveals itself in patterned ways in ritual format, in myth and in human behavior as well.

> In order to be genuine, in order to exist as a social reality, as a stabilized viewpoint on some act of collective violence, scapegoating must remain nonconscious. The persecutors do not realize that they chose their victim

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[12] Rene Girard, 79-80.
[13] Rene Girard, 80-81.
[14] Rene Girard, 85.
[15] Rene Girard, 95.

> for inadequate reasons, or perhaps for no reason at all, more or less at random.
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> How can the choice of such a victim be perceived as anything but random or arbitrary? How can such a grossly irrational phenomenon pass for rational and legitimate? The answer is within our reach, I believe, but we must be careful. For the truth of scapegoating, our subjective experience obviously does not suffice. As I remarked earlier, this subjective experience hardly exists. We never catch ourselves in the act of scapegoating.[16]

A Critical Analysis Of The Two Works Cited

One of the critical questions for Burkert has to do with the question of historical evolution. Are there ritual characteristics that are carried over from pre-historical times into ancient and even modern times? Or rather does the state of technology, from hunting, agricultural, industrial to informational modes, produce unique ritual characteristics without reference to prior ritual format? The answer is probably somewhere in between.

Concerning the violent basis to ritual and myth, is it generated, as Burkert would maintain, from the hunt or is it a perennial characteristic inherent in the human psyche, as Girard presupposes? Of course violence and aggression as a generative aspect to social structure is not a consideration from a purely functionalist point of view. This of course is Burkert and Girard's objection.

As we have shown, for Burkert the ritual aspects generated from the hunt, which are carried over and which influences later ritual format are the characteristics of flight, tearing apart, frenzied epiphany, the covering of guilt, gloom, and dissolution.

The tearing-apart element in ritual is interpreted differently by the authors. For Burkert the tearing of clothes and self-infliction and the beating of breasts in funerary ritual is a vestigial characteristic reminiscent of animals tearing apart their prey witnessed during the hunt. For Girard it is the hand that wants to strike out in anger, but which because of the diffusive nature of the ritual itself, comes down on oneself rather then on another.

Both Girard and Burkert offer compelling notions about the generative capability to man's violent and aggressive nature. Both refer to a collective violence and aggression that is unconscious. When it comes to the sacrificial ritual in particular it is the victim that at once reflects and diffuses unconscious aggression.

While there is much that is relevant to what Burkert and Girard are saying I think a weakness lies in the "stretching" of their theory. Is aggression and violence the sole generative aspect to cultural formation? First of all we cannot enter the minds of the primitive hunter and know if it is indeed with a violent heart that the hunt is conducted and victims sought for sacrifice. For Burkert and Girard the psychology is that the aggression is unconscious. This of course makes their thesis all the more unprovable, but this is no cause to not speculate. If the purpose of the sacrificial ritual is to diffuse violence and provide order, and the proof of this is in the results, considering the prevalence of violence and war, that assumption requires a closer look. On the other hand the killing of another person is a violent and barbaric act and the institutionalization of that act through

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[16] Rene Girard, 78.

ritualization and communal participation makes one wonder at the violent nature of the performance and the reason why. Burkert and Girard at least provide an answer without skipping the question.

An example of where Burkert stretches his assumption lies in the disorder and order-attained element in the Grecian New Year festivals.[17] To Burkert, in primitive societies, the violence, urgency and aggression involved in killing wild animals and the witnessing of beasts tearing prey apart represent a final form of chaos that was repaired by the communal order necessary to pull off a kill and by the communal meal.[18] That the sacrificial ritual would retain similar elements, such as the tearing apart of the sacrificial victim and the reorganization of the bones, among the primitives, would be a natural next step. But to say the dissolution format in New Years festivals of an agriculturally and commercially based society retain similar characteristics for the same reason is, I think, an over application. Death and disorder on a personal level are always present. As it is on a social level as well. War reminds us of that. As surely it did for the Greeks. The precipitation of disorder because of death, war or economic failure, is an immediate concern that is ritually repaired at any stage of history without reference to a hunting ritual from the dark past, but whose order may be dictated by the unique existential situation of a particular culture with particular technology. This same over application we surely see when Burkert tries to draw parallels between the Dolphin myth and primitive hunting ritual. What is readily apparent is that it was the economic and personal situation of coastal life that dictated the ritual format without reference to a hunting past.[19]

With the Milomaki myth Girard first assumes aspects of the myth are vestigial to a sacrificial tradition (which the myth itself does not propose) but which nevertheless does reveal a scapegoat theme. But when Girard compares the Ojibway tale to his scapegoat model a more tenuous parallel seems to be drawn.

About the Ojibway Indians, who live on the northern shore of the Great Lakes, Levi Strauss offers this genesis myth.

> The five "original" clans are descended from six anthropomorphic supernatural beings who emerged from the ocean to mingle with human beings. One of them had his eyes covered and dared not look at the Indians, though he showed the greatest anxiety to do so. At last he could no longer restrain his curiosity, and on one occasion he partially lifted his veil, and his eyes fell on the form of a human being, who instantly fell dead "as if struck by one of the thunderers." Though the intentions of this dread being were friendly to men, yet the glance of his eye was too strong, and it inflicted certain death. His fellows therefore caused him to return to the bosom of the great water. The five others remained among the Indians,

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[17] Walter Burkert, 135, 154, 158.

[19] Walter Burkert, 196-204. Burkert talks of things being lost at sea and returning destroyed, representing a disorder and the boy-on-the-dolphin motif as metaphorical to order restored. But because there are parallel motifs of dissolution in different ritual formats from different stages in our cultural evolution this does not necessarily indicate that something is borrowed. But rather each culture at different times still grapple with similar conditions, such as death and disorder, with their own unique ritual format influenced by their own unique environmental, technological and cultural conditions.

> and "became a great blessing to them." From them originate the five clans or totems: catfish, crane, loon, bear, and marten.[20]

At this point Girard seems to incorporate many assumptions that are not revealed in the myth itself. First he speaks of the actions of the anthropomorphic being as being murderous, but the myth itself reveals that the killing was unintended and the intent of the being, as Girard himself observes, was not malicious, but if anything friendly. At the most this is indicative of manslaughter not murder. Therefore the superimposition of guilt onto the sacrificial victim, an often-necessary precursor for the successful completion of the sacrificial rite, is not necessary or present. Secondly, the persecutory motive essential to the scapegoat construct is also absent. It rather appears the being that did the harm returns to the deep not because of a violent demand from the human community, but at the request of his "fellows". This is not indicative of a scapegoat impulse, but a commonsense solution that brings harmony to all. In this instance I believe Girard is stretching his thesis when the myth itself reveals something else. Again Girard refers to the need of the community to "overpower" the being, an action characteristic of the violence and aggression necessary in the scapegoat construct. But what is implied is a voluntary departure on the part of the powerful being at the request of his fellows. This is contrary to the necessary relegation of the sacrificial victim to a subordinate role. In this instance the being's power is intact because the decision to leave is his. He is neither bound nor persecuted. Instead what is indicated is that a pact of peace is offered covering a potentially dangerous situation of disorder for which no one is blamed and to which all agree.

Thus, while I believe Burkert and Girard stretch their premises, their works, combined and compared, provide a unique and interdisciplinary insight into the ongoing debate about our ancient ritualistic past.[21] I believe their main contribution is their inquiry into how the human condition itself affects social formation. Because of the multiplicity of aspects involved in the human condition Burkert's interdisciplinary approach, with his emphasis on anthropological, ethnological and ethological consideration is reasonable while Girard's psychological inquiry into violence and aggression a necessary direction.

A Proposed History Of Sacrifice And Ritual

Another thing I like about Burkert and Girard is their inclusion as to the pivotal part psychology must play within this inquiry. The reluctance to use a psychological principle as a foundational aspect for exegesis and to see it, instead, as an understanding that "sheds some light", is demonstrated in Burkert's remarks in his paper, "The Problem of Ritual Killing".

> For methodological reasons, I have so far avoided bringing in psychological considerations or, at any rate, using them as arguments. Psychology is obviously essential for understanding, for our empathy with the phenomena described. Yet continuity of behavior--it's communicative function for creating social solidarity, the hunt and the hunters' customs--

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[20] Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, Boston: Tr. Rodney Needham, (1963) 19.

> can be described without recourse to psychic experience, to the internal motives and responses of the actors involved.[22]

Yet, while the part that tradition plays on behavior, through custom and socialization, towards its continuation and repetition cannot be denied, custom does not account for change. Therefore other factors have to come into play. The perfect example of this is the practice of sacrifice, for at its basis and beyond any theoretical analysis as to its origin or purpose, it still is pure invention. But this begs the question, under what conditions is this invention engendered? While it is hard to accept social evolution for a variety of reasons, among them the lack of a gradual and progressive continuum of change, nevertheless our social and economic structures and cosmologic understandings have changed. One of the main pieces of evidence that change of some kind has occurred is the present virtual absence of ritual sacrifice. One might even venture to maintain that ritual itself is on the wane. From the ethnographic evidence it appears that in most primitive societies a far greater range of aspects to life are ritualized. Not only is social behavior more formalized, but spatial movement is as well.

So why in our modern society is there less ritualized behavior and sacrificial ceremony? Looking at our earliest history may dispel the mist a bit more, on that and other questions.

Burkert seems to have been on the right track when he identified the sacrificial ritual as coming out of the hunting mode of life. That was the state of existence at that time and it is propitious that we start there and ask the question, what might have been the forming effect existence itself may have had on the human mind and the formation of community?

The human animal is a complex thinking and emotive being that have from the start reacted differently to its environment then has all other animals. How humans have handled this "survival situation", or what I prefer to call the "existential situation" since we are talking more than just survival, has surely had some formative effect on behavioral, psychological and social patterns. We will find that cognitive and psychological interactions play a part in the development of religion and the rise of ritual and sacrifice.

What are the facts? First of all within the existential situation we have to look at what is there from the start, and what is not there, and the behavioral propensity to what is there and what is not. What is there in the beginning and which has been proven anthropologically and archaeologically, is that people did live in small groups, they did hunt and gather and at some point, earlier or later, did plant and domesticate. The most prominent aspect in the survival situation that would have needed to be immediately dealt with is the need to live in spite of the things that work against that. From the hunting mode no doubt killing and death were prominent facts of life and one of the first true facts learned would have been that in order for something to live something must die. To live, humans must kill and eat other animals. Animals must kill and eat other animals. One animal must sacrifice its life so that another may live. Therefore the existential situation brings with it, in a prominent way, the element of killing and death. But against death there is a desire to live and because of the desire to live, it is desirable that death dies and like a hunter that overcomes his prey with the kill, death is killed with the idea of life. While life is evident in the existential situation it is in the end overcome by death and since

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[22] Walter Burkert, Rene Girard, Jonathan Smith, *Violent Origins,* Stanford, California: Stanford University

death comes inevitably, it can therefore only be overcome with life after it. Now life takes on the form of continuation and becomes perceptually "spirit" as it is now something not physical and continues without end. Similarly, while life is not seen after death, yet is believed to exist and kills death, it must therefore be likened to something which is not physically evident as death is, thus the association of spirit with air, wind, breath, water, etc. The superlative power of spirit comes from its victory over death. The idea of ancestral beings comes from the same projected and now formulated desire to live and continue in relationships that once were. But at this point we must enter two important elements into the equation.

One of the most universal aspects of primitive thought is the idea that thought and action has an effect that can be projected onto history and destiny. The other universal is the one condition that distinctly and uniquely separates humans from other animals: the vicarious use of everything, from tools to language.[23]

In the struggle against death that struggle is met in every instance with vicarious manipulation: clothes, shelter, tools, weapons, etc. Now, concomitant with death is meaninglessness and the death of fame. Of course the aim is control of the existential situation which is accomplished through "vicarious-use" combined with the idea that thought affects history. This now gives the primitive a means of control against the existential situation through the manipulation of objects combined with formulated action and language that is projected onto the existential situation with certainty as to effect. Thus the rise of ritual.[24] In one respect one could say that sacrifice is an aspect of the mind's desire to order the world in face of the disordering and life-ending elements in the existential situation.

The idea of animal sacrifice again comes from the observation that for something to live something must die and that process is naturally ritualized for effective control and is again projected onto the existential situation. The idea of the empowering attribute of blood comes from the observation that blood, when it leaves a body, causes that body to die. Therefore blood = life. And life, as we have seen, since it overcomes death, is all-powerful, thus blood, since it equals life, is also powerful and has in it the attributes of life i.e. the kind of life that overcomes and exists after death.[25] Thus we have a means of

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[23] On this point Burkert relevantly states, "Our conception of primitive man and his society will always be a tentative construct; still there are some social and psychological preconditions that cannot have been absent from the situation of the early hunters. The primate's biological makeup was not fit for this new way of life. Man had to compensate for this deficiency by a tour de force of ingenious technology and institutions that is to say, by his culture, although that culture itself quickly became a means of selection. Of primary importance was the use of weapons . . . " (Walter Burkert, *Homo Necans,* 17.) In connection to this, the connection of the vicarious-use condition to ritual is evident. But the connection of that condition, transformed into a conceptualized embodiment of continuation, to religion and the ideas of eternity, is also possible.

[24] A concern for control and the key part that ritual plays is especially manifest with the Kwaio who Keesing says, "are more concerned with means than with meanings, with result than with reasons, with controlling than with explaining. The concept of *nanama*-ization gives retrospective understanding of success and failure, good living and catastrophe; and it give hope that by negotiating with ancestors, the living can enlist their powers and solicit their continuing protection." (Robert M. Keesing, *Kawio Religion: The Living and the Dead in a Solomon Island Society*, New York: Columbia University Press (1982) 49.)

[25] The Nuer have some interesting thoughts concerning blood that Evans-Pritchard relates and which seem to affirm what we are here saying. "Human blood has for the Nuer a peculiar psychical value. When kinsmen and neighbors fight they use clubs instead of spears . . . It may be that behind it is the notion that not the same responsibility is felt if the life-blood does not flow as it would from a fatal spear wound—that in a

control, ritual, that results in a projected effect (magic) onto the existential situation which is now infused with meaning when a powerful spirit world also projects effect. Now life has meaning in a struggle against not only the existential situation but in interaction with a spirit world, which is also sometimes struggled with.[26]

Finally, as to the unthinkable advent of human sacrifice. Some have tried to argue human sacrifice is not an extension of animal sacrifice and was there from the beginning. But a review of probable history will reveal that human sacrifice does come later.

In the smallest scale societies which are generally self-contained and removed from competitive contact with tribes of similar culture and language or from dissimilar tribes, there will be virtually no human sacrifice. At this point every member will be important to the subsistence and survival of the tribe and because of that contribution every individual is "valuable". In the smallest scale societies, with existence more precarious and mortality higher, the liability of any member is pretty well taken care of.

At the point that subsistence practices improve and there is greater agglomeration and people mass to a point that without "imposed order" there would be disorder--which requires a coalescence of control--does society become hierarchical and the value of individuals classified; therefore some member's value will be less then others. The evidence for this is abundant. Where there is a higher degree of social stratification human sacrifice seems to be more prevalent. This is evident with the Central and South American empires as opposed to the North American more egalitarian tribes.[27] A higher degree of social stratification and the association of human sacrifice was evident in the Carthaginian state.[28] Sacrificial myths and legends abounded in the stratified societies in Greece and

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sense the man has not taken the life, that the death happened of itself, as Nuer put it. That the Nuer have some such idea is shown by the fact that a ghoul may be killed with impunity, but only if he is beaten to death with clubs and his blood not shed. The blood of a man slain with the spear is moreover thought to enter in some way into the slayer and he must therefore at once have his arm cut by a leopard-skin priest to let it out. This must mean that blood is thought to have some vitality of its own." (E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Nuer Religion*, London: Oxford University Press (1956) v-ix, 213.)

[26] To the Kwaio, as Keesing states, magic is also used as a tool with effect. "Magic is conceived by ancestors, a form of transaction. On the other hand, magic is viewed as one kind of technology, a form of pragmatic action. . . (Robert M. Keesing, 52.)

As Driver points out ritual belongs to what the Greeks called *techne* which is the root for our words technical, technique, technology. As Driver states, "Ritual is a sort of technology because it is a method (a time honored one) for accomplishing something in the real world." (Tom F. Driver, *Liberating Rites: Understanding the Transformative Power of Ritual*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press (1998) 47.)

[27] The anomaly to this is the Pawnee. But the Pawnee were more socially stratified then their neighbors. It is also believed they came from Central America. (Robert O. Legase, Pawnee Society, http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/EthnoAtlas/Hmar/Cult_dir/Culture.7864 (1998)

[28] Shelby Brown maintains that Phoenician and Carthaginian cemeteries "reveal concrete, physical evidence of the theoretical similarity and even interchange-ability of human and animal sacrifices, since both children and animals were buried together and commemorated with similar monuments. (Shelby Brown, *Late Carthaginian Child Sacrifice and Sacrificial Monuments in Their Mediterranean Context*, Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press (1991) 14.)

The translatability of animal and human value is evident throughout. As Davies mentions, "On the contrary, in terms of basic notions that lay at the root of Semitic sacrifice, animals would probably have been deemed purer andmore perfect. If we turn to recent writers who tackle the subject, George Gusdorf (*L'Experience Humaine de Sacrifice*, 1948) also refuses to make a marked distinction between animals and

India.[29] There is close correlation of human sacrifice to kingship in Africa and Hawaii as well.[30] So historically, concerning the human place, we have value, then devaluation and now with democracy, revaluation. But what we have not yet spoken about is the place of ego, communal ego and power, which either causes or is a result of social stratification. . . But we will leave that for later. Suffice it to say that while hierarchical stratification cannot wholly explain the mystery of human sacrifice it certainly opened the door for it.

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human victims. Frequently men and animals were offered together on the same alter, to the same god, to obtain the same favors. Romans, Greeks, Vikings, and Druids, to name only a few, in which man an beast shared a single ceremony." (Nigel Davies, *Human Sacrifice in History and Today*, New York: William Morrow (1998) 20.)

[29] Hyam Macoby, The Sacred Executioner: Human Sacrifice and the Legacy of Guilt, New York: Thames and Hudson (1982) 76-77.)

Uma Marina Vesci, *Heat and Sacrifice in the Vedas*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (1985) 57, 103.)

[30] John S. Mbiti, 177-182.

Valeri Valerio, Kingship and Sacrifice: Ritual and Society in Ancient Hawaii, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1985) 130-171.)

Sagan maintains that in the movement from "kinship to kingship" it is the kingship societies that exclusively practice human sacrifice. (E. Sagan, *At the Dawn of Tyranny: The Origins of Individuality, Political Oppression and the State*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf (1985) 352.

In partial contrast, in a society not as definably stratified as some, the Bantu Kafir of Africa resort to human sacrifice only rarely and then the individual so consecrated is left to wander about in sacred woods until "the gods take him." (W.C. Willoughby, *The Soul of the Bantu: A Sympathetic Study of the Magico-Religious Practices and Beliefs of the Bantu Tribes of Africa*, New York: J.&J. Harper (1969) 362.)

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FACES IN THE CLOUDS

A Critical Analysis and Expansion of Stewart Guthrie's Theory of Religion as Anthropomorphism

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In *Faces in the Clouds*: *A New Theory of Religion,* Stewart Elliott Guthrie advances the thesis that the attribution of human characteristics to non-human things and events is fundamental to religion universally and historically. In short, religion has permanent roots in anthropomorphism, which evolved from animism. In rejecting the claim that religion is fundamentally emotional rather than non-cognitive, Guthrie insists that religion is a special way of interpreting and perceiving the world.

Animism is a perceptual and interpretive strategy for relating to the environment. The philosophers called Rationalists argued that we have innate ideas that are true principles of mind and reality. Kant turned the innate ideas into the twelve categories, which are the mind's knitting needles by which the sense-manifold is transformed into phenomenal objects. Borrowing from Karl Popper, Kant and Guthrie, I suggest that anthropomorphism is an innate strategy for unifying experience under a broad model that gives us a start in interpreting our environment. The emphasis is on *a start* in the thinking and perceiving process. Anthropomorphism is our primordial model or even our primordial paradigm. Far from being a frozen pigeonhole, however, into which we dump our experiences, anthropomorphism is a highly creative and productive function by which we generate similarities, analogies, comparisons, theories, and contrasts. Stated in another way, anthropomorphism is a strategy for both receiving impressions from without and simultaneously giving them configuration and significance.

Because the environment does not always yield to our perceptions of it, however, we are in perpetual need of making revisions as to what is out there. All revisions are the product of what Karl Popper calls conjectures and refutations. When we discover that at least aspects of our conjecture are mistaken, we fall under pressure to modify our previous conjecture, sometimes slightly, at other times drastically. This revision process takes place not only in science, but also in daily common-sense living and even in such realms as myth, theology, and art.

Traditionally, science and religion live at the very least in tension with one another. I suggest that the tension is initially cognitive, although its ethical, emotional, and political repercussions can be profound. Over the centuries science has been in the process of revising the anthropomorphic interpretation of the world so drastically as to generate a rival model on even a rival paradigm. Max Weber spoke of modern science as stripping the world of its enchantment. In effect, science populates the word differently. It is perhaps a mistake, however, to assume that science deals with the visible whereas religion tries to relate to an invisible world. After all, science deals with the atoms and other units not visible to the naked eye.

Fundamentally, whereas the natural sciences postulate entities, *virtually all of which are impersonal*, religion has traditionally populated the universe with person-like or animal-like beings. Whereas the natural sciences attempt to discover and articulate the patterns by which the impersonal entities and forces operate, religion attempts to learn the patterns by which such putative person-like beings as gods, spirits, demons, totems, and the like operate.

The primary goal of science is to discover the patterns and to learn how the entities and forces interact. The primary *concern* of religion, however, is that of successfully coming to terms with the more or less conscious beings thought to populate much of the cosmos. This view of religion helps explain why the offering of sacrifices is so prevalent in religions. Religion reaches beyond the goal of increasing pure knowledge to that of advancing ways of influencing and negotiating with the person-like beings who presumably exert their considerable influence on the world. Sacrifices and prayers are believed to have some favorable impact on the gods or spirits.

The question naturally arises as to how human beings came to think that sacrificing animals, children, body parts, special persons, and foods of various sorts would win the favor of the gods or spirits. One plausible answer is that giving gifts and offerings has worked reasonably well in human affairs. Gifts and sacrifices from tribe to tribe, or between individuals, have proved a somewhat successful strategy in appeasing aggression and hostility. More positively, they have proved successful also in building goodwill, gaining favors, establishing cooperative enterprises, and maintaining social bonds. Religions reflect and extend the successful gift-giving and sacrifice-making practices operating universally among human beings. Since departed ancestors were once a part of the exchange of gifts and favors, their survivors often continued to include them in the exchange. Of course, certain modifications became necessary since departed ancestors, spirits, gods, and the like do not conspicuously consume the gifts or make use of them.

The cognitive dimension of religion can scarcely be exaggerated. The anthropomorphic model provided cognitive tools for advancing conjectures (beliefs, theories, hypotheses, and claims) about the behaviors of the environment. Droughts, floods, epidemics, deaths, births, and numerous events, customs, and practices required explanations. The wind, though invisible, caused things to stir. Today we can easily see how winds were perceived as spirits with consciousness or personal agency. Shamans and their successors came to be regarded as individuals with special abilities to interpret the wishes of spirits and gods. They could also negotiate with such beings. The shaman's role is, of course, an extension of the role of interpreter and negotiator in human interaction. From a strictly sociological perspective, the shaman's special ability is largely the ability to read the community's range of beliefs and the range of expectations. The negotiating terms that the shaman reports to the community must be believable. What counts as believable to one culture may appear ridiculous or perhaps even dangerous to another. The tension between science and religion has ancient roots in the tension among religions harboring different beliefs about the cosmos and about ways to negotiate with, and relate to, the gods and spirits. One culture will believe their divinities prefer sacrifices of grain or fruit whereas another culture will believe they prefer animal or even human sacrifices.

If religion is seen as grounded in the anthropomorphic model, the debate over the difference between magic and religion can be cast in a new light. I suggest that the label "magic" in the pejorative sense applies to certain practices performed by those religions

that are judged to have seriously flawed beliefs about what gods and spirits desire or require. Christian missionaries, for example, have tended to regard the sacrifices and religious practices of heathen religions as either ineffectual magic or misguided attempts to influence the "true God." In some cases, the missionaries classified foreign gods as demons. Recently, some fundamentalists among Southern Baptists urged fellow Baptists to pray for millions of Hindus because they were "lost in hopeless darkness." Contemporary secular humanists tend to regard fundamentalists to be wandering in considerable darkness on a number of issues. Some Christian fundamentalists are prone to regard the gods of the New Age and other religions to be real beings, demonic in nature, rather than mere delusions. B. B. Warfield, noted defender of one version of Reformed Christianity, insisted that the heathen religions were uniformly viewed as "degrading to man and insulting to God" (565).

The so-called secularization process probably began when rival religions confronted one another's claims and practices. Each religion with its special theories about the world and its special ways of relating to its gods and spirits had somehow either to account for the other or to make accommodating adjustments.

Sometimes, when poignant events did not fit with the beliefs or expectations of a religion, serious doubts surfaced. Thucydides in the *History of the Peloponnesian War* notes that a plague struck Athenians who prayed as well as those who did not. They perished alike (50). Thucydides refers to Nicias' speech in which he expressed the prayerful hope that the gods would treat his army with greater mildness (137).

Today, biblical scholars often take for granted the discipline called historical criticism. In past decades, the historical-critical method appeared dangerous to the faith. Why? The answer would seem to be that the historical-critical method gives little ground to the anthropomorphic conjecture of the deity's miraculously inspiring prophets and apostles to write down inerrant propositions. Those scholars who have come to terms with the historical-critical method have revised their view of inspiration. They tend to portray the deity as working through varied literary and other means that earlier theorists of inspiration either were oblivious to or readily leaped over. The point is that the anthropomorphic model is itself quite malleable in the hands of not only biblical scholars and theologians, but also televangelists and creative members of the clergy. The question nevertheless remains as to why the anthropomorphic model not only persists, but also thrives in a culture where the scientific model appears to be prevalent. Although Guthrie does not answer this question satisfactorily, I will venture a partial answer.

First, it is a mistake to think that most Americans, for example, have a sound grasp of the major scientific theories. Ours is not a scientific generation. Knowing how to operate in a technological age is one thing. Being knowledgeable about science is quite another. Second, human beings are aware of their finitude. Technology and medicine can help in overcoming some of the limits of finitude. But death, loss of important relationships, emotional defeats and other manifestations of human finitude are not conspicuously cured. Science does not promise to cure them. The social and cultural processes that do make sweeping promises to overcome the most grievous forms of human finitude draw upon the anthropomorphic model. In short, gods or spirits are believed to have the necessary power to overcome finitude. Furthermore, the gods or spirits are regarded as willing to help finite mortals. Religion continues to thrive into the twenty-first century because human beings are a conscious and desperate species. Walter Burkert in his remarkable book *Creation of*

the Sacred is correct in saying that "religion is serious." "The utmost seriousness of religion is linked to the great overriding fear of death" (7, 31). The so-called "religious instinct" that A. N. Wilson and others postulate is in fact the response to the human condition of conspicuous, observable finitude. Since this condition can at best be modified only somewhat, religions as sweeping promises and hopes will continue to thrive.

Third, an anthropomorphic view of the world is not only relatively easy to grasp, but also cognitively satisfying to vast populations and more or less emotionally satisfying. When supported by social institutions geared to meet not only cognitive, but also emotional, ethical and social dimensions, it increases its ability to thrive. Fourth, a scientific non-anthropomorphic view of the natural environment is so complex that it will always be the view of a minority of the population. This is not because most people lack the mature intelligence to understand it. Rather, most simply have no powerful interest in investing the discipline, time, energy, and money required to gain a thoroughly non-anthropomorphic view of the cosmos. Like any strictly academic pursuit, to be true to itself, science must have as its overriding goal the search for knowledge. Religion has this goal, but it has other powerful goals that often seriously compete with it. Indeed, systematic theology, which seeks a more profound understanding of the central beliefs within its anthropomorphic model, has sometimes clashed with the folk religion that gave it birth.

Fifth, religion will thrive for good and/or ill because its institutions are adaptable. Televangelists, for example, borrow humanistic psychology while simultaneously denouncing humanism. The twentieth-century theologian Paul Tillich represents a sustained drive to retain some of the basic symbols and deepest insights of his Protestant tradition while eliminating most of Christian anthropomorphism. Martin Heidegger's poetic ontology has appealed to many Catholic thinkers and others who, while no longer able to accept most of the explicit anthropomorphic model, continue to carry some of its implicit residue. Instead of speaking of God as revealing himself, for example, Heideggerians feel free to speak of the World's or Being's disclosing itself and of individuals' remaining open to the disclosure.

Sixth, some versions and expressions of religion have survived because of political backing and police power to punish and intimidate rivals. Of course, religious wars will continue either where something like the First Amendment does not prevail or where one aggressive religious tradition gains insufficient police power to suppress all its rivals.

Finally, some religious traditions increase their ability to survive by hitching a ride on ethics. Most people understand how crucial moral standards and practices are to social existence. If religions can convince the population that morality absolutely depends either on believing in the gods or on observing the proper rituals and ceremonies devoted to the gods, then the religion increases its popular support. Plato was one of the first philosophers to suggest that ethics had its own ground and that the gods had to behave ethically to be honored as gods. Centuries later, Kant made the moral category primary. Calvinism, by contrast, has so stressed the deity's putative sovereignty as primary that many critics, including John Wesley, have judged it morally bankrupt. Taking anthropomorphism to the limit, Calvinism has made murder, rape, and all atrocities wrong solely because the Creator labeled them as wrong.

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STATUS ANXIETY AND WEAKNESS IN CORINTH: A Psychosocial Interpretation of Paul's Apocalypticism and Messianism

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Problem Solving

Within the individual stirs a restless search for new liberties and new possibilities. All organisms occupy themselves with problem solving, including the search for better living conditions, greater freedom, and a better environment (Popper 1213). The Apostle Paul is no exception. This does not mean that organisms succeed in overcoming all the obstacles encountered. Rather, we as human beings understand others and ourselves better if we can locate the problems on which we are working. Human problem solving and invention do not always occur at the fully conscious level. The Apostle Paul wrestled with what he clearly considered critical difficulties created by the Torah, his sociopolitical circumstances, and the conflict of desires. Clearly, he also believed he had come upon a multifaceted solution that gave him astonishing liberty previously unknown to him. Sociologist Max Weber calls attention to the "overpowering joy" radiating from Paul's letters, the joy of one who believed himself liberated from enslavement. In Paul's case, says Weber, it was the "slave law" that failed to provide the sense of salvation and that kept its devotees locked into "the fate of pariah status" suffered by Jews at that time (Weber 260). Accordingly, Paul's shift to a new model of a divine Messiah gave him unparalleled freedom. Christ sets us free, the apostle wrote to the churches at Galatia in the hope that they would remain free (Gal. 5:1). Is Weber correct, however, in suggesting that Paul's basic perplexity was his feeling trapped in pariah status? Why would he need a cosmic Christ to resolve that problem? Perhaps studying Paul's view of Christ can bring insight into his fundamental perplexity. If Christ is, for Paul, the solution, then at least a preliminary look at Christ as the apostle characterized him will likely throw light on the problem(s). Admittedly, shuttling between conjectured problems to proposed solutions equates to the method of trial and error. Nevertheless, all other promising methods seem to manifest this process.

Power Through a Crucified Messiah

Something quite surprising was at play in Paul's notion of a crucified Messiah. Clearly, he was obsessed with the idea that *power* came through the crucified Messiah who had arrived on earth in humility. Like the Trojan horse, the divine Messiah's human form contained hidden power. According to 1 Corinthians 2:8, none of the "rulers of this age" recognized what was taking place. They did not see that incomparable power lay behind the apparent weakness of the Messiah destined for crucifixion!

Now, this preordained drama began in disguise—in secret (1 Cor. 2:7). In 1 Corinthians 15, Paul pictures Christ as eventually not only destroying every principality, ruling force, and power, but also placing all his enemies under him (15:2425). All things will be put in subjection under God's feet because of Christ's death and resurrection (15:27).

In the first two chapters of 1 Corinthians, Paul places weakness and foolishness on one side. On the other, he places power and wisdom. Elsewhere, he has identified himself with weakness (2 Cor. 12). In 1 Corinthians 1, he says that whereas the Jews demanded miracles and the Greeks looked for wisdom, he did not meet their expectations but, rather, preached "a crucified Christ." Paul's whole point is that despite appearances, the *humiliated Messiah's crucifixion brought real power and wisdom into being.* According to the ancient tradition, the leaders of Troy brought the gigantic wooden horse into their walled city, not knowing that their conquerors had concealed themselves inside the horse's belly. Similarly, the rulers of the age took Jesus to the cross, not knowing that in crucifying him they would release a cosmic force that would conquer them.

The Problem of Weakness

Paul was highly conscious of something about himself that he classified under "weakness." Most likely, he became preoccupied with the model or image of a cosmic being who became a slave and appeared so weak and powerless as to die in shame and humility on a cross. The thought that enormous authority erupted from absolute weakness apparently captured Paul's imagination. He wanted to identify himself somehow with this Christ crucified. Why? Evidently, he came to view this transformation or new creation as the only way to receive sufficient control over the weaknesses that plagued him. "I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me (Gal. 2:1920). To the church at Corinth, he explained, "He [Christ] was crucified in *weakness*, but lives by the *power* of God. For we are *weak* in him, but in dealing with you we will live with him by the *power* of God" (2 Cor. 13:4 Italics added). Earlier in this same letter, he wrote that the Lord's grace rendered power perfect through Paul's weakness (2 Cor. 12:9).

Sociopolitical Status

Sociologists might find Paul's audience in Corinth considerably interesting. Who were the Corinthian church members? Paul has given a brief description. Few were wise according to worldly standards. Few possessed power, that is, political and economic influence. Few were of noble birth (1 Cor. 1:26). First Corinthians 1:278 opens a door that allows the careful reader to gain insight into both Paul's selfimage and his image of those he addressed at Corinth.

> But God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world, things that are not. (1 Cor. 1:2728)

Paul sounds like someone who felt alienated from much of his society and perhaps from himself. He portrays himself and the Corinthian Christians as outsiders in need of a way to gain *cosmic status and power*. He thought he had found a way to gain power and wisdom, if not in a society of power and status, then in a realm that he considered more real than his present society and age. Some might charge that Paul journeyed into a make-believe world that promised to give him the status, wisdom, and power previously denied him. Notably,

in the very passage discussing his weakness and the external challenge to his status as an apostle, he partially discloses the subjective process by which he received what he deemed as divine revelations about another world or realm, "the third heaven" (1 Cor. 12:112).

Paul in Personal Conflict—Romans 7:725

Paul's preoccupation with the theme of weakness and power relate directly to the puzzling Romans 7:146 passage regarding the law.

> We know that the law is spiritual; but I am unspiritual, sold as a slave to sin. I do not understand what I do. For what I want to do, I do not do; but what I hate I do. And if I do what I do not want to do, I agree that the law is good.

In the same chapter, Paul had made an even more puzzling comment: "But sin, seizing the opportunity afforded by the commandment [the tenth against covetousness], produced in me every kind of covetous desire [. . .] . I found that the very commandment that was intended to bring life brought death" (7:8, 10).

Paul's experience proves universal even when we cast it in a paradigm not his own. To be human is to have conflicting desires. He classifies some of his as belonging to the law of sin, which is at work in the members of his body. By contrast, his mind serves God's law (the law of the spirit) in the war against the flesh and its law.

For Paul, Christ exemplified weakness, humiliation, and slavery (Phil. 2:78). What could manifest weakness more than taking on the nature of a slave and obediently dying in agony on a cross? *Yet, it is out of this utter weakness that God fully demonstrates his power.* The event of the Israelite slaves' escaping across the Sea of Reeds was God's deliverance of his people, Joshua eventually taking the former slaves into the Promised Land. However, for Paul, nothing can compare with the event of the cross. He believes that through Christ crucified, the liberation of the elect among both Jews and Gentiles has become possible. The new Joshua (Jesus) will lead the believers into the very presence of God and the spiritual territory of redeeming grace.

Dreaming of the Happy Ending

The author of 2 Maccabees creates a hopeful and fanciful ending to the threat of Antiochus IV Epiphanes. First, he envisions pagan Antiochus as coming to realize that "no mortal should aspire to equality with the Godhead" (9:12). Second, the pagan ruler declares Jerusalem a free city. Third, he declares the Jews to have rights equal to the Athenians. Fourth, the sacred vessels and other plundered objects of the temple are restored many times over. Fifth, from his personal revenue, he defrays the expenses incurred for the sacrifices. Sixth, "to crown all, he himself turns Jew and visit every inhabited place, proclaiming the power of God" (9:1317). Clearly, this is a fanciful move from sociopolitical weakness to power.

Either Paul or another Christian composed a poem with an even more hopeful ending for the Christians. After his crucifixion and resurrection, Christ is raised high and given a name above all names so that everyone everywhere will proclaim Jesus Christ as Lord

(Phil. 2:911). Seeley offers the plausible conjecture that the entire poem was created to contrast the ideal Lord's behavior with the reprehensible behavior of Caligula. The ideal or model Lord (*kurios*) reflects the highest and noblest expectations of a true and good ruler. Such expectations had been projected over the centuries. Seeley points to some of these royal, noble qualities. The ideal king serves his people and takes no thought for himself. Rather than greedily *grasping* after that which belongs to others, he selflessly labors for others. He manifests wisdom and humility (Seeley 647). Margaret Morris goes into much greater depth to show that the idealized kings of Egypt and Rome become mythological shepherds to their people and take on the life of humility, becoming in some cases servants or peasants.

The Christian hymn of Philippians 2:611 takes this exceedingly ancient model of the ideal king and casts the Jesus Christ figure into the role. Examining the hymn, we may consider it in light of Seeley's thesis that the author created it in conscious opposition to the self-aggrandizing ruler who grasped greedily for a divine status he could never possess.

> Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross. Therefore God also highly exalted him and gave him the name that is above every name, so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. (Phil. 2:511)

Seeley suggests that the author composed the hymn in response not only to the religious and political crises exemplified by mad Caligula, but also to the stories of the suffering righteous. Near the chapter's end, Yahweh affirms that all shall bend the knee to the suffering messiah and every tongue confess Yahweh's justice and power. Seeley seems to argue that the need for the Christian hymn in the first century becomes clear when viewed against the historical setting of disillusionment with first-century political life. The literary, cultural, and apocalyptic backgrounds provide the hymn's composer with rich material for developing the theological and political vision of the ideal king or Lord coming from heaven to earth in humility and death only to be resurrected in power over all creation.

Earlier, the Roman poet Ovid had written the following about his beloved ruler Augustus: "Jupiter controls the heights of heaven and kingdoms of the triformed universe; but the earth is under Augustus' sway" (Miller 15:85860, citing Ovid, *Metamorphoses*). The Christian poet took one step beyond Ovid to portray his Lord Jesus Christ as receiving power over everything "in the heavens, on earth, and under the earth" (Phil. 2:10). Unlimited force and unblemished piety joined in one being. Unlike Caligula, the Christ of the Philippians hymn emptied himself of the very possession for which Caligula grasped during all his reign but could never call his own.

The Law and Sinful Desires

Evidently, Paul had given a great deal of thought to the role of the law in coming to terms with his own weakness that drove him to both the heights and the depths. At the heights, he could boldly proclaim himself an apostle of the Lord Messiah, God's Son, so that not even Cephas or James could challenge his authority. At the same time, despite professing to have personally received the risen Christ's commission, Paul felt driven to despair. "I do not understand what I do. For I do, not what I want, but what I hate" (Rom. 7:15 our translation).

In this now famous Romans 7 passage, Paul focuses on the Tenth Commandment for a reason. More than any other, it locates the source of human weakness in the conflict of desires. Attempting to discover the pattern of human collective violence, René Girard examines the relationship between desire and its objects. Paul believes that some desires conflict and simply cannot be harmonized. On this point, he shares insights with Buddhism, Platonic psychology, and Stoicism. He has discovered that some human desires must suffer defeat. The "law is spiritual" in that it exposes the desires of the flesh as evil or sinful. This same law, Paul believes, had made him conscious of the sinful nature within him. His mind, his inner being, allies with the spiritual law that makes him hate satisfying his sinful desires (Rom. 7:8, 1520).

Paul and the Gospels are driven to present a divine being who triumphs over all human vulnerability and makes his followers a part of his triumph. Like Plato, the early Christians fought with everything within them against the conclusion that tragedy has the final word.

> [H]e said to me, "My grace is sufficient for you, for [my] power is made perfect in weakness." So, I will boast all the more gladly of my weaknesses, so that the power of Christ may dwell in me. Therefore, I am content with weaknesses, insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities for the sake of Christ; for whenever I am weak, then I am strong. (2 Cor. 12:910)

The Problem of Cosmic Failure

The Jewish author of 2 Esdras struggled with the depressing conviction that most human beings lose in the personal battle for righteousness and salvation. Most of the human race ends in torment and perdition. Despite the Law of Moses and other elements of goodness in both the world and individuals, righteousness usually lacks the power to thwart evil. This baleful human predicament must have plagued Paul, for it suggests that The Creator has failed in his purpose. As an all-consuming problem, it threatened to eat the heart out of the anthropomorphic paradigm. We may conjecture that the problem (with its terrifying implications) drove Paul to make a major change at the heart of his paradigm. He replaced the law (Torah) with the Christ in the hope of making salvation more accessible to Jews and Gentiles alike.

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FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE A CALL TO MINISTRY

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Introduction

Baylor University, chartered in 1845 by the Republic of Texas and affiliated with the Baptist General Convention of Texas, is both the state's oldest institution of higher learning and the world's largest Baptist university. Established to be a servant of the church and of society, the mission of Baylor University is to educate men and women for worldwide leadership and service. Thus, as part of her mission, the University is committed to preparing persons for leadership and service to Christ and the church.

As part of the strategy to fulfill this mission of preparing leaders for the church, Baylor has established a program called Ministry Guidance. The Ministry Guidance program is designed to help undergraduate students who are exploring vocational ministry to clarify and affirm their call and to introduce them to ministry. Located organizationally in the Department of Religion, College of Arts and Sciences, the Ministry Guidance program seeks to assist students who feel called to vocational ministry, as expressed in an ever-growing array of ministry opportunities. Baylor offers multiple avenues of preparation for a variety of ministry vocations – pastor and other congregational staff ministries, missions, education, counseling, social ministry, chaplaincy, church recreation, communications, denominational leadership, and others. Over 1,600 currently enrolled Baylor students have expressed an interest in vocational Christian ministry. These students – referred to as ministry students – are studying in a wide variety of academic majors and minors across the university, and they represent a diversity of denominational preferences. Currently approximately 63% of these ministry students are Baptist students. Other denominations well represented numerically in the group are Presbyterian, Methodist, Catholic, Assembly of God, Episcopal, Lutheran, and Church of Christ.

Primary emphases of the Ministry Guidance program are academic studies that are related to the practice of ministry, hands-on experience in ministry settings, and fellowship with other individuals who are preparing for vocational Christian service. Each of these focal points allows students varied opportunities to explore personal interests and relationships in an effort to understand God's calling.

One of the responsibilities assigned to the Ministry Guidance program is the coordination of the Ministry Scholarship program. Baylor, in cooperation with the Baptist General Convention of Texas, provides tuition assistance to Southern Baptist ministry students. To be eligible, a student must be:

1. An active member of a Southern Baptist church.
2. Planning to pursue vocational Christian ministry, as evidenced by personal testimony.
3. Certified for ministry by a Southern Baptist church, either by ordination, license, or statement of certification.

This Ministry Scholarship program, as it is currently designed, has been in place since 1990.

Research Methods

During the summer of 1999, I conducted a study of the applicants for this Ministry Scholarship program during the ten-year period 1990-99. A total of 868 students were certified for the Ministry Scholarship during this ten-year period. The students were from a total of 446 churches representing 77 Texas Baptist associations and 31 additional states and one foreign country.

As part of the scholarship application procedure, the students are asked to write a "testimony" of their call to ministry. The study referenced above involved a random sample of 217 of the certified students (a fourth of the Ministry Scholarship student population during the ten-year period). The statements of these 217 students were analyzed to identify factors that influence a call to ministry. It was the intent of the study to begin to provide answers for questions like the following:

1. How do persons hear and respond to God's direction in their lives?
2. How do persons describe the experiences that have served to develop an understanding of their call to ministry?
3. What are some of the factors that influence persons to respond to a call to vocational Christian ministry?
4. What can congregations and individuals do to "called out the called" – that is, what can be done to influence persons who are called to ministry to respond to that call and to prepare themselves for leadership and service to Christ and the church?
5. How can congregations encourage potential candidates for ministry vocations?

The research design was such that I read the statements of each of the 217 students in the random sample selected for the study. The statements were the "personal testimony" describing the student's own understanding of his/her personal call to ministry, as the statements appeared in the Ministry Scholarship application for each student. No other documents in the scholarship application for each student were studied, and the personal statements were studied without reference to the student's name or church affiliation or pastor's letter of reference.

Findings

The study resulted in a compilation of the factors cited by the selected random sample of Ministry Scholarship applicants as having been influential to the students in their understanding of their personal call to vocational Christian ministry. It is important to note that the factors discovered are factors that the students themselves chose to cite in their testimony statements. It is certainly possible that more factors than those cited were influencing factors, either recognized or unrecognized by the students. The findings of the study are only those factors that the students themselves recognized and chose to mention in their statements.

A list of eighteen factors was discovered, and the frequency of the appearance of these factors was recorded. This section of this paper reports on these eighteen factors (see Table One: Factors that Influence a Call to Ministry As Cited in Written Statements of Students).

The factor most frequently cited by the students was private Bible study and prayer, cited by 94 (43.3%) of those in the random sample of 217. Though this factor was

described in a variety of ways, it was clear that a student's personal reading and study of scripture, along with meditation and prayer, was influential in helping the student to sense, to understand, and to respond to a call to ministry.

TABLE ONE

Factors that Influence a Call to Ministry

As Cited in Written Statements of Students

(217 students in sample)

	No. of students responding	Percent of sample
Private Bible study and prayer	94	43.3
Volunteer lay ministry experience	83	38.2
Christian home/parents	72	33.2
Christian camp	59	27.2
Ministry internship experience	54	24.9
Influence of significant person	51	23.5
Adult (25)		
Peer (22)		
Sibling (4)		
Counsel of a minister	48	22.1
Youth ministry of church	45	20.7
Mission/Choir trip	35	16.1
Minister as role model	25	11.5
All ministers (3)		
Children's minister (1)		
Missionary (6)		
Music minister (3)		
Pastor (2)		
Youth minister (10)		
Discipleship conference	21	9.7
Parent is a minister	16	7.4
Involvement in missions organizations	15	6.9
Comments of church members	14	6.5
Sermon about call to vocational ministry	10	4.6
Christian concert	1	0.5
Christian television program	1	0.5
Revival service	1	0.5

The next most frequently cited factor was volunteer lay ministry experience, cited by 83 (38.2%) of the students. For most students, this experience was in their home congregations in a variety of leadership roles. These roles included Bible study leader, camp counselor, children's choir worker, choir/orchestra member, local missions project volunteer, music leadership opportunity, preaching opportunity, recreation assistant, small group leader, summer missions volunteer, Sunday School teacher, Vacation Bible School worker, and youth group leader. Some students also cited college student ministry leadership opportunities as being helpful in the call affirmation and clarification process.

Growing up under the influence of Christian parents in a Christian home was the next most frequently cited factor, cited by 72 (33.2%) of the students. Students mentioned that their Christian parents were role models for living the Christian life. Further, Christian parents involved the students in the life and ministry of the church. Students mentioned that their Christian parents often were open to God's direction and purpose in the life of their children, thereby encouraging the students to seek and to follow God's will for their lives. Students also mentioned that their Christian homes were the instruments for the transmission of spiritual values. According to the students, the home was the place were Christian character was formed, spiritual disciplines and habits were developed, and a Christian worldview was encouraged.

The fourth most frequently cited factor was the experience of a Christian camp, cited by 59 (27.2%) of the students. Interestingly, a number of these students noted that it was during a Christian camp experience when they made public their decision about a call to ministry.

A ministry internship experience was the fifth most frequently cited factor, cited by almost one-fourth (54, 24.9%) of the students. Often these internship opportunities were as summer assistants to one of the ministers in the home congregations of the students, usually (but not solely) with the youth or student minister. These experiences were cited as helping the students to understand more about ministry as a vocation, as well as helping the students to learn more about their own abilities, aptitudes, interest, and fulfillment in ministry.

Fifty-one students (23.5%) identified the influence of a significant person in their lives. Twenty-five students identified an adult, twenty-two students identified a peer, and four students identified a sibling as the significant person in influencing their response to a call to ministry.

The counsel of a minister was identified as an influencing factor by 48 (22.1%) of the students. Several ministry positions were identified as those from whom counsel was received, including pastors, music ministers, youth and student ministers, church recreation ministers, and missionaries.

Involvement in the youth ministry of the congregation was cited by 45 (20.7%) of the students. Involvement varied among the students, with Bible study, missions activities, and fellowship activities mentioned prominently.

Mission trips and choir trips were mentioned by 35 (16.1%) of the students. These trips were often mentioned in conjunction with ministry opportunities that gave the students a practical, hands-on experience in ministry away from home.

Twenty-five students identified a minister as a role model that served to influence their response to a call to ministry. Youth ministers were mentioned most often (10), followed by missionaries (6), music ministers (3), all ministers generally (3), pastors (2),

and a children's minister (1). It appears that the role model minister was often the minister with whom the student had the most individual contact.

Discipleship conferences were cited by 21 (9.7%) of the students as being influential in an understanding of a call to ministry. As with Christian camps, several students indicated that public decisions about a call to ministry had been made at these kinds of conferences.

For some (16, 7.4%), the fact that a parent is a minister was an influencing factor. Other factors mentioned more than once included involvement in missions organizations (15, 6.9%), comments of affirmation from members of the congregation (14, 6.5%), and sermons about the call to vocational ministry (10, 4.6%). One student each (0.5%) identified a Christian concert, a Christian television program, or a revival service as being an influencing factor.

Implications

Since students have cited these eighteen factors as having been influential to them in their understanding of a call to ministry, it would seem that congregations, ministers, and others who work with persons who may be candidates for ministry vocations would consider these factors as they design ministries, programs, and services for these persons. Surely some, if not most, of these factors could be key elements of youth and student ministries as congregations seek to call out the called and to prepare persons for leadership and service to Christ and the church.

Certainly one of the key areas of influence is the Christian home and family. Whether as Christian role models, as sources of encouragement and support, as transmitters of spiritual values and heritage, or as influential persons to their children in a variety of ways, Christian parents and families have a responsibility to help children hear and respond to God's direction for their lives. To this end, congregations and family ministries can be intentional in nurturing and strengthening families. They can provide opportunities for families to be involved together in ministry and missions projects. They can encourage the sharing of spiritual journeys in order to facilitate the transmission of spiritual values and the shaping and forming of the faith of family members.

Surely there are areas for further study. One of the further study areas that could be helpful is a study of congregations that seem to be particularly used of God at calling out the called to vocational ministry. One such study is underway, growing out of the study described in this paper. It is a study of the top thirteen churches of the 446 churches that certified the 868 students for the Ministry Scholarship during this ten-year period.

The study is surveying the selected churches to obtain from ministers (multiple from each church) and key lay leaders (one from each church) responses about:

1. What programs, special ministries, emphases, etc., occur in the church that may have an influence on the significant number of students from the church who have shown evidence of a call to Christian ministry.
2. What unique characteristics of the congregation exist that may have an influence on the significant number of students from the church who have shown evidence of a call to Christian ministry.
3. What things ministers (or lay leaders) do individually that may have an influence on the significant number of students from the church who have shown evidence of a call to Christian ministry.

Conclusion

Congregations and other religious institutions today need to improve the caliber and increase the number of future outstanding ordained and lay leaders. From this study, it is apparent that families, congregations, and individuals (parents, ministers, church members, other family members, and peers) are noted by students as being influential in their understanding of and response to a call to ministry. Therefore, the task of improving the caliber and increasing the number of church leaders is an assignment for the church, her families, and her institutions.

The goal of the reported study, and of the study in progress, is to provide empirical data that will assist ministers and churches in their efforts to identify, encourage, and support persons in their congregations who have sensed a call to vocational Christian ministry. In addition to being helpful to ministers and churches, these data will be useful to Baylor and to other institutions of higher education who are seeking to recruit, educate, and prepare persons for effective vocational Christian ministry.

In order to prepare persons for leadership and service to Christ and the church, it is imperative that those universities who seek to accomplish this mission give emphasis to helping students gain access to religious wisdom about vocation as they make choices about their future work and life. If teachers, ministers, parents, and church members can identify the factors that help persons understand and respond to a call to ministry, then they will be in a better position to develop ministries, strategies, programs, and services to help persons clarify and affirm a call to vocational Christian ministry. To this end, the study reported in this paper was conducted. Hopefully it is a worthy addition to an ongoing study.

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YOU ARE (NOT) SHANGO:
Jungian Archetypes in Contemporary Santería

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Introduction

Jung describes archetypes as "essentially ... unconscious content that is altered by becoming conscious and by being perceived..." (Jung 1969, 5). He suggests that "primitive man"[1] assimilates all the mythological processes of nature, the seasons, the phases of the moon, etc., as "symbolic expressions of the inner, unconscious drama of the psyche which becomes accessible to man's consciousness by way of projection—that is mirrored in the events of nature" (Jung 1969, 6). He describes the collective unconscious as a "system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. This collective unconscious does not develop individually but is inherited. It consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents" (Jung 1969, 43). He suggests that "[t]here are as many archetypes as there are typical situations in life." According to his theory archetypes are actually "*forms without content*, representing merely the possibility of a certain type of perception and action." It is only when these forms meet a particular type of perception and action does the archetype become activated, in other words, personal experience fills the form with individualized content (Jung 1969, 48).

Since they stand as collective, universal and impersonal forms the archetypes are available as containers of individualized experience. Thus an individual encounter with/as the mother, father, warrior, seductress, etc. can be described and processed through the mythological narratives. These stories can also provide models for dealing with a variety of personal and interpersonal situations.

Within Santeria the Orisha, the deities of the religion, are often described in terms reminiscent of Jung archetypes. According to Santería cosmology each individual is believed to be the child of a particular Orisha. As the child of an Orisha the devotee is often said to exhibit the archetypal qualities of that Orisha, thus a hot-blooded, macho, man-about-town would be associated with Shango while an earth mother would be associated with Yemaya. Because of these relationships it is understood that an individual's personal life experience can be described and processed through the stories of

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[1]For critiques of the use of such terms as archaic, primitive and the like see Tomoko Masuzawa, Marianna Torgovnick and Edith Wyschogrod Masuzawa, Tomoko. 1993. *In Search of Dreamtime: The Quest for the Origin of Religion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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the appropriate Orisha. Such an understanding of the relationship between the Orisha and their worshippers is often used by practitioners to explain their own and other's personal behavior.

This paper is the beginning of a larger project exploring this use of the Orisha as archetype. In this paper I will look at the correspondences between Jungian and Yoruba understanding of the person and then explore the use of Orisha mythology as archetypal constructs.

Description of Orisha

The Orisha are the deities of the traditional religion of the Yoruba people of West Africa and their religious descendents in the Americas. They are multi-dimensional beings who represent the forces of nature, act as archetypes, and function as sacred patrons or "guardian angels". As knowable aspects of Olodumare, the so-called high-god, they represent a level of power that is approachable though ritual action and so provide one very important focus for Yoruba religion (Lawson 1984, 57). The Orisha have attributes and stories similar to the stories and attributes used to describe the ancient Greek and Roman deities. Their stories tell how the world came to be the way it is (why thunder and wind are often found together, for example) and how to live a good life. However, unlike the Greek gods, the Orisha are not remote deities living high on a mountain peak, rather they are living beings present in the everyday lives of their followers. It is around the Orisha that most Yoruba and Santería religious activity focuses.

In Africa there are an innumerable number of Orisha: 201, 401, 2001—as many as you can think of—plus one more. Since they represent the forces of the universe and are elements of Olodumare, there is an Orisha associated with every natural and manufactured thing. These things include rivers, hills, the forest, the ocean, the crossroads, love, children, wealth, occupations like blacksmith, farmer and hunter, as well as phenomenon like thunder and lightning, wind and rain. In the New World among practitioners in Cuba, Brazil and the United States some parts of this pantheon have maintained or gained prominence while others have become more obscure. Prominent Orisha in Santería include the warriors Eleggua, Ogun and Ochosi; the King of the White Cloth Obatala; the mother of the Orisha Yemaya; Shango, the legendary fourth king of the city-state of Oyo; Oya, the whirlwind and the owner of the cemetery; Obba, the first or legitimate wife of Shango; Oshun the youngest of the Orisha who is the guardian of love, wealth and children; and the diviner Orula, who is known in Africa as Orunmila.

Eleggua is the trickster, the messenger of the Orisha and the owner of the crossroads. Because he is a mischief-maker, he is often associated with the Christian devil but that misrepresents his nature. Ogun, the blacksmith, is associated with iron, ironworkers and all technology. Representing the triumph of technology over nature, he is the patron of all those type-A folks who live to work. Ochosi, the patron of hunters, is often represented by a bow and arrow or a deer. Because his justice is swift and sure, in the Americas he has become associated with police, judges and jails.

Obatala, whose name means "the king of the white cloth," is the symbol of wisdom, intelligence and purity. As one of the oldest of the Orisha he is often considered to be the father of all the Orisha. Shango who is believed to have been the fourth Alaafin (that is, king) of the city of Oyo is the essence of male sexuality and power.

The female Orisha Yemaya and Oshun are said to be sisters or a mother-daughter pair. They represent the complementary forces of female sexuality and maternal love and protection. The stories tell us that in addition to her own children, Yemaya often raised the children of others, especially those of her sister Oshun who as the goddess of love was more interested in the begetting of children than the raising of them. Oya, the third major female Orisha, is the embodiment of the winds and the tempest. She is a warrior Orisha and can be very aggressive in her behavior. She is also the owner of the cemetery and as such controls the *iku* (Yr., the dead).

The Orisha are best discovered through their stories. Yoruba mythology describes the Orisha and their interaction among themselves and between themselves and their human children. Some stories explain the forces of nature while others are morality tales designed to instruct and educate. As a group these stories form the collective unconscious of the Yoruba people, and, by extension, the followers of the Orisha worldwide.

Jungian Archetypes

When Freud, Jung, and their followers developed their theories of human behavior using dreams, myths and various construction of the human mind they gave us new tools for the analysis of religious beliefs and practices. Jung postulated a total psyche that consists of several interacting elements: the ego-centered, subjective conscious, the personal subjective unconscious and the objective psyche. The conscious and the personal unconscious are both formed from the unique experiences of the individual while the objective psyche (what in the early work is referred to as the collective unconscious) refers to those elements of the psyche that are of a general human character (Whitmont 1991, 41). Jung compared the objective psyche to instinct, that is, to the *a priori* elements common to the human condition. It is this stratum of the psyche that is manifested in emotions and drive impulses. It is from this stratum that complexes and archetypes arise (Whitmont 1991, 42). The energy of the objective psyche Jung called, after Freud, the "libido". These drives imply a purposeful pattern for each person. This pattern, this drive toward wholeness forms Jung's understanding of the Self as a "superordinate personality which encompasses and meaningfully directs conscious as well as unconscious functioning" (Whitmont 1991, 43). It is the Self, aided by the other archetypes, that is intent "upon altering and widening consciousness" (Whitmont 1991, 48). In fact, according to Edward Whitmont, Jung suggests that it is the Self that directs the individual along a predetermined developmental path such that the only choice is either to "walk it, or to be dragged 'like cattle to the slaughterhouse' when we attempt to refuse'" (Whitmont 1991, 48 quoting Psychology and Religion par. 746). Although the Self is the first and most prominent of the archetypes, it is only one of a group formed in the objective psyche.

It must be understood at this point that the Self as described by Jung is not the same self as understood by common usage. The (lowercase) self might be more generally characterized in Jungian terminology as the *ego*, that is the center of consciousness. The (uppercase) Self, on the other hand, is the content of the total personality, both conscious and unconscious. Because major portions of the Self are unconscious and *a priori* it is viewed as the archetype of personal wholeness that seeks fulfillment within the individual human life.

In its interaction with the ego, the Self is constantly challenging the ego's adjustment to its life circumstance so that it is always striving for the incorporation of those portions of the Self that have been repressed, denied or not yet recognized. This movement toward completion is the process Jung called "individuation", that is the integration of the dark and neglected part of the Self. This process is guided by the Self which he sees as a superordinate quality (126–27). Because it is an "unknown, superordinated, directive and encompassing entity" the Self is also often associated with the godhead " (Whitmont 1991, 218–219).

In addition to each individual's personal unconscious that is based on her own experiences she also has a collective unconscious that is universal and impersonal. It is from this collective unconscious that the archetypes arise (Jung 1971, 59–60). These archetypes, which have developed through endless repetition across eons of human development, are forms without any content. They represent the "possibility of a certain type of perception and action" so that when a situation occurs in an individual's life the corresponding archetype, like an instinctual drive, automatically appears filling the empty form with particular content (66). We can see this most easily in the archetype of the Mother. Each newborn contains an empty archetypal form of Mother but only when he has experienced certain types of interactions with her environment does she fill that form.[2] Thus as described by Jung each archetype is composed of a mythological core and a personalized shell. The core of the archetype is the universal pattern that is inherent in each of us " (Whitmont 1991, 68) while the shell is the surface that "presents itself as the peculiar reaction pattern" dependent on each person's personal nature and experience (65). This shell is the individualized manifestation of the universal energies inherent in the archetypal core; it is a mythological motif that incarnates itself and makes itself felt in a personal life situation (69). It is the transformation of these archetypal elements into the personality constructed by the Self that Jung calls individuation.

Archetypes are most easily recognized and described through the use of the mythologem, that is the recurring motifs of myths, stories, fairy tales and traditional religious forms (73). These mythologems are symbolic representations of the archetypal core that is transmitted by culture. Because they originate from the same psychological core as the archetypes they can be used to described and explicate archetypal presentations. By recognizing the universal meaning present in archetypal expressions, both personal and cultural, we can use them for our individual and societal development.

In his exploration of mythology and the archetypes, Jung realized that each person lives according to her own individual myth and that these myths demand recognition and translation into an actual life (84). It is these myths that provide the individual with her own relationship with ultimate reality. This suggests that when one is living at variance to one's founding myth or when that myth no longer serves the Self a new "religious attitude" must be found in order for life to continue to be meaningful. It is the attitude toward the manifestations of the "not-I," that is to the archetypal, that determine one's psychic development and transformation.

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[2]Perhaps Rizutto's work on the development of the God-image, even though it is Freudian in orientation, presents the clearest description of how the form of an archetype is filled with particular content and used by the individual.

Yoruba Psychology

Based on their mythology and other oral literature, the Yoruba, like Jung, believed that the human being was formed from a group of physical and non-physical elements. In his book *African Philosophy: Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and Contemporary African Realities,* Segun Gbadegesin present a systematic view of Yoruba psychology based on mythology, language and other oral sources. He describes the traditional understanding of a human being or *ènìyan* as having several constituent parts, which he names as *ara*, *okàn*, *èmí*, and *orí*.[3]

The final component of the human being, the one that may be of most interest to us, is the *orí*. On the one hand, the word *orí* refers to the physical head and recognizes its important physical character. On the other hand, there is also an understanding of a spiritual *orí* that is the bearer of a person's destiny. Orí is also understood to be one's personal divinity, offerings are made to it and it has the power to guard and protect (38). It is understood that one's *orí*, the bearer of one's destiny, is the key to one's success or failure in life. Indeed, a proverb tells us that if your *orí* is against you, there is no question of success (48).

Part of the working out of one's personal destiny is learning about the spiritual influences that are present in one's life. Every person has a specific energy pattern that is associated with his *orí* and is the foundation of her individual consciousness. We might suggest that this energy pattern is the individual's personal *ashé*. It is this *ashé* that marks the nature of the person's personality and character (Canizares 1991, 371). Among Santería practitioners this energy pattern is described as the Orisha that "owns one's head (*orí*)". Living in harmony with Nature means living in harmony with one's self, with the lessons one is intended to learn in this incarnation. When one knows one's patron Orisha one can form a spiritual link with its energies. One learns the name of one's guardian Orisha through divination. Knowing of this spiritual link and the attributes and stories associated with it helps one along the path chosen by the *orí*. At this point it is important for us to realize that although this spiritual force is associated with the destiny chosen before birth, it cannot be known without a special type of divination. One does not choose one's Orisha patron, one's "guardian angel." Within Santería it can only be determined absolutely as part of the initiation into the priesthood.

The following table will compare Jungian and Yoruba psychological concepts.

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[3]Bascom presents a similar view of the number, nature and function of the soul in Yoruba belief systems Bascom, William. 1960. Yoruba Concepts of the Soul. In *Men and Cultures. Selected Papers of the Fifth International Congress of Anthropology and Ethnological Sciences,* edited by A. F. C. Wallace. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.. He suggests that these beliefs are common not only among practitioners of traditional religion but also those who practice Islam or Christianity (401). Although there are minor differences between the beliefs as outlined by Bascom and Gbadegesin, in general their two accounts agree.

Jungian Concept	Yoruba Concept
Subjective Conscious (ego)	Okan (heart, site of conscious identity)
Personal Unconscious	??
Objective Psyche, Collective Unconscious (Archetypes–Mythological Core)	Orisha in general
Archetypes–Personal Shell	Orisha as experienced, Orisha paths
Libido, psychic energy	Ashé
Self	Ori (personal Orisha)
Individuation	Ori (head, destiny)

Orisha as Archetypes

At this point we need to explore more deeply the idea of the *orí*, or sacred destiny and the Orisha associated with it. In Yoruba cosmology the head is first of all the seat of one's personality, one's metaphysical self. It is said that before a child is born it kneels in front of Olodumare, the so-called high god, and chooses its "head" for this lifetime. This head encompasses the person's intelligence, competence, personal limitations and capacity to defend himself. It is symbolized by the physical head and is associated with the guardian Orisha (Matory, 97). It is this guardian Orisha that is said to "own one's head." Within Santería this relationship is described in terms of familial relationships. That is, each individual is believed to be child of a particular Orisha. As a child of the Orisha the devotee is believed to exhibit the archetypal qualities of that Orisha. And it is through the interaction between one's head or destiny and one's Orisha guardian that one manifests the fullness of one's destiny, or as Jung would say, achieves individuation.

Although the association with an Orisha isn't solidified until the time of initiation, there is much theorizing among devotees about the identity of this Orisha and many solicit knowledge of "their" Orisha in anticipation of eventual initiation. Outside of formal divination, one can hypothesize a person's Orisha based on a correlation between the person's personality and the known characteristics of the Orisha.[4]

However it is important to remember that the classification of individuals according to these archetypal categories is inexact for several reasons. Foremost among these is the understanding that there is an overlap between and among categories. That is,

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[4]In fact one popularly published book about the Orisha, *The Way of the Orisa*, lists the qualities one might use to identify one's guardian Orisha Neimark, Philip John. 1993. *The Way of the Orisa: Empowering Your Life through the Ancient African Religion of Ifa*. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco..

although we can identify a certain group of characteristics that are typical of a particular Orisha-archetype it is unlikely that any *one* characteristic can be invoked as a universal trait that excludes the possibility of a different Orisha-archetype. That is both Yemaya and Obatala are wise and benevolent; both Shango and Oshun are associated with sexuality and reproduction. A preponderance of characteristics associated with a particular archetype may be enough to include one within the group of individuals associated with that archetype but exceptions preclude absolute certainty (Segato 1995, 177, 181).[5]

At the same time it is important to understand that one does not choose one's primary Orisha nor is that Orisha assigned by others. Rather the Orisha that own one's "head" is determined through divination, the random throw of cowry shells or kola nuts. Within the religion it is understood that an individual is chosen by an Orisha to be its worshipper and priest. Individuals are claimed by an Orisha for a variety of reasons. Although the personality one brings to the divination session may predispose one to an alliance with a particular Orisha, some individuals are chosen by an Orisha in opposition to their personal characteristics. And some associations seem to be completely arbitrary, neither supporting nor challenging the devotee's personal self-concept. There doesn't appear to be any *necessary* relationship between the personality of the individual and her Orisha guardian.

It is also important to mention at this juncture that the Orisha and the archetypes they represent are distributed without regard to the gender or sex of the human participant. That is, an individual presenting him or herself for divination is as likely to be given a male as a female Orisha regardless of his or her own gender. Because the personality of the priest often correlates with the type of the Orisha, one would expect certain types of men to be associated with Oshun, the goddess of love and sexuality and certain types of women to be associated with the blacksmith, Ogun. But this type of correlation does not always hold. Although in general Oshun priests are sweet, sexy and fun to be around, there are also exceptions to the rule, for example. At the same time, there does not seem to be a difference projected onto one relative to these gender correspondences or differences. That is, male Oshun priests are not *necessarily* perceived as effeminate nor are female Shango priests necessarily seen as overly masculine. Using a Jungian vocabulary, this means that an individual's Orisha does not necessarily function directly as either one's Self or as an *anima/animus* archetype. It is at this point that the comparisons between Jungian and Santería understandings of archetype diverge. Jung understood that gendered archetypes functioned differently for men and women, serving different purposes in the development of a fully individuated personality. This does not seem to be true among Santería practitioners. Correlation between the gender of one's ruling Orisha and oneself does not seem to be important at all. I mention this only in

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[5]Segato cites Needham's article on polythetic classification Needham, Rodney. 1975. Polythetic Classification: Convergence and Consequences. *Man (N.S.)* 10 (3):349–369.; Barnes uses a similar scheme (she calls it a "sacred iron complex") to trace the presence of the Ogun cult though a variety of African and African diaspora societies Barnes, Sandra T. 1980. *Ogun: An Old God for a New Age.* Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.

Barnes, Sandra T., and Paula Girshick Ben-Amos. 1989 (1997). Ogun, the Empire Builder. In *Africa's Ogun: Old World and New*, edited by S. T. Barnes. Bloomington: Indiana University Press..

passing at this point. Further explication of this phenomenon is part of my larger research project.

Examples

Much more could be said about the relationship between the individual Santería practitioner and their Orisha. But at this point I want to describe how these relationships are used within the Santería community. Who is one's Orisha guardian is of great interest to the community. Of course for all initiated priests (and a majority of the practitioners are priests) this Orisha has been determined and has been firmly "attached" to the individual as part of the initiation ceremony. However as soon as one becomes involved in the religion and long before initiation is contemplated, there is a hunger for this piece of knowledge. In the same way that those who know astrology feel that they know something about an individual when they know his birth sign, Santería practitioners believe that knowing one's Orisha gives them insight into the person's personality. Outside of the divination session practitioners speculate on who "owns" a newcomer's head. Correspondences between the personality of the individual and the archetypal characteristics of the Orisha govern this speculation. Someone who is brash and forward may be associated with Shango while someone who is even-tempered, calm and cerebral may be the child of Obatala. Motherly types are thought to belong to Yemaya while Oshun is thought to govern someone who is always impeccably and fashionably dressed. A certain popular book actually has a checklist that one can use to determine which Orisha might be one's guardian (Neimark 1993).

Many practitioners are quick to take their new followers (called godchildren) to the diviner to determine this interesting piece of information. Although within the Santería complex the determination of the guardian Orisha serves little function until initiation is imminent, for many people learning their personal Orisha guardian is an important part of their socialization into the Santería community. Once one learns who "owns her head" there is a strong tendency to attribute behaviors to this correspondence. Even someone without children will begin to look for maternal feelings after being identified with Yemaya, for example. Or someone who has a problem controlling their temper or sexuality may attribute their failings to their association with Shango, the great womanizer among the Orisha. Practitioners will dig into the mythology in order to explain certain types of behaviors. For example, in one story the hunter Orisha Ochosi accidentally kills his mother because he thought she was a thief. A priest of Ochosi might find an explanation for her own problems with her mother in this story.

Behavior Regulation

Initiation does more than solidify the relationship between Orisha and devotee. During the initiation process the Orisha is firmly seated "in" the devotees' head so that not only is she the child and priest of the Orisha but also the vessel. For it is after initiation that the new priest can manifest the Orisha directly through possession trance. During the possession event the priest becomes her Orisha guardian in a uniquely intense way. It is during this event that we find the archetype manifested for the worshipping community. During this time what was internal and psychological become external and open to the

community. Much more could be said about this phenomena, but for our purposes it is most important to note that during a true possession (the community acknowledges that false or faked possessions are possible) the personality and awareness of the priest is completely absent. That is, a priest can only become the archetype *in absentia*; she can *never* experience herself as the Orisha.

This relationship between Orisha and worshipper is hard to understand, even for Santería participants. Priests are liable to explain or excuse certain behaviors as the manifestation of that Orisha archetype outside the possession event. This is especially easy in those cases where a priest exemplifies the characteristics of the Orisha. However this becomes a problem in the community when a priest chooses to explain unacceptable behavior in this manner. Priests of Shango are especially noted for doing this. Shango, the arrogant manly Orisha with hundreds of wives and a quick temper, is often used to provide an excuse for his priests to exhibit the worst of these characteristics. "I can't be faithful to my wife, I'm a son of Shango after all." But older priests, who see this behavior as the excuse it is, will often counter with the reply "but you are *not* Shango". In this way they tell the young priest that outside of the controlled environment of the possession event, he is still expected to be in control of his own behavior and is expected to follow the general norms of the community, *not* the example of the mythological corpus.

Preliminary Conclusions

Much more could be said about Orisha as archetypes. We could profitably explore the ways in which the mythology is used to identify, promote and sanction individual behavior. An explication of the relationship between a person's *ori* and her ruling Orisha could help us to understand how and why initiation is so important to Orisha worshippers. Further study into possession trance and the place of the personal Orisha archetype outside the possession environment would help us to understand the relationship devotees see between themselves, the other members of the community and the pantheon of Orisha whom they jointly worship. Such questions are the focus of the larger project of which this is only a preliminary study.

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