

The Year 2001
PROCEEDINGS

of the

*Association for the Scientific
Study of Religion*

*March 17-18, 2001
Dallas, TX*

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Editor's Note

This year marks a very special time both for me and the Association for the Scientific Study of Religion (ASSR). It has been again both an honor and privilege to serve as the editor for *The Year 2001 Proceedings of the ASSR*. I believe that this year's edition of the *Proceedings* is another fine collection of papers submitted by our most reliable and faithful members.

It is important for our future that every member of the ASSR not only encourages new membership at every opportunity but solicits scholars throughout the colleges, universities, and organizations at which you reside to become involved in our organization through chairing sessions, writing and submitting papers, or holding office.

The quality of these *Proceedings* attests not only to the fine work that has been accomplished by the individuals that have traditionally represented our core membership, but the efforts of many others who participate and promote our meetings through research, writing, attending our sessions, and sponsorship through both donations and the purchase of this collection. I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who helps to make the ASSR what it has been, what it is, and what it hopes to become. Please encourage your friends, colleagues, and associates to join and become active next year!

I still envision great things ahead for the organization and hope that all of you who are not already members will join our section. Joining the ASSR is free of charge and all we ask in return is your support and participation in our yearly sessions and helping to make them successful by writing and presenting papers, chairing sessions, and attending the presentations of others. Once again, I want to thank all of you for your support.

I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the officers of the ASSR for this last year. These are the people who, along with our presenters, truly made the Year 2001 meetings possible:

President: Richard Ambler, Southern Arkansas University
Vice-President: Jon K. Loessin, Wharton County Junior College
Secretary: Mary Ann Clark, Rice University
Program Chair: Richard Ambler, Southern Arkansas University
Treasurer: Jeter Basden, Baylor University
Proceedings Editor: Jon K. Loessin, Wharton County Junior College

I hope all of you have a good year and I will be looking forward to your participation in the ASSR in 2002!

Sincerely,



Jon K. Loessin, Editor

Year 2001 Proceedings of the ASSR

Supralapsarian Calvinism: A Psychological Interpretation of Religious Violence

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Introduction. According to supralapsarianism, before the Fall, the Creator elected to save only some of his creatures from the curse of the Fall. The Fall itself and the accompanying curse were also predestined. Since this appears to leave a gap between creation and the Fall, a critical question emerges. Did the Creator come under pressure (logical, ontological, or whatever) by which the election of only some became his only option? A dilemma arises. *Either* creation before Adam placed such restraints on the Creator that he had no option but to select some for salvation and others for damnation, *or* election preceded creation and therefore presumably came about through no external restraints.

Since presumably nothing existed before creation except the Creator, something internal directed him to elect only some. Does this not entail, however, that he *wanted* some of his creatures to gain everlasting bliss and others to suffer everlasting agony? According to supralapsarian Calvinism, creation is precisely what the Creator *wanted* in every detail. He not only desired the damnation of some, but also arranged events and all the sequences that made their damnation inevitable.

Auschwitz. Abundant pictures and documentaries graphically display the horrors that the Nazis perpetrated on Jews and others in Auschwitz and other concentration camps. Viewing such scenes through Calvinistic lenses forces the conclusion that the Creator actually wanted the victims to suffer. He not only foreknew that their prayers for deliverance would go unanswered, but also arranged all prior events so that they would lead to the atrocities, including all the implied human agonies. Furthermore, traditional Calvinism, insisting that the Creator controls all events to the infinite detail, advances the scenario in which the millions of Jews who died in the concentration camps will one day be resurrected for the purpose of casting them into an eternal concentration camp called Gehenna. The word "Gehenna," derived from a Hebrew word meaning "valley of Hinnom," refers literally to a valley southwest of Jerusalem where some of the kings of Judah engaged in human sacrifice by fire. In extracanonical Jewish literature and in the New Testament, "Gehenna" designates the place/state of torment of the wicked. The apocalyptic work of *First Enoch* portrays the accursed valley as the place of final judgment wherein the torment of the wicked will become a public and endless spectacle for the righteous to behold.

According to evangelical predestinations, Jews who fail to convert to Christianity will be classified among the wicked, their greatest sin being that of not worshipping Jesus as the promised Messiah and Son of God. Hence, their place in Everlasting Auschwitz is viewed as thoroughly deserved. A foreshadowing of this outlook can be found in Martin Luther's vicious lashing out against the Jews, who did not convert as he apparently had hoped. Claiming that Jews were depraved parasites on German society, he set forth his program for dealing with them. In 1543, he exhorted fellow Germans to set fire to

synagogues; to destroy Jewish homes and scriptures; to confiscate Jewish belongings; to deny Rabbis, on pain of death, the right to teach; and to grant no safety to Jews on highways. He recommended driving them out like dogs (Luther 135, 258, 266-292).

The Question of Control. Gordon Clark, one of the most articulate of supralapsarian Calvinists in America, taught such notable evangelical leaders as Carl Henry, Billy Graham, Edward J. Carnell, and Paul Jewett. During a conference at the Park Street Church in Boston, a Jew on the panel asked Clark, "What would you do if I could *prove* to you beyond all doubt that you were wrong?" Without hesitating, Clark answered, "I'd shoot myself" (Nelson 211). Clark views God as the Creator in total control of everything that comes into existence. In his view, God is the cause of sin and of everything. "Not only is Satan his creature, but every detail of history was eternally in his plan before the world began; and he willed that it should come to pass[. . .]. God determined that Christ should die; he determined as well that Judas should betray him" (237-38).

Although Judas chose to betray, he did not freely choose, Clark insists. Both Pilate's and Judas's choices were necessary, predetermined events. For Clark, if Judas, Pilate, or anyone else had enjoyed free will, God would not have been in full control and, consequently, the prophecies of Christ's crucifixion might not have come true. The idea of divine permission clashes with that of absolute control. Permission leaves open the real possibility of independent forces changing the outcome (Clark 205-207).

Divine Goodness and Control. John Wesley and others have regarded Calvin's God as immoral, as no God at all, but a conscious force subject to no stable controls. Clark answers bluntly that since the Creator invents and contrives the moral standards, no one can judge him. God is "ex-lex," outside law.

Does this, then, make Clark's God an amoral outlaw? Plato and Euripides would probably answer in the affirmative. As Clark sees it, God originates moral laws for human beings. The laws are not binding on the Creator, however, which is why he can put a lying spirit into the mouths of prophets or direct and cause tools like Pharaohs to commit evil deeds. If so, how can any human tool be held morally responsible? Clark gives his answer.

Man is responsible because the supreme power can punish him for disobedience. God, on the contrary, cannot be responsible for the simple reason that there is no *power* superior to him; no greater being can hold him accountable; no one can punish him; there is no one to whom God is responsible; there are no laws that he could disobey. (241 Italics added)

The key concept here is *power* or *control*. The outcome of the entire Calvinistic scenario would seem to generate unimaginable horror for doubtless most of the human race, including the slaughter of Egyptian children in the time of Moses and the drowning of almost the entire population of children and adults in Noah's time. The greatest horror, however, is reserved for Buddhists, Humanists, Hindus, Jews, Jehovah's Witnesses, and millions of others either already in Gehenna or en route.

The fact, if it were a fact, that all this misery and agony would originate in the mind of an omnipotent Being in full control of everything comforts some. For others, it

compounds the terror; for the consequences of the controlled events seem worse than if the whole had no conscious planner or cosmic manipulator. The latter group does not worship power per se and tends to regard as perverse those who subscribe to the principle that Supreme Might makes right.

The Psychology of Calvinism. Now, how does this idea of predestined atrocities affect the conscience of each Calvinist? Perhaps not all subscribers deal with the problem in the same way. Principles of clinical psychology open up several possibilities. First, some supralapsarian Calvinists may respond through abstraction and denial, thinking of the damned less as feeling creatures and more as mere objects, as category members. The violence inflicted on the damned is not perceived as violence if the recipients are not perceived as sentient human beings. Damnation is treated more as "filing away" than as inflicting endless pain and torment. According to the second option, by contrast, some supralapsarian Calvinists regard the damned as living, though vile, creatures to be either identified with or ranked closely with the demonic. The reasons given for so regarding them resemble those given for inflicting cruel punishment upon hardened criminals. Unbelievers deserve their punishment because of the heinous nature of their crime (sin) or their demonic nature. In the Gospel of John, Judas not only is chosen to play the scripted part of the betrayer, but also is identified as a devil (6:70). Just as some governments strip prisoners of all dignity and virtually all rights as human beings, so in Calvinistic theology the damned either have no innate dignity or have dignity in a perverse sense only.

According to the third option, just because the damned enjoy human dignity, they cannot be put out of their misery as one might put a cornered rat out of its misery. Rather, human dignity requires that the damned be punished (tormented) endlessly with no hope of relief or release. Rats, spiders, and other presumed loathsome creatures do not receive endless torment because they, lacking human consciousness and dignity, cannot sin. Those taking this third way evidently must undergo a psychological hardening if they become its apologist for long.

The Amity-Enmity Complex. In *African Genesis and Territorial Imperative*, Robert Ardrey argues that the human species has inherited from its animal roots the amity-enmity complex. The members of a group who are united within their home territory develop protective love for those in the group and hostility toward outsiders of the same species. I would modify this hypothesis by suggesting that as a species gifted with symbolic interaction, we can treat various things, including an ideology or belief system, as if it were home territory. If so, then as believers humans have a predisposition to regard outsiders with enmity. Calvinism has provided a theological version of, and justification of, the primitive amity-enmity complex. This is why many Calvinists have over the centuries been able to accept the eternal damnation of all outside the ideological territory. Indeed, Ardrey argues that humans have a primitive duality of conscience, leading people to not only love insiders, but also to debase outsiders. In this connection, a Feuerbachian reading of the supralapsarian Calvinistic theology might disclose a great deal about human duality.

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Spirit Made Flesh: The Body-Mind Problem and the Question of the Possession Trance

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The use of spirit possession to communicate with spirits and deities within Santería rituals suggests interesting questions about the nature of the human self and the larger cosmos. We can either reject this phenomenon out of hand as an example of psychological instability or outright fraud, or we are required to develop a worldview that allows the non-material (that is, the spiritual) to affect the material world. In the philosophical literature, this question is often subsumed under the so-called body-mind problem. As most clearly articulated by Descartes, the body-mind problem asks: how can a spiritual (that is non-material) substance affect a physical (that is material) substance? Philosophers are not the only scholars concerned with the body-mind problem. Although often unacknowledged, it permeates medical, psychological and theological contemplation.

Trance possession in the Santería and Espiritismo traditions involves the temporary absence of the subject's "soul" while an alien spirit fills the space left empty by this absence. This alien spirit may be a divinity in the Afro-Cuban pantheon, a spirit of a dead relative or the personality of a spirit guide. In philosophical terms, this is a radical interpenetration of the non-material into the material world.

In this paper, I will use the phenomenon of trance possession to explore the ways in which the non-material can intrude into the material world and directly into the physical body. I will begin by an examination of the body-mind problem as articulated by Descartes and refined by later thinkers. Then I will challenge some of the underlying assumptions of these positions by examining the ways in which possession phenomena calls into question these understandings of the material and the spiritual and the interaction between them. Finally, I will propose an alternative worldview in which legitimate possession phenomena *could* occur in an effort to articulate a philosophical position that can accept the possibility of a non-fraudulent trance possession.

Descartes' First Meditation

Descartes project, as proclaimed in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, was to tear down the edifice of knowledge and rebuild it on a new foundation. This undertaking began in a quest for absolute certainty through the vehicle of radical doubt and resulted in a dualist theory that split the spiritual mind from the material body. Only through the action of a benevolent deity was it possible for Descartes to bridge the gap between these two disparate entities. Later philosophers rejected this appeal to God as *deus ex machina* choosing instead to either deny the possibility of an experience of an independently existing physical world or to deny the spiritual "mind" as an actuality. Although both of these positions are irrational in light of the obvious facts of experience, they provided the only philosophically sound responses to the Cartesian theory that mind and body are ontologically different types of things incapable of interaction. Materialists have solved the mind-body problem by eliminating the spiritual mind and giving all its functionality to the physical brain, thus eliminating the nagging problem of interaction between these two realms while opening up

another set of related questions: how can a purely physical system give rise to the non-material functions of the brain?

Concurrent with this philosophical elimination of all things spiritual was the development of psychoanalysis. Psychological theory replaced the actions of the human soul with psychological phenomena that eventuated in neurosis, psychosis and complexes. Psychoanalytic theory, for example, suggests that all mental manifestations can be traced to physical brain functions or childhood experiences. Freud's suggestion that religion was merely an illusion that could be at least partially overcome by psychological analysis was another way the spiritual was replaced by the material. Although how the mind/brain works was still mysterious, it was understood to be amenable to scientific inquiry without remainder. When accompanied by neurological theory, psychology continues to attempt to describe all the causes of mental processes as activities within the brain and nervous system. The use of pharmaceuticals within contemporary psychiatric practice is only one indicator of this movement toward a completely materialistic theory of the mind.

However, the mind-body problem continues to plague us. Central to this problem is the question of spirituality. If we stay within the contemporary, materialistic worldview, how can we justify belief in a non-physical realm that is beyond scientific analysis? Must we choose between the loss of all spirituality in our quest for scientific knowledge or a return to a pre-modernism that ignores the gains of empiricism and rationality? Is it possible to have both science and spirituality? These questions do not deny that there are genuinely religious people in the contemporary world but rather are presented to engage the larger question of what cosmological worldview might allow for full participation of contemporary peoples in both the rational and the spiritual.

This problem is thrown into high relief when we begin to investigate parapsychological phenomena, including possession trance, channeling, extra-sensory perception (ESP) and psychokinesis (PK). The possible "reality" of each of these phenomena rests on the possibility of interaction between the material and non-material realms. Dualism, which posits mind and body as absolutely and ontological different, leaves open the possibility for spiritual entities but seems to provide no theoretical basis for analyzing interaction between them and us. Scientific materialism, since it a priori denies the possibility of the spiritual, only offers conscious or unconscious fraud as explanatory theory. It is instructive that the same arguments against spiritualism presented in Allen Kardek's *The Book of Mediums* written in the mid-nineteenth century can be found in Jon Klimo's 1998 book on channeling. No progress seems to have been made to either confirm or deny these phenomena in the ensuing 150 years. I will have more to say on this later.

Possession Trance

It was an attempt to describe spirit possession as found in Santería and related religious systems that highlighted these questions for me. What exactly is spirit possession? Vincent Crapanzano suggests the most liberal description. Spirit possession, he says, is "any altered state of consciousness indigenously interpreted in terms of the influence of an alien spirit."ⁱ Participants in a Santería tambor or drum ritual, may experience what I. M. Lewis calls trance possession. In his classic *Ecstatic Religion* Lewis distinguishes between possession and trance. He says that trance is due "to the temporary absence of the subject's soul"ⁱⁱ while possession is the "invasion of the individual by a spirit."ⁱⁱⁱ Although either state may happen independently, possession trance is a state wherein an alien spirit fills the space left empty by

trance. In the Santería context, a priest's consciousness is temporarily displaced by the presence of a deity or spirit. Since his (or her) consciousness is absent, the possessed person has no memory of the possessing being and its actions and communications. During the duration of the possession event, the priest becomes the embodiment of the Orisha for the worshipping community.

Within the Santería community, the movement toward possession is often characterized by temporary, often violent, physical changes in the appearance and movements of the medium, the person moving into possession. These are understood to be one's reaction to "invasion" by an alien spirit. Although the possession event is considered desirable and actually promoted by participation in the tambor, the temporary absence of one's soul and the "vacating" of one's body are not easy. Once the possession is complete, however, the possessing spirit gains control and the medium exhibits the characteristics typical of the invading Orisha. These changes alert the remaining members of the group that the Orisha has arrived.

Several elements are necessary for a successful possession event. Orisha do not normally enter into persons unless called and although participants are encouraged to communicate with their deities outside of the communal events, they do not normally engage in full trance possession outside of the protected communal environment. In the context of Santería, the Orisha are only allowed to invade the bodies of those whose initiations have prepared them to receive their presence. If the uninitiated begin to exhibit signs of possession they are removed from the environment of the sacred drums and called back into themselves.

Possession trance requires, in addition to a willing and able victim, a community that can facilitate the passage of the deities, protect the body of the medium from injury, and communicate the revelations of the possessing Other. Without a supportive community, possession is both difficult, since it is understood that the possessing entity comes at the invitation of the community, and dangerous, since the medium is without resources to protect him- or herself or even to effect the evacuation of the possessing spirit and the return of his consciousness to his body. If fully possessed, the person is entranced, unaware of his own or others actions. Only in the presence of another can an Orisha speak and be heard. In the absence of the host personality, only the enabling community can communicate with the possessing Orisha.

Conscious and Unconscious Fraud

Generally those who discuss Afro-Caribbean possession trance have either taken an emic approach, accepting as "real" those physical and psychological changes that are accepted by the participating group as legitimate possession events or an etic approach that views all such events with suspicion and a need to "explain" the phenomena in psychological or sociological terms.^{iv} These traditions themselves recognize the possibility of conscious fraud, that is, the faking of a possession event, and provides tests of the legitimacy of any particular such event. Once a particular possession is accepted as legitimate by the community, however, the actions and statements made by the medium are accepted as the words and actions of the gods.

Nevertheless, fraud provides the only explanation open to scholars whose materialistic worldview generally cannot provide a circumstance in which a legitimate possession event is possible. While conscious fraud is pretty much self explanatory and easily dismissed, unconscious fraud is often suggested in the scholarly description of the possession event,

such as when possession is the explosion of personal psychological urges and desires.^v Lewis suggests as much in his description of a Haitian Voodoo ceremony in which he compares possession rituals to a modern psychodrama where repressed urges and desires are played out in a permissive and comforting environment. At the conclusion of the possession ritual, he says, ideally each participant “eventually achieves a state of ecstasy, and in stereotyped fashion collapses in a trance from which he emerges purged and refreshed” so that each participant clearly gains “a great deal of psychological satisfaction” as well as certain “social advantage[s].”^{vi} Thus he says that the possession event can be understood psychologically, “in the light of the subject’s own personality needs, his life situation, and cultural background.”^{vii} Possession and related phenomena are regularly compared to psychological afflictions. Lewis says that shamanism is often seen as “an institutionalized madhouse for primitives” and cites Levy-Valensi, who claimed that the spiritualist séance was the ante-chamber to the asylum.^{viii}

Like Lewis and those he cites, most investigators into paranormal phenomena begin by exploring the various ways this phenomenon can be explained in the light of the modern atheistic mechanistic worldview. However, some investigators find this approach inadequate to the data. A typical response can be found in Harvard Medical School professor of psychiatry John Mack’s description of his own early investigations of alien abduction phenomenon. “The dilemma I faced was this: while from a clinical standpoint these reports sounded like occurrences in the “real world,” my worldview at the time simply discounted the existence of such things. The choice, then, was to persist in trying to find a conventional explanation for the phenomenon, forcing it into molds that seemed not to fit, or to consider the possibility that my worldview was incomplete.”^{ix} Although Mack eventually began to accept the reality of his informants’ account, leading other scientists to discount his work, the question he asks is provocative. To suggest that some of these phenomena cannot be explained by the commonly held worldview, leads to the idea that that worldview may be incomplete or incorrect.

Just as Mack’s study of alien abductees, my own investigation of possession trance challenges the basic assumptions of the Western worldview. Two important aspects of possession seem to have escaped the notice of many investigators. The first is the difference between mediums, those subject to trance possession, and individuals we recognize as psychologically ill. One of the primary characteristics of severe psychological illness is an inability to engage in the activities of normal daily living. When psychotic episodes are uncontrolled they intrude on daily living making it difficult for the patient to maintain regular employment and on-going personal relationships. In addition, left untreated, psychological illness tends to worsen over time.

On the other hand, outside the ritual environment, spirit mediums are difficult to differentiate from others in their community. They hold regular jobs, some are professionals; they maintain relationships not only within their religious communities but other groups as well. In addition, continued participation in ritual possession tends to facilitate the medium’s movement in and out of trance so that many of the more bizarre motor activities associated with the movement into full possession decrease, rather than increase, over time.

This leads us to the second difference between a psychotic episode and a possession event. Although little commented upon in the literature, the goal of possession in Santería and its sister religions is not the wild dancing and exhausted collapse but rather the subsequent controlled interaction between possessing deity and worshipping community. The frenzy that commonly characterizes descriptions of possession events gives way, in Santería rituals, to a more sedate and tranquil interaction between the fully embodied spirit and the

worshipping community. The confusion and excitement so often described in the literature is merely the gateway through which the medium passes on the way to a fully possessed state. While embodied, Orisha bless their worshippers, perform healing rituals, and give advice. Although they may eat, drink, dance and generally enjoy themselves, they only participate in the frenetic activities associated with possession when attempting to entice another of their sacred company to join the ritual.

Not all possession events are legitimate, some certainly are purposefully or unconsciously fraudulent. Many mediums, however, are accepted by participants as neither intentionally deceitful nor the victims of their own personal psychological urges and desires. It is not my intention to prove or disprove the authenticity of this phenomenon, rather I want to end this paper by asking how it is possible to construct a worldview in which legitimate possession trance is possible.

An Alternative World View

David Ray Griffin suggests that it is irrational to ignore both the non-material aspects of human consciousness and the obvious interactions between mind and body found in everyday experience simply because they contradict our metaphysical theories. Rather he suggests we reconsider Descartes' dualism and the materialist worldview it produced in light of the idea that they are based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the mind, of the body or both.^x

Using the work of Alfred Lord Whitehead, Griffin offers an alternative to the standard materialist worldview.^{xi} He focuses a portion of his discussion on paranormal phenomena, including possession trance, because he says it calls into question the standard worldview. Without uncritically accepting all paranormal phenomena, he says that the possibility that some of these events may be legitimate calls for a reconsideration of our metaphysical paradigm. A reconsideration of what he calls paranormal phenomena should entail not only the open-minded investigation of these phenomena but also the development of a worldview in which such phenomena *could* occur. He divides paranormal phenomena into three categories: "events in which a psyche receives influences that are not mediated through its physical senses", that is *extrasensory perception* (ESP); "events in which a psyche produces effects in the world beyond its physical body without using this body to bring about these effects", that is *psychokinesis* (PK); and "experiences...that are suggestive of the existence of psyches apart from their physical bodies" such as messages from mediums and near-death out-of-body experiences.^{xii} What is distinctive of each of these categories, he says, is the idea of "*influence at a distance of or from minds*."^{xiii}

The early modern worldview did not entirely preclude paranormal events, as belief in the supernatural (God or demons) abounded. However, by the late modern period, as belief in these supernatural and spiritual agents declined, the mind was reduced to the action of the physical brain and paranormal events were no longer possible.^{xiv} This has led to the contemporary understanding that the mind is simply the brain and identical in every respect to it.^{xv} Although positing the material brain as the sum total of the mind solves the body/mind problem, it does so at the expense of the non-material. Griffin's challenge was to re-introduce a non-material mind without re-introducing the problems of dualism. In a strictly dualistic view, mind and matter are ontologically different types of things that can never interact. Materialism solves that problem by eliminating mind and accepting only matter and the experience of the body as ontologically real.

Griffin, citing Whitehead, suggests that there are certain perceptions that are outside our physical experience. These include our perceptions of values, such as "truth", "beauty", and "goodness" as well as our knowledge of the past, which he suggests arises from our (nonphysical) memories of previous experiences.^{xvi} Memories are a particularly telling example of such nonphysical perceptions since our memories are "more or less creative reconstructions as well as prehensions of the past events as they really happened."^{xvii} He goes on to suggest that there are all sorts of things that we could not know if a strict sensationist theory of perception were true. These include the world beyond our personal experience, the past as real, our knowledge of nonmaterial values.^{xviii} Finally, he suggests that our experience of such perceptions can lead us to accept the hypothesis that sensory perception is not our only mode of perception.

Whitehead called this nonsensory mode of perception "prehension"^{xix} and suggested that all living beings, including one-celled organisms like bacteria and amoebas, have perceptual experiences, even in the absence of sensory organs. The upshot of accepting non-sensory perception is Griffin's suggestion that "those single-celled organisms that are our brain cells can receive influence from the mind because they can perceive, in a nonsensory way, the feelings and intentions of the mind."^{xx}

According to this theory, sense organs are not required for all types of perception, thus Griffin suggests, "if we were to find ourselves existing apart from our physical bodies, we would not be wholly devoid of perceptions"^{xxi} nor would we utterly be without the capability to act upon matter in the same way as (non-material) mind can act upon brain.^{xxii}

By allowing for the acquisition of non-sensory data and the action of the non-physical upon the physical, Griffin opens the door for the consideration of human existence apart from physical bodies. If the nonphysical mind can influence the physical body, then, Griffin argues, it is possible for other non-physical entities to assert such control as well. This allows for the possibility of ESP, PK, out-of-body experiences, near-death experiences, channeling and possession trance. While these phenomena are not a necessary part of his philosophy of panexperientialism they are not, a priori, excluded from it and thus can be investigated as legitimate (not fraudulent) phenomena.

If we can accept Griffin's panexperientialism as a theoretically possible worldview we have provided ourselves with a philosophically sound way in which to respectfully investigate spiritual and religious phenomena. Without accepting all such phenomena uncritically, we can begin our investigations from a position that allows for authentic religious and spiritual experiences. In the case of Santería possession events, we can work with participants to develop criteria for identifying potentially legitimate phenomena and, given the situation of a non-fraudulent event, describing and analyzing it.

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- ⁱⁱⁱ *Ibid.*, 46.
- ^{iv} In looking at possession trance in the Voodoo tradition, Deren for example, takes the first approach while Lewis takes the second (Deren, Maya. 1983 [1953]. *Divine Horsemen: The Living Gods of Haiti*. New Platz, NY: McPherson; Lewis, 1971).
- ^v Lewis, 1971, 195.
- ^{vi} *Ibid.*, 195.
- ^{vii} *Ibid.*, 200.
- ^{viii} *Ibid.*, 199.
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- ^{xii} *Ibid.*, 11.
- ^{xiii} *Ibid.*, 16.
- ^{xiv} *Ibid.*, 21.
- ^{xv} *Ibid.*, 113.
- ^{xvi} *Ibid.*, 137-38.
- ^{xvii} *Ibid.*, 137-38.
- ^{xviii} *Ibid.*, 141.
- ^{xix} *Ibid.*
- ^{xx} *Ibid.*, 142.
- ^{xxi} *Ibid.*, 143-45.
- ^{xxii} *Ibid.*, 145.

ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOSS: HAMLET'S GRIEF

Linda Kraeger
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Abstract

Shakespeare's Hamlet represents a case study of an individual who suffers loss while having no contemporary who can understand the depth of his grief. Emotionally, Hamlet has lost two homes. His first home consists of his mother, King Hamlet, and Uncle Claudius. Hamlet, like many contemporary people, must reframe and invent himself while his world changes before his eyes. Because a moral fog envelops his family of origin, so do his duties to them. What duty does he have to his father? Has Hamlet only imagined the ghost of his father, the King? If so, has he only imagined the King's call for dutiful revenge? Hamlet must invent his conscience or give it new context. He appears driven to call into question his second, his worldview.

In the character Hamlet, Shakespeare created a new kind of consciousness and therefore a new branch of human psychology that has a precursor in Romans 7.

In Shakespeare's *The Tragedy Hamlet, Prince of Denmark*, no one in the story seems to understand the profound loss that he suffers at multiple levels. He returns from the university at Luther's Wittenberg to learn that he no longer has a home that resembles the one of his youth. Malicious doubts surround the death of his father, King Hamlet. Uncle Claudius seems wholly different from the man Hamlet had earlier known. In many cultures, the family considers the uncle at least as important as the father, but what has Uncle Claudius done to the family? The uncle professes to want Hamlet to remain home and take his place as a member of the royal family. But how can Hamlet do so if Claudius has replaced him?

Moreover, the uncle has stripped Prince Hamlet not only of his political identity, but also much of his social identity. Ophelia rejects Hamlet's gifts and affection, and his two friends from the university prove so treacherous that he must kill them before they bring about his death. The ghost of his father the king leaves Prince Hamlet with the unnerving impression that his mother may lack the innocence he had ascribed to her. Though forbidding Hamlet to take actions against her, the ghost destroys her image. The prince must now face the question of his mother's role in her first husband's death. Did she know that Claudius had plans to murder his brother, her husband, and take the throne for himself? René Girard notes her silence during the younger Hamlet's tirade. What can she say, after all? For her, the two brothers seem so alike that she can remain indifferent (171). Whereas the son would raise his father to the sun, the mother sees him as a warrior on this planet, a warrior who probably took the throne through violence, a brother to Claudius, not only by blood but in blood since they equaled each other in treachery, a conclusion that the son finds abhorrent.

The younger Hamlet has lost three kingdoms. He will not succeed his father as King Hamlet, with Ophelia perhaps as his queen. Second, he teeters on losing his mind. Third, his cosmos, his world-order, his metaphysics, if you will, melts before his very eyes.

Only a few decades before Shakespeare completed *Hamlet*, Luther's voice had joined that of Roman Catholic leaders in denouncing Copernicus's cosmological revolution. Calvinists, Lutherans, Anglicans, and Catholics had viewed comets as manifestations of divine wrath. Around the time of Shakespeare's writing of *Hamlet*, Galileo built the first complete astronomical telescope. Luther, still steeped in medieval Catholic cosmology, regarded the winds as good or evil spirits. He believed that God kept several demons captive in a nearby pond (White 126, 212, 339). As a college intellectual, Prince Hamlet would have had to wrestle with the new cosmology while simultaneously contributing to a new psychology. Harold Bloom claims that Hamlet becomes "a dramatist of the self that surpasses St. Augustine, Dante, and even Montaigne; for that is Shakespeare's greatest invention, the inner self that is not only ever-changing, but also ever-augmenting." Bloom approaches saying that through grieving his loss and experiencing its anguish, Hamlet arrived at "the first absolutely inner self, which belonged not to Martin Luther but to William Shakespeare" (741).

How should Hamlet interpret the ghost: As a real entity, or a human residue from beyond the grave, or even a hidden residue of the prince himself, a demon in disguise tempting him to explore self-destruction? If the prince merely imagined the ghost, must he still heed the demand for blood revenge, an expectation of manhood in the Middle Ages? Many interpret the prince as going insane. Yet, what if his behavior only seems *bizarre* because he continually rethinks the sanity or insanity of an ancient tradition, the hoary duty of blood revenge? Princely duty has grown foggy Denmark. Normality comes into question, as does common sense. Along with "To be or not to be?" come questions about what in this whirling world has robbed him of a home base? If the planet spins, does morality spin, too, with no foundation? Should a prince serve to defend his home? But what if the enemy *is* his home? What honor comes from filial revenge if one's mother conspired in the murderous plot?

Hamlet's manhood is on the line. Or rather, it would be if he could find the line. Should he kill Uncle Claudius? But what if the ghost has practiced malicious deceit and falsely accused Claudius? By murdering Claudius, would Hamlet commit regicide, the very crime his uncle might have committed? Hamlet's hesitation has merit. Making his decision seems akin to shooting arrows while everything spins round and round.

Literary critic Harold Bloom says that Hamlet must now invent himself by overhearing himself (4-6 "Introduction"). But can he do so without simultaneously trying to reconstruct metaphysics. For self-invention does not happen *ex nihilo*. Shakespeare seems to have bestowed upon Hamlet his own mantle, his own awesome intellect. Hamlet has not so much lost his conscience as experienced a mental and emotional earthquake that has torn up the well-designed highways on which conscience once traveled smoothly. Conscience must have content as well as form.

Hamlet's feigned derangement represents but a temporary reflection of his deranged world, a world out of joint. And now he faces the cursed task of building a new metaphysic, a new intellectual-moral-emotional home. Where will he start? With himself? I am mad, therefore I am? I am *what*? In *relation* to what? But the relations are not what they seem. Hamlet feels not so much alienated from reality as at a *loss* as to how it all connects and relates. If reality were a text, he would ask, "What does it mean?" Is reason merely a pimp for desires? (III.iv). Is reality whatever one chooses to make of it, like figures in the clouds? A camel now? Later a weasel? A whale? (III.ii).

What does it mean when his uncle, perhaps a murderer, tries to cheer him. Such action seems perverse given the atmosphere of murder, thievery, and deception. How does a prince respond to

treachery committed by his dearest kin? How can Hamlet find a perspective when he lacks a home base for gaining perspective?

The questions that leap out like sparks from *Hamlet* land in the drama *King Lear* and burst into flame. The same metaphysical questions burn there so fiercely that Shakespeare must cast them in a pagan setting. Still, the questions burn out of control and invade Christian theology, challenging divine justice, goodness, and purpose. The question no longer concerns the happenings in Hamlet's castle or in Lear's castle. Rather, does it concern events Heaven? What are the gods up to? If nature with all its fury and impersonal power reflects the gods, then what can one say of the gods themselves?

Like Hamlet, Lear has lost not only his crown, but also his family. Two daughters have proved more treacherous than have his enemies. And, worst of all, Lear became his own worst enemy, demanding the verbal trinkets of love while scorning the true devotion of his daughter Cordelia.

Where Hamlet's intellect overpowers the stage and reaches out to the globe itself, Lear's passion rivals the natural elements in all their fury and rage. Whereas Hamlet cannot *prove* that Claudius has stolen the older Hamlet's life, crown and bed, Lear knows beyond doubt that he has played the fool and lost more than a kingdom. He knows that not even he, a former king, can find a court of appeal against two of his daughters who behave wretchedly toward him. He has lost, and, like Hamlet, suffers a flood of grief beyond description.

Hamlet finds most disturbing his mother's apparent lack of grief at the loss of her husband. It is as if husbands were like replaceable carriage wheels. Did her husband, Prince Hamlet's father, mean nothing to her personally? Where is *her* grief? Have women no heart? Ironically, before Hamlet's eyes, his mother, whatever her flaw, cannot but grieve as her son distances himself from her. She can almost see his disillusionment turn into dissolution. Even more ironically, Hamlet proves himself grossly incorrect in having accused Ophelia of a false heart, too. Like Hamlet, Ophelia, falls victim to grief, her own and Hamlet's. Her means of burying her grief serve to intensify Prince Hamlet's grief. Yet, who directly caused Ophelia's grief, but Hamlet himself? He had given into the call for revenge. In doing so, he accidentally killed Ophelia's father. The price of revenge went far beyond moral bookkeeping. The loss became incalculable and the grief unbearable.

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Sacrifice, Faith, and Freedom

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No science will give them bread as long as they remain free, but in the end they will lay their freedom at our feet and say to us: 'Better that you enslave us, but feed us.' They will finally understand that freedom and earthly bread in plenty for everyone are inconceivable together... There are three powers, only three powers on earth, capable of conquering and holding captive forever the conscience of these feeble rebels for their own happiness—these powers are miracle, mystery, and authority (Dostoevsky, 1990: 253, 255).

Introduction

When I began research on this paper according to my original plan, I envisioned a historical analysis of how the human conception of *freedom* in Western civilizations was and had always been based in matters of faith, as provided by the example of Protestantism in America. I initially sought to apply the ideas posited by Weber in his *Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism* and somehow parallel this endeavor to resemble another Weberian essay, *Class Status, Party*.

After reading and studying for some time in preparation for this endeavor, what began to emerge was not at all what I had initially envisioned. Instead, an overview of the many and varied conceptions of how people in different ages have defined *freedom* surfaced and how faith, belief, and the sacrificial nature of humankind have contributed to not only the definition and conception of *freedom* but the profound impact that these qualities have had on its restriction in history.

The story of Jesus in the Christian tradition in many ways ushered in the modern relationship between *sacrifice*, *faith*, and *freedom*. He died on the Cross as God's sacrifice so that all could be free of sin. Christians are to also have faith as the result of this Great Happening and come to understand how we are ultimately freer as the result of this Ultimate Sacrifice. What also must be acknowledged though, is that religion is not only tied to our own willingness to be sacrificial, but to our obligation to be obedient. Obedience suggests not only sacrifice, but also the willing loss of freedom. Throughout the ages, the concept of *freedom* has taken on multiple meanings, as evidenced by our traditional American concept of the term, but even to the levels of *freedom* being defined as *freedom from freedom* (that which is dependent on one's political, economic, and religious perspectives), *freedom* as a relative construct dependent on the culture and age in which it was found, to *freedom* being nothing more than propaganda, a myth, or a topic worthy of study by experienced students of semiotics.

What follows is an overview of the relationship between *sacrifice*, *faith*, and *freedom* as presented by theorists, philosophers, and Western scholars since the Enlightenment.

Weber's, *The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism*

Weber's *Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism* (1904) made clear the relationship between faith, individual freedoms, and human motivations. According to Weber, the Protestant Reformation indirectly caused the Industrial Revolution in Western society. As the result of Martin Luther's break with Catholicism, a new value system was instilled in early Protestants, including those not only of Lutheran origin, but among the Calvinists and other as well. This value system encouraged *hard work* (defined as fulfilling God's *calling* by Christians), *clean living* (to demonstrate that *one must be among the saved*, answering the question raised by the Calvinist concept of *predestination* and linked the avoidance of sin), and *frugality* (the notion of *avoidance of luxury* and *simple living* which not only contributed to resisting temptations, but lead to the reinvestment of small business profit back into the fulfillment of God's *calling*, resulting in economic growth and eventually, corporate structures and mass production techniques). With the Reformation, faith was transformed from a collective mindset toward a more individualistic relationship with God, the central tenet of many Protestant faiths today. Durkheim also supported the central notion, that Protestants undertake acts of faith more individually than Catholics, in his study of *Suicide* (1897). He found that Protestants were slightly more likely to commit suicide due to their relatively detached form of worship when compared with Catholics for whom suicide was not only a deadly sin, but often avoided due to the cohesive nature of the church, its structure, and collective worship.

Weber was also able, in his work entitled, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (1947), to demonstrate that while employers *gain* rights over a worker's personal freedom due to their subordinate position, such *unfreedom* does not necessarily extend to basic human freedoms. For instance, he concluded, echoing Rousseau, that if the state ever attempted to restrict non-human property rights, such restriction would ultimately "be combined with restrictions on personal freedom, with some form of unfree labour" (Weber, 1947: 49). As for its relationship to the *Protestant Ethic*, Weber stated that, "...for those involved in the fortunes of profit-making enterprises...[is]... significant as a proof of the individual's own achievement or as a symbol and a means of autonomous control over the individual's subject to his authority, or of control over economic advantages which are culturally or materially important to an indefinite plurality or persons—in a word, power" (Weber, 1947: 214).

Locke, the *Two Treatises of Government*, *Royalist Catholicism*, and Bastiat's *The Law*

John Locke stated that, "Adam was a *King from his Creation*... For whatsoever Providence orders, or the Law of Nature directs, or positive Revelation declares, may be said to be by *God's Appointment*." He goes on to say that "as soon as *Adam was Created*, he was *de facto* Monarch, because by *Right of Nature* it was due to Adam, to be Governor of his own *Posterity*. But he could not *de facto* be by Providence Constituted the Governor of the World at a time, when there was actually no Government, no Subjects to be governed..." (Locke, 1963: 186-7).

Locke believed that by Divine Intention, all men were masters of their own existence, bound only by the will and order of God, free from domination by others, and free to do what enhances one's own posterity so long as it is within the keeping of God's law. This view is

not altogether inconsistent with the French royalist Catholic view that God appoints Popes to govern religious matters on Earth while God appoints Kings to govern over political matters. In a strange, seemingly impossible synthesis, the two views share a common thread. The similarity naturally relates to the concept of faith, freedom and domination.

Two of the staunchest critics of the French Revolution were Louis de Bonald and Joseph de Maistre. Both longed for “the ‘good-old days’ of a pre-bourgeois era...,” a feudal order free from both industrialism and Protestantism, based on respect and obedience to authority, whether king or Pope, in short, to God’s will and to God’s chosen (Zeitlin, 1997: 58). The similarity occurs with the ideas of Locke (and even Weber and Marx to some degree) with the notion that the Industrial Revolution was inherently evil and responsible for depriving rather than enhancing individual freedoms and allowing one to manage one’s “own posterity.” According to Bonald, in the industrial era, “...everything is resolved for man in society to produce in order to consume and to consume in order to produce...” (Zeitlin, 1997: 58).

...[Bonald]... derided them for seeing industry as an independent force that guarantees peace and liberty, while, in fact, it was agricultural society that was in all respects superior to industrial society. “The agricultural family can feed and nourish itself—it is not dependent on other men and other social events to assure its continued existence. The industrial family, on the other hand, produces children whom it cannot be sure of supporting, dependent as it is on the vicissitudes of the market... The agricultural family respects the natural and divine order because the father is the authority, unlike the industrial system in which the father, mother, and children are isolated, and family unity is disturbed. Coupling harsh labor on children (which prevents their education and destroys their health) with discarding the weak and the old who cannot work, the industrial revolution divides society into hostile classes and factions while agrarianism had unified it” (Zeitlin, 1997: 58-9).

Similarly, de Maistre shared this concern in his own harsh commentary on science. “No religion can resist science, except one” [Roman Catholicism], (Bertrin, 1910: 2) [addition mine]. One celebrated passage discussing his view of science begins:

One of the inevitable drawbacks of science in every country, and every place, is to extinguish that love of action which is the true vocation of man; to fill him with sovereign pride, pervert him from himself and the ideas which are proper to him, to make him the enemy of all subordination, a rebel against every law and every institution, a born champion of every innovation... (Berlin, 1990: 120-1).

In essence, science and industry rob individuals of their freedoms rather than encourage self-reliance as is often cited as a merit of industrial and technological systems. Modernity invariably results in a loss of freedom, fleeting self-reliance, dependence, and the fracturing of faith, morality, family, and ultimately, the cultural unwillingness to accept responsibility and practice sacrificial acts of faith. In short, modernity results in new objects of worship—material goods, wealth, and so forth, while at the same time silently and covertly reducing

personal freedom. The intricate relationship between sacrifice, faith, and freedom is clearly evident. As Frederic Bastiat stated in his introduction and conclusion to *The Law*:

We hold from God the gift which includes all others. This gift is life—physical, intellectual, and moral life.

But life cannot maintain itself alone. The Creator of life has entrusted us with the responsibility of preserving, developing, and perfecting it. In order that we may accomplish this, He has provided us with a collection of marvelous faculties. And He has put us in the midst of a variety of natural resources. By the application of our faculties to these natural resources we convert them into products and use them. This process is necessary in order that life may run its appointed course.

Life, faculties, production—in other words, individuality, liberty, property—this is man. And in spite of the cunning of artful political leaders, these three gifts from God precede all human legislation, and are superior to it.

Life, liberty, and property do not exist because men have made laws. On the contrary, it was the fact that life, liberty, and property existed beforehand that caused men to make laws in the first place... liberty is an acknowledgement of faith in God and His works (Bastiat, 1990: 5-6, 75).

Bastiat's view is consistent with those of the founders and immigrants to America throughout its history and is expressed in a much more contemporary manner in the 1946 film, *Without Reservations*, which starred the famed American actor, John Wayne. Wayne's character, a Air Force pilot named Rusty Thomas attempts to refute the pro-government arguments in the book of a best-selling female author by making the following statement:

Have you ever heard of some fellows that first came over to this country? Do you know what they found? They found a howling wilderness, with summers too hot and winters freezing. And they also found some unpleasant characters who painted their faces. Do you think these pioneers filled out form number X277 and sent in a report saying the Indians were a little unreasonable? Did they have insurance for their old age, for their crops, for their homes? They did not. They looked at the land and the forests and the rivers, they looked at their wives, their kids, and their houses, and then they looked up at the sky and they said, "Thanks God. We'll take it from here! ... They were men..." (*Without Reservations*, 1990).

de Tocqueville: *Democracy in America*

Alexis de Tocqueville, author of *Democracy in America*, shared his thoughts and perceptions with the world concerning a political and social system he truly admired. Much of what de Tocqueville wrote concerned the union of religion and liberty in America:

The Americans combine the notions of Christianity and liberty so intimately in their minds that it is impossible to make them conceive the

one without the other; and with them this conviction does not spring from the barren, traditionary faith which seems to vegetate rather than to live in the soul... The philosophers of the eighteenth century explained in a very simple manner the gradual decay of religious faith. Religious zeal, said they, must necessarily fail the more generally liberty is established and knowledge diffused. Unfortunately, the facts by no means accord with their theory... in America, one of the freest and enlightened nations in the world, the people fulfill with fervor all the outward duties of religion... In France, I had almost seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom marching in opposite directions. But in America I found they were intimately united and that they reigned in common over the same country... (de Tocqueville, 1945: 317-19).

In seeking to explain this phenomena, de Tocqueville offered a comparative examination of religion in America with that found in Europe. What he concluded was that in Europe, religions were often united with governments in a kind of civil union. (Rousseau, for example, could not envision a society that did not have a religion and even if such a thing was possible, it was the duty of government to provide a civil religion for the purpose of allowing citizens to worship a deity.) He found the difference in America and Europe rested in the fact that America did not only have a constitutional provision relating to freedom of religion but also the notion of separation of church and state. Where religion was not intricately tied to the state, and where citizens were free to worship in their chosen faith, the notion of freedom and religious fervor were entirely compatible:

Man alone... displays a natural contempt for existence, and yet a boundless desire to exist; he scorns life, but he dreads annihilation. These different feelings incessantly urge his soul to the contemplation of a future state, and religion directs his musings thither. Religion, then, is simply another form of hope, and it is no less natural to the human heart than hope itself. Men cannot abandon their religious faith without a kind of aberration of intellect and a sort of violent distortion of their true nature; they are invincibly brought back to more pious sentiments. Unbelief is an accident, and faith is the only permanent state of mankind. If we consider religious institutions merely in a human point of view, they may be said to derive an inexhaustible element of strength from man himself, since they belong to one of the constituent principles of human nature.

I am aware that at certain times religion may strengthen this influence, which originates in itself, by the artificial power of the laws and by the support of those temporal institutions that direct society. Religions intimately united with the governments of the earth have been known to exercise sovereign power founded on terror and faith; but when a religion contracts an alliance of this nature, I do not hesitate to affirm that it commits the same error as a man who should sacrifice his future to his present welfare; and in obtaining a power to which it has no claim, it risks that authority which is rightfully its own. When a religion founds its empire only upon the desire of

immortality that lives in every human heart, it may aspire to universal domination; but when it connects itself with a government, it must adopt maxims which are applicable only to certain nations. Thus, in forming an alliance with a political power, religion augments its authority over a few and forfeits the hope of reigning over all...

In America, religion is perhaps less powerful than it has been at certain periods and among certain nations; but its influence is more lasting. It restricts itself to its own resources, but of these none can deprive it; its circle is limited, but it pervades it and holds it under undisputed control (de Tocqueville, 1945: 321, 323).

With a bias toward his own Catholicism, de Tocqueville defended the Roman Church against the notion that it, by nature, was an anti-democratic faith. He was forced to admit though, that Protestantism was less concerned about equality among men and more concerned with freedom and individual liberty:

I think that the Catholic religion has erroneously been regarded as the natural enemy of democracy... [it]... seems to me, on the contrary, to be one of the most favorable to equality of condition among men.. If Catholicism predisposes the faithful to obedience, it certainly does not prepare them for inequality; but the contrary may be said of Protestantism, which generally tends to make men independent more than to render them equal. Catholicism is like an absolute monarchy... (de Tocqueville, 1945: 311).

In a sense, de Tocqueville was correct. In reviewing the works of, de Maistre, Maurras, and Marcelino Menendez-Pelayo, one finds the common theme of the necessity of authority wielded by the Church in order to unify, restore, and make faithful all potential followers. The rhetoric is inherently nationalistic, restorative, and traditionally Catholic. Many scholars give credit to de Maistre as being the theoretical founder of fascism, while Pelayo is credited with being the "lay saint of the *falange*" (Rock, 1993: 11). (It is also easily observed that all the notable right-wing dictators in twentieth-century Europe and the Americas were all Catholic or rose to power in predominantly Catholic nations [including Hitler, Franco, Mussolini, Peron, Pinochet, and others].) Yet, all intensely religious nations have normally adhered to a pattern of sacrifice, faith, and freedom, regardless of how *freedom* was defined.

Conclusions: Hayek, Cioran, Spengler

Friederich Hayek (1944) quoted Mussolini in his vibrant work entitled, *The Road to Serfdom* who said that, "We [the Italian Fascists] were the first to assert that the more complicated the forms assumed by civilization, the more restricted the freedom of the individual must become" (Hayek, 1994: 49). Many never consider the implications of freedom and security as incompatible according to Hayek. For instance:

Where distinction and rank are achieved almost exclusively by becoming a salaried servant of the state, where to do one's assigned duty is regarded as

more laudable than to choose one's own field of usefulness, where all pursuits that do not give a recognized place in the official hierarchy or a claim to a fixed income are regarded as inferior and even somewhat disreputable, it is too much to expect that many will long prefer freedom to security... Once things have gone too far, liberty indeed becomes almost a mockery, since it can be purchased only by the sacrifice of most of the good things of this earth. In this state it is little surprising that more and more people should come to feel that without economic security liberty is "not worth having" and that they are willing to sacrifice their liberty for security (Hayek, 1994: 145-6).

Of course, one's *freedoms* include those religious freedoms of which *sacrifice* is paramount. As Benjamin Franklin stated, "Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."

Whereas in America religion has constitutionally been granted a position separate from the state, Jefferson, Adams, Madison, Franklin, and others intended that our collective efforts be matters of faith and basic state security while all other endeavors be geared toward individualism, liberty, innovation, competition, and success: "The government that governs least, governs best." In keeping with this notion, there is a good deal of truth, according to Hayek, in Reinhold Niebuhr's book entitled, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932), in which he says there is "an increasing tendency among modern men to imagine themselves ethical because they have delegated their vices to larger and larger groups." Hayek explains:

To act on behalf of a group seems to free people of many of the moral restraints which control their behavior as individuals within the group... It is therefore no accident that... most planners are militant nationalists... the separation of economic and political aims is an essential guaranty of individual freedom and... it is consequently attacked by all collectivists... What is called economic power, while it can be an instrument of coercion, is, in the hands of private individuals, never exclusive or complete power, never power over the whole life of a person. But centralized as an instrument of political power, it creates a degree of dependence scarcely distinguishable from slavery (Hayek, 1994: 159-61).

Echoing thoughts from de Tocqueville, Bastiat, and even Bonald, Hayek concluded that the collective use of power in a political form is inherently socialistic, nationalist, and anti-religious. Even private economic power directed into the political sphere can steer social policy and create dependence for various groups of people who must sacrifice their liberties for the provided security, and among those sacrifices, religion and morality are often included. The socially-conscious philanthropic wealthy, the media, the social and political idealists, and the social engineers and planners naturally fall on the side of social justice and security rather than on the side of individual liberty, property rights, rewarded success, and religious faith.

An observation was once made by philosopher-scholar Emile Cioran while reading Johannes Eckhart's *Sermons*. Cioran read that suffering is intolerable to one who suffers for himself, but is light to one who suffers for God, because it is God who bears the burden, though it be heavy with the suffering of all mankind. He commented that he could

understand such a phrase “for it perfectly applies to one who can never relieve himself of all that weighs upon him” (Cioran, 1992: 11-2). Thus, the sacrificial element of faith is exposed. When one acknowledges the compatibility of faith and sacrifice, individual freedom, albeit aloneness at times, may be preserved without the collective intrusion of the state or other entity who may provide security or needs while depriving one of freedom and liberty. Cioran also brought to light one of the most notable phrases from de Maistre (from his *Considerations*) explaining the difference in Christianity and bondage, and one that demonstrates the believer’s tolerance, acceptance, and promotion of religious principles:

We are all attached to the throne of the Supreme Being by a supple chain that binds but does not enslave us. What is admirable in the universal order of things is the action of free beings under the divine hand. Freely enslaved, they function at once by will and by necessity: they really do as they wish, but without being able to upset the general plan (Cioran, 1992: 31).

The final words on sacrifice, faith and freedom comes from the historical, philosophical, and even prophetic vision of German historian Oswald Spengler, as extracted from his *Decline of the West*. Spengler proclaimed:

Only the timeless is true... truths lie beyond history and life, and vice versa life is something beyond all causes, effects, and truths... Religious knowledge, too, is power—man is not only ascertaining causations, but handling them. He who knows the secret relationship between microcosm and macrocosm commands it also, whether the knowledge has come to him from worship or by eavesdropping... he compels the deity through sacrifice and prayer; he practices the true rites and sacraments because they are causes of inevitable results, and whoever knows them, him they must serve. He reads in the stars and in the sacred books; in his power lies, timeless and immune from all accident, the causal relation of sin and propitiation, repentance and absolutions, sacrifice and grace... we can understand the ultimate meaning of religious ethics—Moral... Moral is a conscious and planned causality of the conduct, apart from all particulars of actual life and character, something eternal and universally valid, not only without time, but hostile to time and for that very reason true. Even if mankind did not exist, moral would be true and valid... (Spengler, Vol.2, 1928: 171-2).

What Spengler suggests here is that the religious nature, composed of *truths* and *morality* (which are one and the same) is *power*. *Power* can also be defined as *freedom*, can it not? Notice also that Spengler states that *moral*, “apart from all particulars of actual life and character” is *true*. Thus, we may conclude that that which interferes with the practice of faith is a vexation to the Spirit and in essence, *false*. He continues:

... it was creative enthusiasm in the man of the city that from the tenth century B.C. drew generation after generation under the spell of a new life, with which emerged for the first time in human history the idea of *freedom*... the freedom-idea [for]ever contains a negative... it loses, redeems, defends,

always frees a man *from* something... [All] intellectual, social, and national movements [that burst forth]...under the name of Freedom leads back to an origin... (Spengler, 1928: 354) [additions mine].

And, in conclusion,

There is no natural science without a precedent religion... even atheistic science has religion; modern mechanics exactly reproduces the contemplativeness of Faith...

There is no justification of assigning to this intellectual form-world [the natural sciences] the primacy over others. Every critical science, like every myth and every religious belief, rests upon an inner certitude. Various as the creatures of this certitude may be, both in structure and in sound, they are not different in basic principle. *Any reproach, therefore, leveled by Natural science at Religion is a boomerang* [Emphasis mine]. We are presumptuous and no less in supposing that we can ever set up "The Truth" in the place of "anthropomorphic" conceptions, for no other conceptions but these exist at all. *Every idea that is possible at all is a mirror of the being of its author* [Emphasis mine]... Each Culture has made its own set of images of processes, which are true only for itself and only alive while it is itself alive and actualizing its possibilities. When a Culture is at its end and the creative element—the imaginative power, the symbolism—is extinct, there are left "empty" formulae, skeletons of dead systems, which men of another culture read literally, feel to be without meaning or value and either mechanically store up or else despise and forget... (Spengler, Vol. 1, 1926: 381-2).

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The Differential Social Influence of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religiosity on Self-Esteem Among Undergraduates in Southern Arkansas

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Abstract

Through the utilization of a questionnaire data was acquired from college students during the spring semester of 2000. The findings of this social research supports the hypotheses that intrinsic religiosity tends to foster positive self-images or high self-esteem more strongly than extrinsic religiosity. Research findings indicate intrinsic religiosity more powerfully impacts self-esteem among females in comparison to males. Conversely, extrinsic religiosity was found to be meaningfully associated with self-esteem among males but irrelevant in predicting levels of self-esteem among coeds.

According to Baron and Byrn (1994, P. 179) self-esteem refers to the self-evaluations that each individual makes. A person expressing high self-esteem believes himself or herself to be fundamentally good, capable, and worthy; low self-esteem is a view of oneself as useless, inept, and unworthy. At any given time self-esteem refers to one's own evaluations of oneself rather than to the reactions or characteristics of others. Vander Zanden (1987, P. 165) refers to self-esteem as the personal judgments we make of our own worth. Self-esteem is indeed an important aspect of our self-conception and in fact some social psychologists often employ these terms synonymously. Vander Zanden asserted people's self-esteem tends to be influenced by the comparisons we make of ourselves with others.

Chris Mruk (1996) had structured programs to improve self-esteem. His programs consisted of a ten-hour course, and it relies on what are now familiar cognitive restructuring techniques. Most of these techniques have the client to list at least fourteen positive qualities about his or her self and to review those qualities every evening and every morning, and once the people review the qualities over and over it will allow their feelings about themselves to depend on the things they wrote on the list and will most likely have a more positive outlook on their self. The clients with low self-esteem believed that their positive qualities did not make them feel any better about themselves no matter how often they looked at those qualities, but he hoped that by the clients with low self-esteem looking at those qualities would help them to incorporate a more positive self outlook toward themselves.

Gorsuch's (1994) refers to intrinsic religious behaviors as those that are internalized and subjectively real, where extrinsic religious behaviors are those directed toward achieving other goals. Intrinsic religious' commitments refer to motivation for experiencing and living one's religious faith for the sake of faith itself. A person's religion is an end to itself, which allows person's goal to be pursued in the absence of external reinforcement.

Burris and Jackson (1999) conducted a study on the intrinsic religiosity and response to partner abuse. The sample included ninety undergraduate volunteers, which consisted of sixty-six women, twenty-three men, and one with no sex indicated from a medium-sized university in southwestern Ontario, Canada. There were thirty-six Protestants, twenty Catholics, sixteen Agnostics, and eighteen subjects of other religious faiths that were enrolled in one of several introductory level religious courses. The questionnaires administered had several items of measurement from Allport's and Ross's (1967) Intrinsic Scale as well as their Extrinsic Scale along with Batson and Schoenrade's (1991b) Quest Scale and C. T. Burris and Tarpley's (1998) Immanence Scale. The formats for each scale were very similar in using a scale score of 1 as strongly disagree, and 9 as strongly agree in their response format. If a person, who has been abused, marries someone who is very religious they will tend to eventually become more

interested in religion themselves. The results of the research also revealed that abused victims would be more likely to refuse marriage because of religious reasons and the higher their intrinsic orientation would be linked to their perceptions. In contrast, the victim refuses marriage because she thinks that she is a lesbian, higher intrinsic orientation predicts greater liking of the individual. In this finding of combination liking the perpetrator suggest that perpetrator may have been seen as a victim of sorts by intrinsically religion. In identifying some of the contextual influences of tolerance toward abuse the research allows people to assess the viability to interpret the frequency observed by positive correlation of homosexual. Intrinsic religious wasn't related with either liking the victim or justifying that person's marriage refusal when she confessed only that she might be a lesbian, therefore there was no direct relationship between loving and hating the victim.

Tesser and Moore (1988) conducted a study on the independent threats and self-evaluation maintenance model. The model is based upon the assumption that people are motivated to maintain a positive self-evaluation. The self-evaluation model consists of three components: (1) their closeness, (2) their performance, and (3) the extent to which the performance is on a dimension perceived to be important to one's self-definition meaning relevance. The first two components working together would help a person to determine the magnitude of their response. There was a study conducted that consisted of 32 male students who were recruited from introductory psychology classes at a large state university to participate in a study entitled "Personality and Performance." With each of the 31 males bringing a friend with them there was a total of 62 participants in the study. The participant was told that the study investigated the relationship between a particular personality trait and the performance on a test, which measured the knowledge in a particular area. Upon completion of the measure the students filled out the Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor, 1953), and the Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). The reason why the participants were asked to bring a friend was so that they could measure the closeness. They figured that the participant would ask a real close friend of theirs. The result was that the 32 men who were picked out scored lower than their friends did. The major hypothesis of this particular study was that the self-evaluation maintenance process serves as an integrated part of a larger self-system. We assumed that people with low self-esteem or high in anxiety might experience a greater level of threat than their friends who are high in self-esteem and low in anxiety.

In the article by Juhasz (1989) self-esteem is based on our conception of our own worthiness, which is determined not only by self-perceptions but also by interpretations of feedback from significant others. The consistency, stability, and clarity of aspects of self-esteem can be expected to vary depending upon situational demands, potency of needs, and availability of resources for coping. For a person to be label as significant others the person must be able to relate to the development of self-esteem, in which two basic conditions must be met. One of the conditions is that the individual must give the information and it can't be anyone else. The second condition is that the research must have the right questions in which it will allow the individual own unique reaction to appear. In conclusion, the research found that older children tend to describe there self in terms of relationship. The same thing was found with seventh and eighth graders and among the freshmen of the university.

According to Hunter's article that loving yourself is at the heart of living, loving, and growing-meaning that if you don't love yourself it will be very difficult for you to love other people. If you love yourself then life problems and goals wouldn't be so hard to accomplish or solve. The message from this article is that young people should realize that the foundation of goodness is to love oneself. If a person has low self-esteem it can keep a person from achieving their goals in life. It can also keep one from seeing the good side of others and prevent one from

a solid relationship with anyone. We have moral education to help change people for the better and to help improve the quality of life in society.

Methodology

The data for this research was derived from a cross-sectional survey utilizing a purposive availability sampling technique. Questionnaires were administered to seventy-five undergraduates of both sexes at various locations on a campus at a university in southern Arkansas. The scale used for measurement on intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity was derived from, "Toward Motivational Theories of Intrinsic Religious Commitment," (Gorsuch, 1994) Measures for self-esteem were derived from sociologist Morris Rosenberg (1965, p. 305). The Likert technique was used in scoring the items. Frequency distributions were used to convert the interval level information into ordinal categories by dividing the sample up into three, roughly equally sized categories for each of the scaled variables.

Analysis and Findings

The hypothesis in this present study is that a direct relationship exists between intrinsic religiosity and self-esteem. Table 1 represents a bi-variate contingency table between these two variables.

Table 1. The Relationship Between Intrinsic Religiosity and Self-Esteem

Self-Esteem	Intrinsic Religiosity			
	Not Very	Moderately	Highly	Total
High	19% (5)	36% (9)	46% (11)	(25)
Medium	35% (9)	32% (8)	29% (7)	(24)
Low	46% (12)	32% (8)	25% (6)	(26)
	Gamma = .31 Chi-Square = 5.5265, 4df, p>.10 Double Chi-Square = 9.0728 4df, p<.10			
Total	(21)	(25)	(24)	(75)

The information from the above table reveals a direct relationship existing between these two variables. This relationship supports the research hypothesis that as the level of intrinsic religiosity increases, the level of self-esteem also increases. The Gamma value of .31 indicates the existence of a moderate direct relationship. However, the Chi-Square value of 5.5265 was insufficient enough to reject the null hypothesis at the .10 level of statistical significance. Doubling cell frequencies resulted in the null hypothesis being rejected at the .10 level with the calculated chi-square value being almost high enough to reject the null hypothesis at the .05 level

of statistical significance. In comparing the percentage distributions of the dependent variable for each of the categories of intrinsic religiosity, a direct relationship can be discerned. For example, whereas less than one fifth (19%) of the subjects who were not very intrinsically religious scored high relative scores on self esteem, almost half (46%) of the intrinsically religious scored high on self-esteem. Conversely, while almost half (46%) of the subjects who were not very intrinsically religious scored low on self-esteem, only one fourth of the highly intrinsically religious scored in the low category of self-esteem.

Since the content of sex roles continues to be significantly different in American Society partially as a result of differential socialization, one might sociologically suspect the influence of intrinsic religiosity on self-esteem to vary between the sexes. As a result, the researchers conducted an elaboration analysis concentrating on the association between intrinsic religiosity and self-esteem in an attempt to discern whether similar or disparate associations between these variables could be identified between the sexes. Table 2 and 3 conveys the resulting partials and statistical values.

Table 2. The Relationship Between Intrinsic Religiosity and Self-Esteem Controlling for Gender.

Self-Esteem	Intrinsic Religiosity			
	Females			
	Not Very	Moderately	Highly	Total
High	20% (4)	41% (9)	50% (10)	(23)
Medium	25% (5)	32% (7)	30% (6)	(18)
Low	55% (11)	27% (6)	20% (4)	(21)
	Gamma = .40 Chi-Square = 6.7888 4df, p>.05 Double Chi-Square = 13.578, 4df p<. 05, p<. 01			
Total	(20)	(22)	(20)	(62)

Table 3. The Relationship Between Intrinsic Religiosity and Self-Esteem Controlling for Gender.

Self-Esteem	Intrinsic Religiosity Males			
	Not Very	Moderately	Highly	Total
High	17% (1)	0% (0)	25% (1)	(2)
Medium	67% (4)	33% (1)	25% (1)	(6)
Low	16% (1)	67% (2)	50% (2)	(5)
	Gamma = -.33 Chi Square = 3.234, 4df, p> .05			
Total	(6)	(3)	(4)	(13)

Information from the above partial contingency table clearly indicates the relationship between intrinsic religiosity and self-esteem to be significantly different between the sexes.

Among coeds, the direct association between intrinsic religiosity and self-esteem that was observed in the bivariate table continued to be manifested. In fact, the association between the variables was found to be stronger among females as illustrated by statistical values as well as percentage distribution in this partial. The gamma value of .40 in the partial was somewhat stronger than the value of .31 derived from bivariate analysis. Furthermore, the calculated chi-square value of 13.578 with cell frequencies doubled was found to be very statistically significant, sufficient enough to reject the null hypothesis at the .01 level. Analyzing the data from this partial also reveals a significant direct association between the independent and dependent variable. Only 20% of the coeds scoring high on intrinsic religiosity indicated having low levels of self-esteem. Put another way, while only 20% of the coeds who were not very intrinsically religious had high self esteem, half of the highly intrinsically religious women indicated high levels of self esteem.

In contrast, when a comparison is made between the findings in the original bivariate table and the partial among male subjects, it is observed that the direct relationship that was found in the bivariate analysis disappears among the male subjects. The data clearly indicates no direct association between the variables. In fact the above contingency table as well as the gamma value of -.33 would indicate a possible inverse relationship. The chi-square value of 3.234, suggests no real relationship exists between the presumed independent and dependent variables. Since this sub sample size is so small, the validity of any conclusion should be questioned and any statement made being taken with a grain of salt.

Analysis indicates a specification type of elaboration model is manifested in the data in that the relationship is strengthened in one partial (coeds) and disappears or takes a different form in the other (males).

The second primary hypothesis incorporated in this research was that extrinsic religiosity is directly related to self-esteem. Table 4 represents a bivariate contingency table between these two variables.

Table 4. The Relationship Between Extrinsic Religiosity and Self-Esteem

Self-Esteem	Extrinsic Religiosity			
	Not Very	Moderately	Highly	Total
High	26% (6)	36% (10)	38% (9)	(25)
Medium	35% (8)	25% (7)	37% (9)	(24)
Low	39% (9)	39% (11)	25% (6)	(26)
	Gamma = .16 Chi-Square = 2.161, 4df, p> .05			
Total	(23)	(28)	(24)	(75)

Although comparing the relative distribution of self-esteem among the categories of extrinsic religiosity reveals a direct association between the two variables, it is clear that the relationship between extrinsic religiosity and self-esteem is comparatively much weaker than the association between intrinsic religiosity and the dependent variable. For example, the gamma value of .16 indicates at best only a moderately weak association. In fact, the chi square value of 2.161 was insufficient to reject the null hypothesis at any meaningful level of statistical significance, suggesting these variables may not be meaningfully associated with each other.

Since gender may influence the associations between these variables, this third variable was incorporated as a control variable. Table 5 and 6 conveys the research findings when partitioned on gender.

Table 5. The Relationship Between Extrinsic Religiosity and Self-Esteem Controlling for Gender-Females.

Self-Esteem	Extrinsic Religiosity Females			
	Not Very	Moderately	Highly	Total
High	24% (4)	33% (8)	43% (9)	(21)
Medium	35% (6)	25% (6)	38% (8)	(20)
Low	41% (7)	42% (10)	19% (4)	(21)
	Gamma = .26 Chi Square = 3.766, 4df, p>.05			
Total	(17)	(24)	(21)	(62)

Table 6. The Relationship Between Extrinsic Religiosity and Self-Esteem Controlling for Gender-Males.

Self-Esteem	Extrinsic Religiosity Males			
	Not Very	Moderately	Highly	Total
High	20% (1)	25% (1)	0% (0)	(2)
Medium	40% (2)	50% (2)	50% (2)	(6)
Low	40% (2)	25% (1)	50% (2)	(5)
	Gamma = -.20 Chi-Square = 1.459, 4df, p>.05			
Total	(5)	(4)	(4)	(13)

Information from the above partial tables reveals the possibility of very different relationships existing between extrinsic religiosity and self-esteem for the sexes. Among the female subjects, contingency analysis would tend to indicate a direct relationship possible existing between extrinsic religiosity and self esteem. Whereas only 24% of the coeds who were not very extrinsically religious scored high on self-esteem, 43% of the women in this sample indicating a high level of extrinsic religiosity also indicated high levels of self-esteem. Conversely, while a substantial proportion (41%) of the coeds who were not very extrinsically

religious scored low on self-esteem, less than one fifth 19% of the very extrinsically religious indicated losing low levels of self-esteem. The gamma value of .26 also supports a moderate direct association between these two variables. Having said this, the calculated chi-square value of 3.766 was clearly insufficient to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between the two variables in question.

Since the number of males in this research project was so small any statement concerning this sub sample must be highly speculative, having said this, it is nevertheless interesting to note an inverse association was observed between extrinsic religiosity and self-esteem

Summary and Conclusions

This social research project provides partial support for the hypothesis that intrinsic religiosity is generally directly related to self-esteem. Multivariate analysis implies a specification type of elaborating model since the direct relationship between intrinsic religiosity and self-esteem was stronger among female subjects and non-existent or possibly inverse among males.

Extrinsic religiosity was found to have at best a weak association with self-esteem. When partitioning data based upon gender, the form of association between the two variables was significantly different for the sexes in a similar pattern that was discerned with intrinsic religiosity and self-esteem. That is, where a moderately direct association was found between extrinsic religiosity and self-esteem among coeds, an inverse association was observed among the male subjects.

Further research dealing with these variables may provide clarity in reference to the actual existent form. Since this research project had so few male subjects, it would be of value to dissolve if subsequent studies with a larger sample of males would confirm the very tentative findings conveyed in this research.

Appendix

Items Used to Assess...

Self-Esteem – Positively Stated (+) – Negatively Stated (-)

- + 1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.
- + 2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
- 3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
- + 4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
- 5. I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.
- + 6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
- + 7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
- 8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
- 9. I certainly feel useless at times.
- 10. At times I think I am no good at all.

Intrinsically (In) and Extrinsic (Ex) Religiosity – All Positively Stated

- Ex 11. What religion offers me most is comfort when sorrows and misfortune strike.
- In 12. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.
- Ex 13. The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life.
- In 14. My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life.
- In 15. The prayers I say when I am alone carry as much meaning and personal emotion as those said by me during services.
- Ex 16. The church is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships.
- Ex 17. I pray chiefly because I have been taught to pray.
- In 18. Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life.
- Ex 19. The primary purpose of prayer is to gain relief and protection.
- In 20. It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and meditation.

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The Relationship Between Intrinsic Religiosity, Extrinsic Religiosity, Religious Maturity, Sex-Role Orientation and Attitudes Toward Abortion Among Undergraduate Coeds in Southern Arkansas

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In utilizing a questionnaire, information was obtained from female college students at a university in southern Arkansas during 1999 and 2000 calendar years. The data proved to be useful in revealing a statistically meaningful inverse association between intrinsic religiosity and attitudes toward abortion. Furthermore, this research discovered religious maturity to be an even more powerful prediction of attitudes toward abortion than intrinsic religiosity. Finally, this research was unsuccessful in discerning any meaningful associations between extrinsic religiosity and attitudes toward abortion nor sex-role orientations and attitudes toward abortion.

The major impact of the Reformation in shaping Protestant attitudes on abortion is rarely mentioned in traditional history until the twentieth century. In the Supreme Court ruling in 1973, *Roe versus Wade* and *Doe versus Bolton* due process guarantees American women the right to obtain medically safe abortions. In the face of national concern over the ethics of abortion, a great number of public debates are drawn between those who would outlaw abortion as an immoral act equal to murder and those who would oppose such legislation as an offense to self-determination. Both women and men face many agonizing conflicts when making reproductive decisions. Many decisions are based on various moral and personal choices that can be socially influenced by such factors race, religion, and sex-role orientation.

In 1990, Nancy K. Parsons, Geoffrey D. Kanter, and Herbert C. Richard studied 230 college students to measure how people view abortion. This research contained 30 Likert-type items that reflected right to life and pro-choice arguments. The researchers used three interrelated core beliefs in support of the position for right to life: a fetus is viable human being, abortion is the moral equivalent of murder, and only God is entitled to make such life and death decisions. Secondly, researchers used three interrelated beliefs for the pro-choice perspective: human life begins at birth, a fetus is an extension of the mother, and abortion is an essential aspect of a woman's right to self-determination. Consequently, the factor pattern was replicated. Scores ranged from -40 to +40 on a single, reliable ($\alpha = .94$) continuum. This research gives support that using Reasoning about the Abortion (RAQ) is a valid method to gather data concerning this topic and predicting positions taken on this issue.

In 1991, Karen Dugger's research displayed that supporters and opponents of legalized abortion held conflicting beliefs about family, motherhood, and sexuality. This study was based primarily upon the responses of white women. It illustrates that attitudes toward sex, family, and gender issues are much weaker predictors of black than white women's position on legalized abortions. The primary goal of this research paper was to compare the correlation between black and white women's attitudes toward abortion. There was a significant difference of opinion from black and white women that consistently demonstrate white women were more likely than black women to support legal abortions. The study conceptualized race as producing a different set of experiences that influences how members of each group interpret political and social realities. Attitudes concerning sexual morality, family, and gender-roles were both related to black and white women's support for legalized abortion. The strengths and patterns of relationships were race-specific. The data presented in this study also demonstrate the need to pay more attention to the diversity of experiences among women and their attitudes toward abortion.

Gordon Allport's concepts of "intrinsic religion" and "extrinsic religion" have been important in current research on religion and prejudice. The questionnaire used included 30 items, eight with the highest item-to-scale correlation and 22 other items. The inner type or intrinsic motivation involves the use of religion as a personality support or help in a crisis. It coincides with the comment that in some

cases religion is used as a "crutch." The outer type extrinsic motivation involves the use of religious membership and participation for social purposes such as meeting the right people, gaining social standing, or acceptance in the community. The two types appear quite different and the distinction may be helpful in many studies to provide a measurement of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Extrinsic religiosity was visible and would tend to uphold their judgements in validation studies.

In 1993, Janice Weslund Bryan and Florence Wallach Freed conducted a study in the Boston area regarding student's attitudes toward abortion. The study consisted of 150 community college students (80 females and 70 males). The researchers made comparison between anti-abortion students and pro-choice students. The findings indicated that anti-abortion attitudes are consistently related to race, religion, and education. The anti-abortion students had more religiosity, believed abortion was murder, were more punitive toward the woman and medical personnel involved, were less sexually active, and less likely to know someone who had an abortion than the pro-choice students did. The ages of the students ranged from 18 to 49. The sample broken down in the following manner: 18-24 years (87%), 25-29 years (18%), 30-34 years (6%), 35-39 years (4%), and 40-49 years (2%). The ethnicity of students being studied was Caucasian (95%), African American (2%), Hispanic (1%), and Asian (1%). The religious denominations of students were Catholic (70%), Protestant (18%), Atheist/Agnostic (4%), Greek Orthodox (2%), Jewish (2%), and other (3%). Researchers indicate a sociological frame of reference as to why there were differences in attitudes toward abortion. They found that pro-abortion women tend to be upper middle class, achievement oriented and sensing a greater need to control their reproduction in order to compete with men in the work world. In contrast, the anti-abortion women tend to be less educated, married young, and have larger families.

Tedrow and Mahoney, study the short-term trends in attitudes toward abortion. The over-all trend between these time periods in attitudes in abortion for 1972-76 show an increase in approval for reasons for an abortion. Males were found to be more approving of abortion than females. Some substantial differences were found between educational groups from the most approved to the least approved reason for abortion with the lower educational group being the most disapproving. Occupational prestige revealed patterns of approval similar to that of education. The lower occupational prestige groups show to be least approving of abortion. Great differences existed between Catholics and Protestants with Protestants being much more approving than Catholics. Church attendance was found to be inversely related to approval of abortion. This was of great importance since it covers a time when the United States that was facing many major changes in the status of legal abortions.

Nancy Felipe Russo and Amy J. Dubal (1997) did a study of relationships of abortion and childrearing to well being. They used 1,189 African American women and 3,147 Caucasian women. The researchers discovered that education, income, and having a work role were positively and independently related to well being for all women. Although an intensive examination of data was conducted controlling numerous variables including comparisons of African American women versus Caucasian women, Catholic women versus Non-Catholic women and women who had abortions versus other women who had not. The findings found the experience of abortion played a negligible independent role in women's well being after an abortion, regardless of race or religion. This study concludes that more education, income, and having a work role had significant and independent influences on women's well-being, regardless of race, whereas larger family size had an independent negative influence to well-being for Caucasian women.

In 1972-1978, The National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey incorporated data related to study factors on abortion. Part of the research was conducted before the Supreme Court decision of Roe and Doe. The increasing liberalization of attitudes toward legalized abortion and change around 1975 becoming more conservative. By 1978, the trend of conservatism became even more established. Comparing the data of respondents by age, sex, and educational characteristics, great differences between the 1960's and 1970's occurred. During the sixties, older people who were most liberal in their abortion attitudes were male and highly educated. While during the seventies, the male and female differences changed dramatically to the younger people becoming more liberal in their attitudes than the older people.

In 1982, Michael W. Combs and Susan Welch conducted a study entitled, "Blacks, Whites, and Attitudes Toward Abortion" in the Public Opinion Quarterly. This research was conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago from 1972 to 1980. The researchers used data from the General Social Survey (GSS). These surveys used national samples of 1,500 respondents each year except for 1979. This article examined the significant patterns of Caucasian and African American differences toward abortion. Six standard questions were measured ranging from: defect in the baby, the mother's health seriously endangered from pregnancy, the result of rape, wanting no more children, very low income, she is not married and does not want to marry. These measures were taken for each year. The research concluded that African Americans are less likely to favor abortion in all six instances. Another factor correlates that religious participation makes racial differences between Caucasians and African Americans. There is a correlation between attitudes toward abortion, religion, and church attendance. The research found that Catholics and frequent church attenders were more opposed to abortion than infrequent churchgoers. "In addition, in the black community, the church may represent a strong tie to the traditional African American culture." If African Americans attend church more often and are more committed to traditional religious practice, this may also be an explanation of the racial difference.

Randall King, Steven Myers, and Dennis Byrne demand model that was applied to a nationally representative sample of unmarried, pregnant teenagers drawn from the National Longitudinal Surveys to identify the economic determinants of abortion. Since the Roe versus Wade Supreme Court decision, there has been an enormous increase in the number of young women having legal abortions. The demand for abortion, especially among unmarried teenage women, is examined in this research to understand the extent to which economic factors have played in the individual's decision to give birth or abort. Economic variables in the study included predicted wages, local area unemployment rates, other family income, poverty status, and school enrollment. Other factors that played a significant role were age, ethnicity, and religiosity. In general, young women in favorable economic conditions were substantially more likely than others to abort a pregnancy. These findings should do away with the myth that abortions are more likely to occur in the lower economic status.

Methodology

This Research project was based upon a cross-sectional survey utilizing a purposive availability sampling technique. The purposive availability sample was taken from two hundred undergraduate female students at a university in southern Arkansas. The questionnaire took approximately ten minutes to administer. Four scales were used for measuring the four variables. A Validated Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1972, 11:369-376. Sex-Role Orientation Scale Items by Brogan and Kutner, Journal of Marriage and the Family, 1976, Vol.38:31-40. Religious Maturity Scale, Review of Religious Research, 1990, Vol. 32: No.2, 103. The Likert technique was used in scoring the items. As Allport stated, "Religion is useful for people in providing security, solace, sociability, and distraction, status and self-justification." In contrast, a person typified as highly intrinsically religious is one who truly lives by and for his/her religion and beliefs. Religiosity the independent variable is defined using the following dimensions: Religious beliefs or attitudes toward the importance of church affiliation. Religious maturity, the independent variable will measure religious beliefs. In other words as intrinsic religiosity increases attitudes toward abortion become negative.

Analysis and Findings

The fundamental hypothesis in this present study is that an indirect or inverse relationship exists between intrinsic religiosity and attitudes toward abortion. Table 1 represents a bi-variate contingency table between these two variables.

Table 1. The Relationship between Intrinsic Religiosity and Attitudes toward Abortion

Attitudes Toward Abortion	Intrinsic Religiosity			
	Not Very	Moderately	Highly	Total
Strong Attitudes	62% (19)	42% (18)	38% (33)	(70)
Moderate Attitudes	39% (16)	29% (20)	26% (24)	(60)
Low Attitudes	15% (06)	44% (30)	38% (34)	(70)
	Gamma= -0.128 Chi Square= 11.1, 4 df, p < .05			
Total	(41)	(68)	(91)	(200)

The calculated gamma value of -1.28 indicates the existence of a relatively weak but nevertheless relevant weak inverse association between the two variables. The calculated Chi-Square value of 11.1 was sufficiently high enough to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship at the .05 level of statistical significance. In observing the percentage distribution of attitudes toward abortion for the different categories of intrinsic religiosity, a meaningful relationship between these two variables can be clearly demonstrated.

For example, while 62% of coeds who were not very intrinsically religious manifested strong pro-abortion attitudes, only 38% of the high intrinsically religious did so. In contrast, while only 15% of the not very intrinsically religious revealed a pro-life position, 38% of the highly intrinsically religious indicated rather negative attitudes toward abortion or in other words took a rather strong pro-life orientation.

The second primary hypothesis incorporated in this research was that extrinsic religiosity is inversely related to attitudes toward abortion. Table 2 represents a bi-variate contingency table between these two variables.

Table 2. The Relationship between Extrinsic Religiosity and Attitudes toward Abortion

Attitudes Toward Abortion	Extrinsic Religiosity			
	Not Very	Moderately	Highly	Total
Strong Attitudes	33% (22)	41% (26)	32% (22)	(70)
Moderate Attitudes	35% (24)	25% (16)	30% (20)	(60)
Low Attitudes	32% (22)	34% (22)	38% (26)	(70)
	Gamma= -0.04 Chi Square= 2.42, 4 df, p >.05			
Total	(68)	(64)	(68)	(200)

Unlike the observed inverse relationship existing between intrinsic religiosity and attitudes toward abortion, information from the above table indicated no meaningful association existing between extrinsic religiosity and attitudes toward abortion. This is indicated by the relatively meaningless calculated gamma value of $-.04$. Furthermore, the calculated Chi-Square value of 2.42 was quite distant from the value needed to reject the null hypothesis at the .05 level of statistical significance with 4 degrees of freedom (9.488). In fact, the calculated Chi-Square value insufficient to even reject the null hypothesis of relation at the .50 level.

Contingency analysis also reveals no linear relationship existing between these two variables. For example about one third of both the not very extrinsically religious indicated strong attitudes favoring abortion. The differences between the categories of extrinsic religiosity take a pro life position were also found to be negligible. About one third of both the not very extrinsically religious (32%) and the moderately extrinsically religious (34%) manifested negative attitudes toward abortion. The differences between the moderately extrinsically religious (34%) and the very extrinsically religious responding in a pro-life fashion was also found to be relatively insignificant. Since these forms of religiosity are differentially associated with attitudes toward abortion, it might be insight to test another religious variable.

The following bi-variate table represents the continuous analysis between religious maturity and attitudes toward abortion. The hypothesis that religious maturity is inversely related to attitudes toward abortion in Table 3.

Table 3. The Relationship Between Religious Maturity and Attitudes toward Abortion

Attitudes Toward Abortion	Religious Maturity			
	Not Very	Moderately	Highly	Total
Strong Attitudes	38% (14)	45% (37)	23% (19)	(70)
Moderate Attitudes	49% (18)	20% (16)	32% (26)	(60)
Low Attitudes	13% (05)	35% (29)	45% (36)	(70)
	Gamma= -0.28 Chi-Square 19.92, 4 df, p < .05, p < .01, p < .001			
Total	(37)	(82)	(81)	(200)

In contrast to Extrinsic Religiosity, the above table reveals a quite significant inverse relationship existing between religious maturity and attitudes toward abortion of $-.028$ indicates a very meaningful inverse association existing between these two variables. The calculated Chi-Square value of 19.92 was found to be quite significant to reject the null hypothesis at the .05 level of statistical significance. In fact this calculated Chi Square value was high enough to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship not only at the .01 level but even at the .001 level of statistical significance a 4 degrees of freedom (18.465 was the critical value).

In comparing the percentage differences with reference to attitudes toward abortion across the categories of religious maturity a clear and significant inverse relationship is revealed in analysis. While 38% of the coeds who were classified as not very religiously mature indicated strong favorable attitudes toward abortion or pro-life position, less than one fourth (23%) of the religiously mature women endorsed a strong pro-abortion position. Put another way, while only 13% of the not very religious mature women responded with very negative position toward abortion or pro-life position, almost half (45%) of the religiously mature coeds responded in a very pro-life fashion strong opposing abortion.

A clear and significant inverse relationship is revealed in analysis. While 38% of the coeds who were classified as not very religiously mature indicated strong favorable attitudes toward abortion or pro-choice position, less than one fourth (23%) of the religiously mature women endorsed a strong pro-abortion position. In other words, while only 13% of the not very religiously mature women responded with a very negative position toward abortion or pro-life position, almost half (45%) of the religiously mature pro-life fashion strong opposing abortion.

Table 4. The Relationship Between Sex-Role Orientation and Attitudes toward Abortion

Attitudes Toward Abortion	Sex-Role Orientation		
	Modern	Traditional	Total
Strong Attitudes	37% (36)	31% (18)	(70)
Moderate Attitudes	31% (30)	32% (32)	(60)
Low Attitudes	33% (32)	37% (38)	(70)
	Gamma= 0.10 Chi-Square= 0.793, 3 df, p > .05		
Total	(98)	(102)	(200)

In contrast to what the researchers were expecting to find, the above table indicates that sex-role orientation does not dramatically influence attitudes toward abortion. As expected, women with a modern sex-role orientation were more favorable attitudes toward attitudes toward abortion than women incorporating a more traditional sex-role orientation. However, the differences to say the least were far from dramatic. While 31% of the women with a traditional sex-role orientation had strong favorable attitudes toward abortion, and 38% of the coeds with modern se-role orientations took strong pro-choice positions. In other words, while 37% of the sample with a traditional sex-role orientation had very negative attitudes toward abortion, a similar percentage 33% of the women with a modern sex-role orientation took a strong pro-life position,

The calculated statistics also tend not to support any causal relationship between sex-role orientation and attitudes toward abortion. The Gamma value of .10 indicates at best a weak relationship between the presumed independent and dependent variables. The calculated Chi Square value was so low that the null hypothesis of no relationship could not even be rejected at the .80 level of significance much less the .05 level.

Summary and Discussion

The findings of this social research project supports the hypothesis of a causal inverse relationship existing between intrinsic religiosity and attitudes toward abortion. Another variable, that of religious maturity, was found to have an even stronger impact on attitudes toward abortion.

One major reason for expecting these variables to influence negative attitudes toward abortion affecting a pro-life value position was based upon a Biblical foundation. There are Biblical scriptures, which imply that, in addition to or behind the biological source of procreation, God created each human. For example Job 31:15 states "Did not He Who made me in the womb make [my servant]? And did not one fashion us both in the womb?" Proverbs 14:31 states "He who oppresses the poor reproaches, mock

and insults his Maker, but he who is kind and merciful to the needy honors Him.” Proverbs 17:5 being with “Whoever mocks the poor reproaches his Maker.” Malachi 2:10 begins with “Have we not all one Father? Has not one God created us? Isaiah 49:1 states “The Lord has called me from the womb, from the body of my mother He has named my name.” Isaiah 44:2 begins with “Thus says the Lord who made you and formed you from the womb.”

Another Biblical foundation for expecting these variable relationships to exist is based upon a scriptural view indicating God’s position on the taking of innocent human life. Although a scriptural basis may exist to support God condemning killing the guilty, this does not apply to the innocent. In fact, Proverbs indicates that God concedes such acts an abomination. Proverbs 6:16 and 6:17 states “These six things the Lord hates; indeed seven are an abomination to Him: A proud look [the spirit that makes one overestimate himself and underestimate others], a lying tongue, and hands that shed innocent blood.” Among natural human beings, what category of humanity could be considered more innocent than the unborn?

This research formed extrinsic religiosity to be unrelated to attitudes toward abortion. Although this finding was not expected, in some ways it was not all that surprising. That is, since motivation of the extrinsically religious is to use religion for social purpose such as gaining status and acceptance in the community, one taking a strong pro-life position might hinder one’s status and acceptance in contemporary American society in which many view a strong pro-life position or being “politically incorrect.”

Surprisingly, this research failed to reveal any clear association between sex-role orientation and attitudes toward abortion. The researchers were expecting women with a modern sex-role orientation to have significantly more favorable attitudes toward abortion in comparison with those coeds manifesting a more traditional sex-role position. Since a modern sex-role position tends toward endorsing greater freedom and rights for women, this position might reasonably encourage the right of a woman abort her own offspring. Although women with a modern sex-role orientation were somewhat more likely to have more favorable attitudes toward abortion, the differences were not great enough to conclude a real association exists between sex-role orientation and attitudes toward abortion. Possibly some third variable may be suppressing a real relationship existing between these variables. Multivariate analysis controlling for test variables would need to be conducted for such a conclusion to be reached. Possibly further analysis with the data collected in this research might be done and presented in a subsequent article. Finally, it should be noted that all analysis in the research was of a bi-variate form. In order to eliminate some other plausible explanations and add support that the observed associations are causal in nature, multivariate analysis would need to be conducted.

Appendix

Items Used to Assess...

- + 1. Abortion is a matter of personal choice.
- 2. Abortion violates an unborn person’s fundamental right to life.
- 3. Abortion is the destruction of one life for the convenience of another.
- + 4. A woman should have the right to decide to have an abortion based on her own life circumstance.
- 5. Even if one believes that there may be some exceptions, abortion is still basically wrong.
- + 6. If a woman feels she can’t care for a baby, she should be able to have an abortion.
- 7. Abortion can be described as taking a life unjustly.
- + 8. A woman should be able to exercise her rights to self-determination by choosing to have an abortion.
- + 9. The idea of young girls participating in Little League baseball competition is ridiculous.
- + 10. It is more important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to have a career herself.

- + 11. The husband should take primary responsibility for major family decisions, such as the purchase of a home or car.
- 12. Women should not feel inhibited about competing in any form of athletics.
- 13. The use of profane or obscene language by a woman is no more objectionable than the same usage by a man.
- + 14. Unless it is economically necessary, married women who have preschool age children should not work outside the home.
- 15. A husband should not feel uncomfortable if his wife earns a larger salary than he does.
- 16. Women should be able to compete with men for jobs that have traditionally belonged to men such as being a physician.
- + 17. Even though a wife works outside the home, the husband should be the main breadwinner and the wife should have the responsibility for running the household.
- 18. Marriage is a partnership in which the wife and husband should share the economic responsibility for running the household.
- + 19. If I were to join a church group I would prefer to join the Bible study group rather than a social fellowship.
- + 20. My faith involves all of my life.
- + 21. One should seek God's guidance when making every important decision.
- + 22. The prayers I say when I am alone carry as much meaning and personal emotion as those said by me during service.
- + 23. Church is important as a place to go for comfort and refuge from the trials and problems of life.
- + 24. Sunday morning can often be spent more profitably than in regular churchgoing.
- + 25. Religion helps to keep my life balanced and steady in exactly the same way as my citizenship, friendship, and other memberships do.
- + 26. One reason for my being a church member is that membership helps to establish a person in the community.
- + 27. Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in life.
- + 28. Although I am a religious person, I refuse to let religious considerations influence my everyday affairs.
- + 29. My faith sometimes restricts my actions.
- + 30. Nothing is as important to me as serving God as best I know how.
- 31. Churches should concentrate on proclaiming the gospel and not become involved in trying to change society through social and political action.
- 32. I could not commit myself to religion unless I was certain that it is completely true.
- 33. My religious beliefs are pretty much the same today as they were five years ago.
- + 34. Important questions about the meaning of life do not have simple or easy answers; therefore faith is a developmental process.
- + 35. As best I can determine, my religion is true, but I recognize that I could be mistaken on some points.
- + 36. My religious beliefs provide me with satisfying answers at this stage of my development, but I am prepared to alter them as new information becomes available.
- + 37. I consider myself to be a religious person.

The Likert Scale Format was used in scoring the items. The positively stated items scored in the following manner:

VSA (very strongly agree) = 6
 SA (strongly agree) = 5
 A (agree) = 4
 U (undecided) = 3

D (disagree) = 2
 SD (strongly disagree) = 1
 VSD (very strongly disagree) = 0

The negatively stated items were scored in the following manner:

VSA (very strongly agree) = 0
 SA (strongly agree) = 1
 A (agree) = 2
 U (undecided) = 3
 D (disagree) = 4
 SD (strongly disagree) = 5
 VSD (very strongly disagree) = 6

Questions 1,4,6,8 are positively stated items related to attitudes toward abortion.

Questions 2,3,5,7 are negatively stated items related to attitudes toward abortion.
 (Range 0-48).

Questions 9,10,11,14,17 are positively stated items related to sex-role orientation.

Questions 12,13,15,16,18 are negatively stated items related to sex-role orientation.
 (Range 0-60)

Questions 19, 20, 21, 22, 29, 30 are positively stated items related to intrinsic religiosity about women religious beliefs.

Questions 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 are positively stated items related to extrinsic religiosity about women religious beliefs.

(Range 0-72)

Questions 34, 35, 36 are positively stated items related to religious maturity.

Questions 31, 32, 33 are negatively stated items related to religious maturity.
 (Range 0-36)

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